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Dissertation Abstract
Community Members’ Perspectives on the Thurgood Marshall Academic High School
Riot: A Case Study of the Effects of Embedded Law Enforcement in High School
Despite studies by legal and social-justice organizations pointing to connections
between school-based police referrals and arrests that lead youth (particularly of color)
into the juvenile-justice courts and criminal courts and are funneling students of color
into the school-to-prison pipeline, schools increasing use school resource officers (SROs)
in programs on K–12 campuses. Much of the academic literature about SROs in schools
highlight the rationale for placing programs in urban schools from the perspectives of
policymakers, legislators, members of the juvenile- and criminal-justice systems, and
school district officials. Limited scholarly work documents the voices of impacted
members of school communities (educators, students, and families) bearing the
ramifications of SROs and school-based policing programs placed on their campuses.
The San Francisco Unified School District’s Thurgood Marshall Academic High
School (TMAHS) “October 11, 2002 Police Riot” holds a place in U.S. public school
history. It is the second largest law-enforcement response (126 officers) to a K–12
facility, for a “nonweapon” school fight, escalated to a riot by the increase in SROs on
the campus.
A narrative, qualitative research approach was used for this study that involved 10
one-on-one interviews with former members (students, educators, and parents) of the
TMAHS Community. Research findings revealed that participants recognized the
TMAHS era in three distinct phases: (a) Pre-10/11, (b) 10/11, and (c) Post 10/11, and
then (d) the overall impact that TMAHS and the 10/11 riot had on their lives. Factors that
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motivated participants to become deeply invested in TMAHS were the school’s clear
collaborative education philosophy and the notion that if students of color were given the
right tools, success was more than possible but wholly probable. Reflections pointed to
factors that shifted the school’s philosophy under new school leadership that
implemented harsh zero-tolerance policies and tripled the number of SROs on campus.
This research yielded recommendations for professional practice and key
questions that should be asked of and discerned from a broad spectrum of potentially
impacted school community members before placing SROs or embedding armed lawenforcement officers on a school’s campus. Additional recommendations were to reassess
zero-tolerance policies, removing school-based law-enforcement personnel from the
student disciplinary process, and implementing a restorative-justice-and-practices model
for community-harm accountability, reconciliation, and reduction for school community
members. Finally, developing an ongoing system of accountability measures and data
monitoring would ensure that racialized behaviors and bias tensions are eliminated from
interactions between law-enforcement officers and school community members.
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CHAPTER I
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
In September of 2002, the San Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) alerted
the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) that a gun fight was ensuing between rival
students at Washington High School (see Map 1, #1) on the northwest side of San
Francisco. The police department responded to the incident with one squad car.
Washington High School had 2,390 students enrolled at the time (California Department
of Education [CDE], 2017), with a predominately Asian and Caucasian student body. A
week later, another student altercation occurred: a knife fight with students at Lincoln
High School (see Map 1, #2) with about 2,560 students enrolled (CDE, 2017), also on the
northwest side of San Francisco and also with predominately Asian and Caucasian
student body. The SFUSD alerted the SFPD, which responded by sending six officers
(N’T. Lee, 2004) to the scene. On October 11, 2002, an on-campus SFPD school resource
officer (SRO), stationed at Thurgood Marshall Academic High School (TMAHS), located
on the southeast side of San Francisco (see Map 1, #3), alerted SFPD that there was a
nonweapon school fight between some African American boys (Fuentes, 2013). The
TMAHS student population had a more even spread of diversity between Asian, African
American, and Latino students.
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Map 1
Locations of George Washington (#1), Abraham Lincoln (#2), and Thurgood Marshall
Academic High Schools (#3) in San Francisco, CA.

Note. Washington, Lincoln and Thurgood Marshall high schools in San Francisco, by
Google.com, 2018, retrieved from https://www.google.com/maps/search/washington
,+lincoln+and+thurgood+marshall+high+schools+in+San+Francisco,+CA/@37.7575548,
-122.5088421,12z/data=!3m1!4b1
The response by local law-enforcement agencies to that riot was to send 126
armed police in special-weapons-and-tactics gear and sheriffs in riot and tactical gear
with helicopter support. The San Francisco Fire Department was called to the scene as
well as ambulatory support. These first responders descended on Thurgood’s small high
school campus with an enrollment of 1,150 (CDE, 2017) and surrounded blocks in the
neighborhood (Office of Citizen’s Complaints [OCC], 2004). Upon their arrival at the
school, the police immediately took command of the school building and staff, as the
authority onsite, for what was understood to be a nonweapon school fight (OCC, 2004).

3
Students and their families and teachers, whose comments appeared in a series of
newspaper articles featured in The San Francisco Chronicle and other local papers,
attested to their incredible dismay of racial slurs and police brutality experienced by
Black and Latino students at the hands of the riot police descending on their school
campus and disrupting what would have been a relatively normal school day, if school
administrators had been managing a school fight and the students involved (Delgado,
2002; Delgado, Van Derbeken & Asimov, 2002; Gordon, 2004). The primary concern
repeated reflected singularly on the following question: How could a nonweapon school
fight devolve into the SRO-led law-enforcement melee that enveloped the Thurgood
Marshall community on October 11, 2002?
Based on the sociopolitical climate of U.S. cities from the 1980s through the
2000s, renewed declarations of the war on drugs, gangs, and criminal behavior turned its
gaze toward youth, particularly youth of color, with the dawn of the superpredator
phenomenon. Zero-tolerance policies and tough-on-crime laws were enacted to support
harsh penalties for the smallest infractions. All municipalities (rural, suburban, and
urban) governed through crime, used ordinances embraced by politicians and media
outlets as a reaction to the fear-mongering. However, urban areas, along with targeted
Black and Brown youth, became a focal point, bearing the brunt of law enforcement’s
wrath. These policies became the overarching rationale for school policymakers,
legislators, and members of juvenile-justice systems to justify the placement of SROs in
public schools. In urban areas, high concentrations of youth of color were targeted as part
of the gang and drug element, broadening their criminal reach into schools.
Much of the literature about SROs and the SRO programs in U.S. schools focused
on highlighting the rationale for placing SRO programs in urban schools from the
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perspectives of policymakers, legislators, members of the juvenile- and criminal-justice
systems, and school-district officials. Several Gun Free and Anti-Gang Initiatives enacted
at the federal level in throughout the 1990s served as legislative responses to juvenile
crime. A multitude studies by legal and social-justice organizations (Brown, 2015b;
Donohue, Schiraldi & Ziedenberg, 1998; Ghandnoosh, 2014, 2015), attempted to
ascertain and verify the deliberate and definitive cause-and-effect connections that stem
from school-based police referrals and arrests leading into the juvenile-justice, criminalcourt, and, eventually, prison systems (Goldsmith, 2016; Petteruti, 2011).
To better understand the City of San Francisco, its School District and Law
Enforcement, along with TMAHS’s universe at the time of the 10/11 riot and what could
have led to an event that shocked the city, it becomes necessary to offer some school
background and describe the nouveau-like renaissance environment of modern day San
Francisco in the 1990s and 2000s.
TMAHS was previously Pelton Middle School (San Francisco NAACP, 1983, p.
22) with a regular maximum student capacity of about 800 students. Over the summer of
2002, the school had grown to between 993 and 1,150 students, due to the closing of
neighboring McAteer High School in the spring of 2002 (Fuentes, 2013; N’T. Lee, 2004;
TMAHS-SARC, 2002). TMAHS used the higher 280 graduation requirement to account
for remediation-course offerings that many incoming students needed to reach grade
level. The higher credits also allowed students college-entry readiness with the
completion of the A-G Course Requirements (University of California, 2017) upon
graduation from TMAHS, and gave students more opportunities to take advancedplacement and honors courses by the time many reached their senior year.
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By the start of the 2002 school year, SFUSD leadership and board of education
eliminated the higher graduation-credit requirement at TMAHS from a 280-unit
graduation requirement to the districtwide 230 units and the sophomore class had already
begun its credit trajectory. Also, over the summer of 2002, the entire senior
administrative staff had been replaced. The principal and two vice principals were
completely new to the school, the student body, school staff, and the families of TMAHS
(N’T. Lee, 2004). The new administrators were not indoctrinated into the unique collegegoing culture of the school, nor did they comprehend the deep relationships of many
families with the staff, regardless of cultural or ethnic background. Their struggle to
blend, mix, and mingle with students, staff, and community was palpable. TMAHS was a
multicultural school (CDE, 2017) in a tightly knit community.
Additionally, during the summer in 2002, hundreds of McAteer students were
assigned and transferred into TMAHS without attending the traditional Thurgood
Marshall Way Summer Bridge Program (TMAHS SARC, 1997). Since the school’s
inception, the staff at TMAHS created a summer bridge program, grade-level specific, to
help incoming students adapt to the block class schedule, assess remediation needs if any,
and conform to the widely accepted college-going culture that existed at the school.
Parents or students’ guardians agreed to support students’ attendance and future
college career by signing a symbolic pledge as an incoming member of the TMAHS
Community. The sophomore class of 2002 was the last class of TMAHS students to
participate in the 2001 Summer Bridge Program. Last, by the start of the school year in
2002, the school had replaced the well-known and respected SRO with two SROs who
were new to the school and surrounding community. The former SRO respected the staff,
students, and families and received their respect in return. However, it was also common
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knowledge that the SRO preferred remaining primarily stationed at the nearby Southern
Police Station in Bayview, which was a brisk 10-minute walk downhill from the school.
The SRO only came to campus to handle issues that required a police officer’s attention.
In 2002, the entire TMAHS Community, except any incoming transfer and freshman
students, knew this SRO’s philosophy and peace-officer interactions with students
(Fuentes, 2013).
The newer SROs on campus had no relationships with the staff or students, nor
did they have an opportunity to “summer bridge” into the school culture. The new SROs
were also told by school administrators that the school had racial tension between African
American and Asian students, though those tensions had not existed in the history of the
school. However, in a meeting that took place just before the school year began, the new
principal noted to the Parent Teacher Student Association, “the problem being with the
Black students” (Fuentes, 2013, p. 172). After the riot, in a press conference, Captain
Puccinelli of Southern Station in Bayview summarized the circumstances as a series of
fights that began just before school started Friday morning, when one youth was attacked
by a group of 10 to 15 students outside the school. That attack precipitated a big fight,
and the two officers in the school were overwhelmed (Delgado et al., 2002). However,
several teachers and students said police had used their batons, grabbed the hair of
students involved in the melee, and handcuffed innocent youths. “They were acting as if
this was a riot, but it was not at the riot stage,” said Hartzog, a teacher at Marshall for 5
years. “The whole thing could have been resolved calmly, without having officers here in
force” (Delgado et al., 2002).
In 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) introduced the Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in Schools Program (“Police in schools,” 2016; DOJ,
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2016) to SFUSD through the Police Department and the City and County of San
Francisco budgeting process by fully funding 26 armed SFPD SROs throughout SFUSD
secondary schools (Fuentes, 2013). Although California school districts were
experiencing deep budget cuts for student-support-service needs, such as counselors and
school nurses, if coupled with the COPS program, schools could receive fiscal allocations
for the counselors and nurses they had requested, along with an SRO as a part of the
support-services package (SFUSD, 2003). Law enforcement, when referring to the COPS
program, have called themselves those much-needed extra pair of hands for school
counselors or the deemed keepers of the peace for administrators by their presence on
school campuses (Greer, 2015; Wald & Thurau, 2010).
Statement of the Problem
School-community narratives from students, educators, and families about the
SRO programs and policing activities in urban schools has largely been absent from
scholarship. Therefore, a deep need exists to explore, through the school community’s
voice, their impressions of the SRO program and policing activities at one specific high
school: TMAHS in San Francisco.
Background and Need for the Study
The TMAHS riot of October 11, 2002 was a catastrophe waiting to happen. All
elements of a racially charged police melee were present, contributing to a moment that
forever changed the life course of hundreds of TMAHS students, their families, and the
educators working at the school. Nevertheless, having the elements of the melee present
did not mean the riot had to happen.
The need for this study stemmed from decades-long negative interactions between
K–12 students of color and policing agencies placed in their schools. When the decision
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place law-enforcement officers in schools by various policymakers, the missing voices of
the impacted community (particularly students of color, their families, and teachers)
rarely has been deeply considered. The following background illustrates the volatile
result of education and municipal leadership’s combining (a) the driven implementation
of zero=tolerance school and community policies, with (b) a sanctioned and enabled
police force on campus, and then (c) turning an intentional deaf ear to the school
community’s concerns regarding the detrimental effects of the aforementioned on
students’ academic and emotional well-being.
Some of San Francisco’s most noteworthy civic bureaucracies have been deeply
intertwined for several decades. Each entity’s actions impacted the others’ over the years
with significant implications and ramifications. Evidence of this could not have been
made clearer than in the early part of the 21st century through a recapitulation of the
sociopolitical climate of and relationship between the City of San Francisco, the SFPD,
and the SFUSD. Adding to the overall climate of San Francisco’s early 21st-century
existence is the history of TMAHS, connecting the school’s origins to the 1983 U.S.
Northern District Court’s Consent Decree from the national landmark case of the San
Francisco Chapter of the NAACP versus the SFUSD and the Post-911 training mandates
for law enforcement in municipalities across the United States.
In 2002, San Francisco had 3 African Americans in the most prominent positions
of leadership in the jurisdiction of city and county. The Mayor, Willie L. Brown,
reelected in 1999, was nearing the end of his second term and had recently appointed the
Chief of Police, Prentice Earl Sanders. Arlene Ackerman, hired in 2000 by a vote of the
Board of Education of the SFUSD, was Superintendent of Schools.
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Mayor Willie Brown
Mayor Willie Lewis Brown, was elected Mayor of San Francisco in a run-off
election on December 12, 1995, beating incumbent and 1-term Mayor Frank Jordan.
Brown had closed out a successful, yet tumultuous 31 years in the California State
Assembly. He resigned his post as Speaker of the Assembly to become what he
proclaimed as the pinnacle of his political career, requesting to no longer be Mr. Speaker
but rather Mr. Mayor to all who knew him (Richardson, 1996).
Throughout his mayoral campaign, Brown combatted many foes he had acquired
in his time in the state assembly: politicians ready to repay Brown for hard-fought battles
and losses, business entities that did not get a coveted contract, and investigative
journalist who could not make allegations stick to him. However, Candidate Brown
continued working in Sacramento, laying the ground for younger Democrats, in case he
won in San Francisco, so his legacy and work could carry the party forward, including
awarding lucrative government contracts. Brown had out-campaigned his opponent by
working the neighborhoods of San Francisco and phone banking with friends from
Sacramento and family members from across the United States. He gained endorsements
from candidates eliminated in the November election, which led to his victory in the
December 1995 run-off. In the press, Brown avoided incendiary topics like the
concluding O. J. Simpson trial and the Million Man March in Washington D.C., while
carefully ensuring not to offend the LGBT community or other San Francisco power
brokers from the Asian, Jewish, arts, and downtown-business communities (Richardson,
1996).
By December 12th, Brown had built a relationship with San Francisco’s citizens,
and the media referred to Brown as “Da Mayor,” acknowledging his new national
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platform as “an instant spokesman for urban America” (Richardson, 1996, p. 391). On
December 13, 1995, Brown said “I enjoy everything I do, and I do it with glee. I’m not
into doom and gloom. I’m into happiness. I hope San Francisco takes on my style and my
attitude” (Richardson, 1996, p. 389). The local press responded, as The San Francisco
Examiner’s inauguration request titled
Sunrise over a Stylish New S.F. … Please do not change a bit in office, Willie.
Keep those beautiful women on your arms. Keep going to the Academy Awards.
Keep wearing that yellow silk tuxedo. We’ve had enough “citizen mayor”
baloney. We want a real mayor, a slick politician who is funny and fearless, who
charms us and who makes us proud when he goes on “Nightline” or “Letterman.”
San Francisco is a royalist city without a royal family. You’re it for the next four
years. (Richardson, 1996, p. 404)
Brown would remain a towering force, politically and socially, in San Francisco, well
beyond the end of his second term, which ended in 2004. Brown’s weekly Sunday
column in The San Francisco Chronicle, the city’s only mainstream media print
newspaper, continues in 2017, entitled Willie’s World.
Chief of Police Earl Sanders
Prentice Earl Sanders moved to San Francisco in the 1950s, working odd jobs
while attending high school and playing football during the day. After graduation,
Sanders went into the military and continued working odd jobs until he took the SFPD
officer’s examination, passing with high marks (Reiterman & Glionna, 2003). However,
the police force in San Francisco was highly segregated throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
with no Asians or women and only two Latino officers. Also, the force had a preference
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for White officers in hiring and for nearly all promotional opportunities in the
department. African Americans in the SFPD formed Officers for Justice in 1968 to
advocate for better wages, assignments, and a change in the racial composition and hiring
practices of the department (Williams, 2014).
In 1971, Robbery Inspector Earl (as he had become known) Sanders became a
homicide detective, gaining respect after solving several homicide cases, as well as
working to solve the infamous zebra-killing attacks and murders. The zebra killings were
a series of racially motivated, yet seemingly random attacks and murders in the early
1970s that had been terrorizing San Francisco (Reiterman & Glionna, 2003). However,
because there was little movement by the 1970s in the SFPD in promoting Blacks or
hiring Latinos, Asians, and Women, the Officers for Justice sued the
City & County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Police Department, and the
Civil Service Commission for its failure to recruit and hire minorities.
Announcement of the suit opened the flood gates and overnight the Officers For
Justice’s lawsuit was joined by the National Organization of Women, Chinese For
Affirmative Action, the NAACP and other Latino and Japanese community
organizations
achieving class-action status (Williams, 2014, para 6) and won. The SFPD, assigned a
special monitor by the judge, began to transform hiring and promotion practices. Sanders
had risen in police ranks to become Assistant Chief of Police to Chief Fred Lau in the
1990s. In Mayor Brown’s second term, he needed to search for a new Chief of Police to
replace retiring Chief Lau. Assistant Chief Sanders was next in line and, in the summer of
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2002, became the first African American Chief of Police in the City and County of San
Francisco (Reiterman & Glionna, 2003).
Superintendent Arlene Ackerman
Arlene Ackerman began her education career by ascending through education
positions as a classroom teacher, then transitioning to school administration as a middle
school principal in St. Louis, then to district-administration ranks. She was recruited by
The Seattle School district recruited her in 1992 to join their district administration and,
in the late 1990s, she moved to Washington D.C. to eventually become the
Superintendent of Schools. While Ackerman was building leadership skills, San
Francisco’s public schools were struggling with school-segregation issues and
inequitable-education opportunities for African American students, settled by lawsuits
and an ongoing Consent Decree implementation measures (Orfield et al., 1992).
In 2000, Ackerman was the first female and African American Superintendent of
San Francisco’s public schools, after the Board of Education and teacher’s union
leadership recruited her from her Washington D.C. Superintendent position (Livingston,
2011). Ackerman immediately noted fiscal discrepancies in contracting and alerted the
FBI of potential fraud in a whistleblower lawsuit (City Attorney of San Francisco, 2004).
After a lengthy investigation that garnered national attention, Ackerman had recouped
more than $50 million in cash and services owed to SFUSD. While SFUSD was
regaining valuable funds lost from years of fraudulent contracting, Ackerman worked on
a strategic plan to support the district’s underperforming schools, located primarily in the
southeast sector, initiating the Students and Teachers Achieving Results (STAR)
program. Ackerman introduced STAR in 2002, as the Consent Decree was due to reach
its end date. Superintendent Ackerman requested an extension on the Decree’s ending

13
date, offering the STAR program as justifiable reasoning for further support and district
monitoring. The court agreed to extend the Decree date to the end of 2005 (Livingston,
2011).
The SFUSD Consent Decree Creates TMAHS
These prominent San Francisco African Americans had all been born in the
educationally segregated southern United States: Brown (Richardson, 1996) and Sanders
(Reiterman & Glionna, 2003) in the 1930s in Texas and Ackerman (Martin, 2013) in the
1940s in Missouri. Additionally, because the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme
Court case would not occur until 1954 (Biegel, 2008), Mayor Brown, Police Chief
Sanders, and Superintendent Ackerman, all living as adults in the cosmopolitan
metropolis of San Francisco in 2002, received part of their primary education in the
segregated South. The early education backgrounds of all three of San Francisco’s
prominent African Americans—Brown, Sanders and Ackerman—strikes an important
note in San Francisco leadership roles. In 1978, the San Francisco Chapter of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), on behalf of
African American parents who had children enrolled in the San Francisco Public Schools
sued SFUSD. The suit garnered national attention because of San Francisco’s uniquely
diverse community (Biegel, 2008), Fagan summarized the suit as follows:
San Francisco branch of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (“SFNAACP”) and a group of black parents filed a class-action
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. They
charged the San Francisco Unified School District, its board members and its
superintendent, the California State Board of Education and its members, the
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State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Department of Education
with engaging in racially discriminatory practices and maintaining a segregated
school system in San Francisco, in violation of the constitutions and laws of the
United States and California. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctions guaranteeing them equal educational opportunity and fully
desegregated schools under a court-ordered desegregation plan, as well as an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Fagan, 2008, p. 1)
Founded in 1994, TMAHS was “established by the [SFUSD], in agreement with
the parties to the Consent Decree [of 1983] and the approval of the Court” (TMAHSSARC, 1994). Originally named San Francisco Academic High School, TMAHS was to
model its curriculum after Raoul Wallenberg High School, located on the west side of
San Francisco, created in 1981 to provide a “small school, family-type atmosphere for the
college-bound” student (Wallenberg-SARC, 1994, p. 1). Although, TMAHS accepted
students from across San Francisco, because it was “located in the Bayview-Hunters
Point neighborhood, it “reserves 40% of enrollment spaces for students from these
neighborhoods” (TMAHS-SARC, 1995, p. 1), and later opened its “enrollment
preferences to students residing in zip codes 94124, 94134, and 94110” (TMAHS-SARC,
1997, p. 1).
During feasibility studies conducted before the plans for TMAHS were finalized,
noted successes were experienced by 1994 at Philip and Sala Burton High School
(Burton), also located south side of San Francisco and created by the Consent Decree (in
1983). In those schools, multiple students received 4-year academic scholarships to such
prestigious higher education institutions as Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
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Chancellors Awards to the University of California at Berkeley (Burton-SARC, 1994,
p. 1), it was deemed more suitable for Thurgood’s curriculum to be modeled after Burton,
as the school also served many residents in the 94124, 94134, and 94110 zip-code sectors
of San Francisco (see Map 2).
Map 2
San Francisco Zip Code Used for Consent Decree Area Boundaries for Thurgood
Marshall High School

Note. From San Francisco, California (CA) Zip Code Map—Locations, Demographics,
by City-data.com, 2018, retrieved from http://www.city-data.com/zipmaps/SanFrancisco-California.html
Therefore, with a close association with a nearby successful Consent Decree high school
(Burton), TMAHS was designed as a 4-year college-preparatory high school with
mandatory “focus on mathematics, science, and technology” (Orfield et al, 1992;
TMAHS-SARC, 1994, p. 1).

16
Later, through continuous improvement strategies, TMAHS implemented the
following:
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT: 280 credits are required for graduation. Four
years of mathematics and science. Orientation and Summer Bridge Program are
mandatory for all incoming 9th graders. Parents & students are required to sign a
contract of commitment to “The Thurgood Marshall Way.” (TMAHS-SARC,
1997, p. 1)
All students are required to take four years of English, mathematics, and science.
All students are required to take three years of social science, and world language
(Chinese, French, Japanese, or Spanish). All students are required to take two
years of technology which involves computer science and/or computer
applications.
We are on a block schedule to facilitate more in-depth teaching/learning.
We also have common planning time for teachers to discuss students’ work and
plan curriculum and standards-based instructional strategies to meet students’
needs,” previously implemented then documented in 2002. (TMAHS-SARC,
2002, p. 5)
In the 2001–2002 graduating class of TMAHS, Thurgood boasted it had sent just
as many or more of its graduates to University of California and California State
University colleges than the nationally renowned Lowell High School, located on the
northwest side of San Francisco, as well as obtained more than $998,000 in senior-class
scholarships. The ethnic background of TMAHS students in the inaugural year, 1993 (see
Table 1) and during the 2002–2003 (see Table 2) showed the school was 14.9% Latino,
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28% African America, and 45% Asian. The grade level demographics of the TMAHS
student body was evenly divided by grade (CDE, 2017). The ethnic demographic of
Thurgood in 2002 was similar to its inaugural year of 1994, and in 2012, still within
Consent Decree percentages (Zabarte, 2016).
Local Law Enforcement after 9/11
After the September 11, 2011 terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and the downed Flight 93 in Somerset, PA,
law-enforcement agencies throughout the United States began creating homeland-security
centers at local municipal and state levels of government. The California State Threat
Assessment Center (CAL STAC, 2017a) is a state-level agency created in response to the
9/11 attacks and deficient national-level information sharing that preceded its creation.
By September 25, 2001, CAL STAC could assuage and address all types of crimes and
hazards that threaten Californians and its infrastructure. The California Highway Patrol in
Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Diego runs day-to-day
operations. At the local level, the CAL STAC partner is the California State Threat
Assessment System (STAS), connecting the county sheriff, a city police department, and
fire and emergency-management systems (CalStas, 2017) to focus on public safety
locally. STAS mirrors CAL STAC monitoring of human smugglers, criminal gangs, and
drug activity, in addition to terror and extremist threats against the lives and assets of
citizens.
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data for 2003, by San Francisco Unified School District, 2004, retrieved from http://web.sfusd.edu/Services/research_public/rpa_student_enrollment/SFUSD
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In May of 2002, STAS distributed a joint Secret Service and Department of
Education commissioned report to local law-enforcement agencies, titled Threat
Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating
Safe School Climates, as a guide to prepare for all types of K–12 school-site violence that
might occur in their jurisdiction (Fein et al., 2002).
The guide includes specific preparations for “Implementing a School Threat
Assessment Process, Conducting a School Threat Assessment, and Managing a
Threatening Situation” (Fein et al., 2002, p. 8). The guide’s predecessor and companion
report, The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the
Prevention of School Attacks in the United States, by several of the same of authors
(Vossekuil, Fein, Reddy, Borum & Modzeleski, 2002), introduced the School Threat
Assessment Tool as a promising school-based violence-mitigation device for local law
enforcement to implement “in tandem with emergency planning with schools and the
school district” ( Vossekuil et al., 2002, p. 37) as soon as possible. Peripherally
commenting on foreign terror threats, this report addresses situations similar to Virginia
Polytechnic Institute or Columbine High School campus threats.
When reflecting on the Thurgood Marshall police riot, officials from San
Francisco’s SFPD and Sheriff agencies’ handling the Thurgood Marshall October 11th
riot blamed the other departments for escalating panic and causing fear in the school’s
small community (Driver, 2002). SF Sheriff Hennessey indicated that the deputies’
tactical unit, in full tactical gear, was in the vicinity, training for a “hypothetical
Columbine-like event at a school—when they got a call from the Police Department to go
to the school. We never touched the students. We just did what the cops asked us to do”
(Reilly, 2002). SFPD’s Assistant Deputy Chief countered with evidence from a videotape
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of the police riot, taken by a teacher who was falsely arrested, showing baton-swinging
deputies rushing “in a formation towards the students in full riot gear, while our guys are
seen standing on the sidelines” (Reilly, 2002).
Later, the investigation revealed that the police department did not contact the
sheriff’s department. The sheriff’s department, already rehearsing for a K–12 violent
school incident nearby, heard the school had an issue and rushed over in their riot gear
(Driver, 2002). Further research shows that police units have been able to use students as
test models when testing new tactics; students serve as live experimental subjects (Beger,
2002, p. 120), forced into cooperating because they are students and tactics testing
happens during the school day.
Local policing-agency decisions regarding schools traditionally did not involve
outreach for guidance from local school families or community members. Lawenforcement agencies typically communicated new procedures through their
administrative counterparts, who transmitted the information to the school-district
leadership and governing body of schools in a memorandum, updated operations manual,
or consent calendar of items that received blanket approvals in meetings.
San Francisco Mainstream Media
Local print and television media reported on the TMAHS 10/11 police riot. Every
local television station in the San Francisco-Bay Area covered the riot for about a week,
with print media’s coverage carrying regular in-depth perspectives on the day and actors
involved. The San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco New Bayview Paper, The San
Francisco Guardian, The San Francisco Examiner, Sing Tao Daily, and El Tecolote had
coverage for their various readerships. However, The San Francisco Chronicle’s
broadsheet (the largest newspaper format available) coverage of the riot was sustained.
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The Chronicle’s reporting of the TMAHS October 11, 2002 riot was covered by a total of
seven reporters for nearly a 2-year period. The primary reporters were Delgado (2002)
and Gordon (2004), augmented intermittently with other reporters.
This dissertation’s case study included providing a document analysis of The
Chronicle’s coverage of the TMAHS riot from October 12, 2002 through September 30,
2004. This dissertation compares the reporting of the Thurgood Marshall riot through a
series of articles. The aim was to discern if a collection of direct and indirect provocation
instances would reveal a certain type of influential reporting about the event as well as
accountability for all people involved in the event.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to provide TMAHS former community members
(students, educators, and parents) an opportunity to offer their perspectives on the overall
school climate at TMAHS and how it felt to have permanent placement of armed lawenforcement officers on their school campus before the October 11, 2002 police riot,
during, and afterwards. The majority of the sophomore, junior, and senior classes in 2002
entered the school in their freshman year under the mandatory 280-credit graduation
requirement expectations (TMAHS-SARC, 1997). All three classes of students and their
families participated in The Thurgood Marshall Way Summer Bridge program and
became indoctrinated in the cohesive TMAHS college-going culture. Those students
were familiarized with the previous principal, vice principals, counselors, and singular
SRO assigned to the school. In filtering potential student participants, at minimum, the
2002 sophomore and junior classes had been at TMAHS as freshmen a full year prior to
the October 11, 2002 riot, had been at school during the October 11, 2002 riot, and stayed
at TMAHS after the October 11, 2002 riot.
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This study did not discount students’ families and educators who had an
opportunity to experience the previous principal, vice principals, counselors, and SRO as
well as the new principal, vice principals, counselors, and SROs. Their views and
reflections on the impact of permanently assigned law-enforcement officers or SROs on
them or the environment of their high school was the focal point of this study. With a
total of 10 qualitative study participants, reflections were accrued through a series of
individual narratives from former TMAHS students, teachers, and parents.
Historical data gathered by the case-study researcher, also a former TMAHS
Community member, and The San Francisco Chronicle from October 2002 to September
2004, documenting the TMAHS 10/11 riot, triangulated the study. In this qualitative
research, the triangulation of multiple data sources provided validity (as suggested by
Creswell, 2012; Roberts, 2010, Yin 2009).
Research Questions
This study was guided by the following research questions:
1. How did embedded on-campus police presence affect school climate at
TMAHS?
2. To what extent did the TMAHS October 11, 2002 police riot impact students,
teachers, and parents?
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for the dissertation was the theory of deterrence
(Polinsky & Shavell, 1999; Skiba & Peterson, 1999, Wright, 2010), which posits that,
regardless of the crime or offense to the whole, the punishment must be much more
severe than any reasonable consequence to deter any other or further attempts of an
offense or equal to something similar in the future. Accompanying the theory, its
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customary companions are zero-tolerance policies and the broken-windows theory. This
is the rationale associated with the three-strikes laws (Wright, 2010).
Rooted in the theory of deterrence is broken-windows theory, which hypothesizes
that by creating fear among community members, policing agencies attempt to regain
order from the speculated escalation of community disorder and deterioration, based on
the notion that one original broken window eventually may cause turmoil (Hinkle &
Weisburd, 2008; Ranasinghe, 2012). Regarding the TMAHS riot, The Chronicle’s pressconference comments from SFPD Captain Puccinelli about TMAHS students on the
evening of October 11, 2002 elevated the fear of family and community members.
Puccinelli noted, “there was a riot going on in that school. If we do nothing, we are
derelict in our duty, and someone might get killed in there” (Delgado et al., 2002, para
11).
At TMAHS, an enabled police force believed that causing fear among
communities of color, especially with youth, through tactics developed under the guise of
zero tolerance, resulted in “an overreaction,” recounted by English teacher McKamey.
“The level of this response was a total disconnect with what was actually happening. Our
students watching this cannot believe it. … They were being treated like common
criminals” (Delgado et al., 2002, para 8).
Viewing the TMAHS 10/11 riot through a critical-race theory (CRT) lens, as a
support theory, weaves study narratives into research that can identify policing power
structures, reflections about race, and the intended or unintended implications for
students of color and their school communities (Bell, 1995; Tate, 1997; Delgado &
Stefancic, 2012; Yosso, 2005). A crucial component of CRT, in the context of school
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settings, speaks to valuing the social and cultural capital that students of color brought to
the TMAHS school setting from their families, homes, and communities (aligned with
Yosso, 2005). Social and cultural capital in CRT are values and experiences of people of
color often not recognized or acknowledge by the “dominant ideology and White
privilege” (Yosso, 2005, p. 74).
Throughout U.S. history, bureaucracies and educational institutions extolled
academic objectivity, self-determination, and operationalized equality for all to succeed
through opportunities, but minimized assets of students of color such as home languages,
family structures, and community networks based on cultural background. CRT adds
legitimacy to the historical wisdoms of storytelling or having a voice (Ladson-Billings,
1998), passed down the generations as equally valuable with other social attributes
canonized and maintained in U.S. society. Dominant culture sees these cultural-capital
assets as deficiencies and believes efforts to resist the dominant ideology by students of
color should be squashed at all costs in dominant-culture schools’ settings (Solórzano &
Yosso, 2002). An insidiously lurking form of racism, uncovered by the CRT lens, is
known as dysconscious racism in the CRT racism structure. In 1992, King noted that
people of color revealed a type of acceptance of life’s conditions that clearly could trace
back to unjust racial discrimination. King called this internalized racism dysconscious
racism. Dysconsciousness is inadequate and distorted thinking about cultural inequity and
diversity, subtly and unconsciously justifying the normalcy of White dominant norms and
privilege (King, 1991; Vinh, 2009).
Another concept bringing these theories together was Freire’s concepts that
undergird CRT structure and support combating systematic oppression to help youth of
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color’s intransitive consciousness. A mind that has succumbed to oppression without
resistance in educational settings challenges the dominant ideology (D. E. Collins, 1998).
The difficult work to unravel the tightly bound intransitive consciousness can be found in
Freire’s critical-consciousness studies and practiced as conscientiousness between
progressive educators and students.
Traditionally indoctrinated “educators most often assume that schools work and
that students, parents and community need to change to conform to this already effective
and equitable system” in the eyes of the existing power structures (Yosso, 2005, p. 75),
regardless of what CRT considers a social asset. This deficit model of thinking in schools
that predominantly educate students of color presupposes students enter the education
universe with less than their White peers. Furthermore, it supposes their families do not
care about supporting academic excellence, as evidenced by achievement gaps made of
their own doing that have existed for decades (Bell, 1995; Yosso, 2005). These theories
and practices are necessary to understand the systems of oppression that permeate
bureaucratic systems such as public schools, particularly those with a majority population
of youth of color, sent to learn within their walls.
Limitations of the Study
Limitations for this case study and research that impacted the studies’ results were
in multiple areas. A limitation was identifying the varied study participants who still
reside in the nine northern California San Francisco-Bay Area counties. An additional
source of participants was one or two crucial participants in southern California and
Arizona who are senior citizens and were noted to be infirm.
The elderly and infirm TMAHS Community members who were ultimately
unavailable for participant interviews are unknown to the researcher. Other potential
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participants who did not come forward may have had family and caregiver obligations,
work issues, or physical challenges that may have prevented their participation.
Conducting the research without those participants did not prevent the research from
moving forward.
A timing limitation for the research occurred through various miscommunications
with the University of San Francisco Institution Review Board (IRB), resulting in final
approval to conduct research well after the anticipated start of May 2017. Understanding
that many of the potential participants’ availability during the summer months was more
flexible than at other times of the year made the summer an optimal period to conduct
this research. With IRB approval occurring in September of 2017, the researcher and
various TMAHS Community members who were educators or former students (now
parents), made negotiating school and work schedules more challenging. Overall, this
timing may have limited snowball sampling in accessing and acquiring participants.
Delimitations of the Study
This case-study research had more than a few delimitations. It was imperative to
narrow the scope and to focus the breadth of research toward the research questions on
the case-study topic. Further, issues regarding the police action at TMAHS on October
11th did raise emotional wounds that were long dormant in a few study participants.
However, when asked, participants noted that the disturbances from the past did not
affect their overall well-being. Careful and ethical considerations were taken to inform
participants about the anticipated conversation. The researcher recalled this period in
their history with each participant, well before the study interview began. Participants had
some time to consider and reconsider participating in the study and how it would affect
their thoughts about police and SROs, particularly if they were currently in the education
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profession at a school site and had to interact with police. The researcher was an integral
TMAHS Community member from the 2001 academic school year and remained
involved with the school until December 2014. The researcher did not select certain
members of the TMAHS Community for the study due to the following circumstances:
(a) past experiences of contention between the researcher and member, (b) the member
was still employed by SFUSD and may not have been able to speak honestly, (c) the
member had been more directly involved in the 10/11 riot and appeared at that time to be
deeply traumatized, or (4) the member was targeted after the riot in an ongoing retaliatory
manner by the SFPD or SFUSD.
Additional delimitations considered were those in the overall TMAHS
Community itself and their abilities to decipher their own feelings and behaviors during
their time at TMAHS and the effects of that time on their lives. These are parameters of
the question timeline. During the study, various TMAHS Community members
disassociated themselves fully from the researcher, utterly stopping all communication
until the research had concluded.
Educational Significance
This research contributes to the gaps in scholarly work that failed to address
insights from impacted school community members (e.g., students, teachers,
administrators, and families). This study elicited reflections involving law-enforcement
officers and SROs placed in their schools as a form of security measure. The research
brought to light those voices often not heard or entreated to participate in decisions about
the placement and funding of embedded police or SROs in schools at the district and
municipal levels, with little regard for the effect on the school’s culture and impacted
community. This research also revealed that the layered decisions to continuously embed
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police, consistently increase their numbers in public schools, and enforce zero-tolerance
policies are not accidental manifestations of targeted youth of color, their families, and
their teachers. Scholarly research rarely highlights those impacted voices of students,
educators, and parents regarding the community-decimating structures and practices
setup in tightly-knit education communities that are meant to serve disenfranchised
students of color.
This study provides background and research to school districts’ governing
bodies, city legislators, and policymakers. This research study may assist public
advocates, grappling with the long-term effects of police-embedded school environments
and arrests on campus. A need persists to hear from and understand problems
experienced by impacted school students, teachers, and parents who are present on a
school’s campus along with the SROs or police. Policymakers can and should draw on
this study’s research to support their decision-making process, analyzing the various
elements, leaving no reason to solely rely on police-union lobbyists, siloed one-note
conversations, and unrefuted law-enforcement statistics that support the referral of SROs
to a permanent on-campus assignment (Dudnick, 2014). Present in this research was an
opportunity to assist decision makers to consider selecting a different model of restorative
discipline or model of police interaction with students, educators, and community
members who are part of school communities.
Definition of Terms
The following terms were operationalized for this study:
A-G Requirements. Widely used and accepted for University of California (UCs)
and California State Universities as well as private colleges and universities, the A–G
course requirements, also known as A–G course sequence is a list of subject requirements
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created in the high school course schedule from freshmen through senior year. Its purpose
is to ensure students obtain a general body of knowledge that will provide breadth and
perspective to new, more advanced study. The list of courses in the sequence are
history/social science (“a”), English (“b”), mathematics (“c”), laboratory science (“d”),
language other than English (“e”), visual and performing arts (“f”), and a collegepreparatory elective (“g”). “These courses are to be academically challenging, involving
substantial reading, writing, problem solving, and laboratory work (as appropriate), and
show serious attention to analytical thinking, factual content, and developing students’
oral and listening skills (University of California Office of the President, 2017).
Block schedule. “A system for scheduling the middle- or high-school day,
typically by replacing a more traditional schedule of six or seven 40 to 50-minute daily
periods with longer class periods” (e.g., 90 to 120 minutes) that meet on an every-otherday schedule throughout the week. One bonus of block scheduling is that student become
accustomed to this schedule, which mirrors college-campus schedules for classes, making
the transition to a college campus seamless (Glossary of Education Reform, 2017).
Board of education/Governing education body. A body of people/board
controlling an educational system or a unit of it; especially, a board of citizens controlling
especially elementary and secondary public-school education in a state, county, city, or
town (San Francisco NAACP, et al, 1983).
Broken-windows theory. Social scientists Wilson and Kelling (1982) posited that
if a broken window on a building remained unrepaired in a neighborhood for an extended
period, no matter the socioeconomic level of the neighborhood’s demographics, other
windows in the building would be broken by any number of residents or passing strangers
because the population had concluded no one cared.
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Case study. Creswell defined case study as “a methodology: a type of design in
qualitative research that may be an object of study, as well as a product of inquiry” (2002,
p. 97). Further, case studies have bounded systems, are detailed, and use multiple sources
of information.
Classroom management. The wide variety of skills and techniques teachers use to
keep students organized, orderly, focused, attentive, on task, and academically productive
during a class (Glossary of Education Reform, 2017).
Conscientization. The process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social
reality through reflection and action. Action is fundamental because it is the process of
changing reality. Freire said that all people acquire social myths that have a dominant
tendency, so learning is a critical process that depends on uncovering real problems and
actual needs (Freire Institute, 2017).
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), Secure our Schools Initiative.
COPS Secure Our Schools grants provide funding to state, local, or tribal governments
working in partnership with public schools to improve school safety. Successful
programs build on a comprehensive safety assessment that identifies the school’s
individual needs, and law-enforcement agencies receiving funding collaborate with
school administrators, teachers, students, and parents to implement solutions to school
safety challenges (DOJ, 2016).
Critical consciousness (in education). A level of consciousness characterized by
depth in the interpretation of problems, by testing one’s own findings while being open to
revision, attempting to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived
notions when analyzing them … affirming the mutual and coequal roles of teachers and
learners (Heaney, 1995).
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Critical race theory (in education). A set of basic insights, methods, perspectives,
and pedagogy that seeks to analyze, identify, and transform those cultural and structural
aspects of education that maintain dominant and subordinate racial positions inside and
outside the classroom. The theory in education challenges biological- and cultural-deficit
stories by using a variety of efforts such as “counterstories, historiographies, corridos,
oral traditions, films, and poetry (McNee, 2015, p. 12).
Discipline. The practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behavior,
using punishment to correct disobedience (N’T. Lee, 2004).
Enabled police force. A police force unhindered by legal scrutiny and empowered
by deregulation in a deliberate attempt to preserve the racially disparate criminal-justice
system (Goldsmith, 2016).
Generative themes. Generative themes are codifications of complex experiences
charged with political significance and likely to generate considerable discussion and
analysis. They derive from a study of the specific history and circumstances of the
learners (Heaney, 1995).
Impact. Measure of the tangible and intangible effects (consequences) of one
thing’s or entity’s action or influence on another (OCC, 2004a).
Intransitive consciousness. The state of those whose sphere of perception is
limited, whose interests center almost totally on matters of survival, and who are
impermeable to challenges situated outside the demands of biological necessity (D. E.
Collins, 1998).
Lockdown in a school setting. An emergency measure or condition in which
school-site staff and students are temporarily prevented from entering or leaving a
restricted area or the whole building during a threat of danger (OCC, 2004).
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Off-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law-enforcement officer).
An SRO patrols perimeters of a physical school location or site, along with the
surrounding neighborhoods (N’T. Lee, 2004)
On-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law-enforcement officer).
An SRO patrols and may have designated space in the physical-school location or site
(OCC, 2004).
Police/Law-enforcement officer. A person whose job is in keep the peace, handle
routine calls for service, respond to emergency calls or in progress crimes, enforce
criminal, traffic, health and safety code violations; assist during major emergencies and
natural disasters with evacuations and perimeter security; arrest and book prisoners and
transport, file crime and incident reports, conduct basic investigations, evaluate and
secure crime scenes, render first aid in appropriate situations, make death notifications;
locate and interview witnesses, serve arrest, traffic and search warrants, patrol assigned
beat or arena in a car, on foot, on a bicycle or horse; a member of the police force (Police
Test Guide, 2018).
Prison–industrial complex. Considering the corporate economic and dividend
structures being attributed to the prison industry, closely reflecting that of the U.S.
military, the profitability of privatized business–government linkages with corrections
and public punishment, the exponential expansion of the penal system can now be
characterized as a prison–industrial complex (Davis, 1998).
Restorative justice. A social science process that studies a harm-causing offense
and uses methods involving primary stakeholders in determining how best to repair the
harm done by that offense. The three primary stakeholders in restorative justice are
victims, offenders, and their communities of care, whose needs are, respectively,
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obtaining reparations, taking responsibility, and achieving reconciliation. The degree to
which all three engage in meaningful emotional exchange and decision making is the
degree to which any form of social discipline approaches being fully restorative
(Wachtel, 2013).
Restorative practices. A practiced social-science process that negotiates how to
build social capital and achieve social discipline through participatory learning and
decision making. The use of restorative practices helps reduce crime, violence, and
bullying; improve human behavior; and strengthen civil society (Wachtel, 2013).
School campus. The physical location of the school site in the school-district
jurisdiction (OCC, 2004).
School community. A school community consists of people associated with the
school on a regular or integral basis. These members consist of, for example, students,
teachers, onsite administrators (principal and vice/assistant principal), janitors, cafeteria
workers, counselors, deans, parents of students attending the school, school-district
officials assigned to oversee the school, neighboring residents, nearby merchants, and
nonprofit organizations near the school location that provide services to the school’s
population (N’T. Lee, 2004).
School resource officers (SROs). By federal definition, a career law-enforcement
officer with sworn authority, who is deployed by an employing police department or
agency in a community-oriented policing assignment to work in collaboration with one or
more schools (Canady, James, & Nease, 2012; McNicholas, 2008).
Social justice. Goldfarb and Grinberg defined social justice “as the exercise of
altering these [institutional and organizational] arrangements by actively engaging in
reclaiming, appropriating, sustaining, and advancing inherent human rights of equity,
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equality, and fairness in social, economic, educational, and personal dimensions”
(Theoharis, 2007).
Stop and frisk. A legal practice used in the United States, predominantly by the
New York City Police Department that originated in London in which a police officer
may detain, ask questions, and search a person who appeared to be suspicious. Stop-andFrisk laws were a direct descendant of zero-tolerance practices and broken-windows
theory. However, after 10 years of the practice, the majority of people who were stopped
and frisked by the New York City Police Department were African American and Latino
men between the ages of 14 and 24 (Devereaux, 2012).
Structural racism. A system in which public policies, institutional practices,
cultural representations, and other norms work in various often-reinforcing ways to
perpetuate racial-group inequity. Structural racism identifies dimensions of history and
culture that have allowed privilege associated with “Whiteness” and disadvantages
associated with “color” to endure and adapt over time. Structural racism is a feature of
the social, economic, and political systems in which we all exist (Lawrence, Sutton,
Kubisch, Susi, & Fulbright-Anderson, 2004).
Superpredator. A term used to describe youth deemed as violent and
unredeemable in the eyes of society. In late 1995, DiIulio, a criminologist and political
scientist, wrote a magazine article entitled “The Coming of the Super-Predators” (Drum,
2016, para 2). DiIulio said
We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for human life and no
sense of the future. And make no mistake, while the trouble will be greatest in
black inner-city neighborhoods, other places are also certain to have burgeoning
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youth-crime problems that will spill over into upscale central-city districts, innerring suburbs, and even the rural heartland.
Three strikes laws. ‘“Three strikes and you’re out,’ requiring that criminals
involved in three serious, violent felonies be sentenced to prison for guaranteed terms up
to life imprisonment” (Meese, 1994, p. 58). The three-strikes laws are also part of U.S.
tough-on-crime policies and zero-tolerance practices.
U.S. Department of Education. The mission of the U.S. Department of Education
(2016) is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by
fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The Office of the Attorney General was
created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93), as a one-person
part-time position. The Act specified that the Attorney General was to be well versed and
educated in the law with the duty to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court
in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon
questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when requested
by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters that may concern their
departments. (DOJ, 2016)
War on drugs. A U.S. term commonly applied to a campaign of prohibition of
drugs, military aid, and military intervention, with the stated aim to reduce the illegal
drug trade. The term was popularized by the media shortly after a press conference given
on June 18, 1971, by U.S. President Nixon, the day after publication of a special message
from President Nixon to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, during
which he declared drug abuse and its users as society’s moral enemy (Dufton, 2012).
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Summary
This dissertation considers the TMAHS October 11, 2002 police riot and denoted
two very different responses by SFPD officers when dealing with high school students on
the northwest side of San Francisco. Much of the literature about law enforcement in
schools or SRO programs comes from the perspective of legislators, policymakers, and
city and school district leadership without including the perspectives of the communities
that are directly impacted by those decisions. The chapter provided an introduction and
brief history of SRO programs and an explanation of how they transitioned into U.S.
schools through the multiple versions of the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 and
systematized tracking databases, coupled with zero-tolerance policies, and the sanctioned
aggressive behavior of policing agencies by the U.S. court system.
The introduction to this dissertation included consideration of the sociopolitical
climate of San Francisco and its convergence with San Francisco’s most prominent
African Americans at the time of the TMAHS riot in 2002—Mayor Willie Brown, Police
Chief Earl Sanders, and School Superintendent Arlene Ackerman—to help readers
understand the larger context in which such an unprecedented event could occur in the
renowned liberal city. The connection to San Francisco’s African American leaders’
segregated childhood education and a brief history of the SFUSD segregation-eliminating
Consent Decree, which called for the creation of TMAHS in the southeast sector of the
city, was a way support the growth of mathematics- and science-education opportunities
in a largely African American community.
This dissertation focused, through semistructured interviews and research
questions, to hear TMAHS Community voices on the police riot. The study sought to
share the unheard voices of students, teacher, and parents about the riot’s effect on their
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school’s climate and further, if the riot influenced their lives. Additional research data
used The San Francisco Chronicle’s coverage of the riot and the dissertation researcher’s
experiences to offer a historical review of San Francisco, the Unified School District, and
the TMAHS Community and riot.
The theory of deterrence led in interpreting participant reflections and helped
decipher the kinds of tactics set in place before and after the riot, along with what
systems of racism ideology affect public schools. A CRT lens was used to deconstruct the
communities of color’s own dysconscious-racism experiences, separating them from
public perceptions and their own realities.
This study’s significance fills current gaps in the scholarship, pointing to the
glaring racial tones and long unheard voices of impacted community members when
police are permanently stationed on their school campus. Further, this study recounts
experiences of a traumatic incident involving the police on campus. The final part of the
chapter listed relevant words, phrases, and mandated defined in context of the discussion.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The review of literature used a claim of interpretation to integrate four claims of
fact. According to Machi and McAvoy (2016), a claim of interpretation makes use of
expert testimony, empirical research, statistical studies, and anecdotal case studies to
synthesize data and to organize several claims of fact. The claims of fact synthesized in
this literature review include the following: (a) the superpredator phenomenon
contributes to the SRO program, which embeds law enforcement in schools, (b) the SRO
program contributes to the profiling and marginalization of youth of color in schools,
(c) structural racism buoys the school-to-prison pipeline, and (d) the culture of massincarceration traumatizes youth of color. Following the discussion of these facets, a
conclusion will employ joint reasoning, arguing that embedded school-based lawenforcement marginalizes and traumatizes youth of color in schools.
The Theory of Deterrence, Broken Windows Theory, Critical Race Theory, and
Dysconscious Racism
The theory of deterrence has long been used in hopes of deterring criminal
activity (Skiba & Peterson, 1999). The theory of deterrence presumes that “human beings
are rational actors who consider the consequences of their behavior before deciding to
commit a crime” (Wright, 2010, p. 2), perpetuating the idea that potential offenders
weigh their future behavior against the consequences of their possible actions and
conclude that the risks of punishment is too severe. When applied to school-aged
children, it has been dubbed zero tolerance and permeates through U.S. schools as a
formula for prejudging and overpunishing youth (Civil Rights Project, 2000). Zero-
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tolerance policies and practices, strongly associated with the theory of deterrence, have
been more casually expressed in public schools as interventions. In the general parlance,
they are more commonly known throughout the country as getting “tough on crime,”
which then leads to enabling mandatory minimum sentencing for minor criminal offences
through three-strikes laws (Wright, 2010, p. 1). These have been coupled with the more
recent stop-and-frisk and stop-and-inspect mandates. Initially, these theories and
practices were lauded by elected officials and legislators as practical tools for crime
reduction through strict deterrence measured and practiced by unbiased law enforcement.
However, actual police practice and documented experiences from communities
witnessing firsthand law-enforcement behavior condemn these methods, stating that
crime reduction results were based on fear and increased police brutality on communities
of color, and particularly men between the ages of 14 and 24 (Meese, 1994).
The additional layer of fear-mongering strategies imported by policing agencies
into poorer communities and communities of color that have not been revitalized is
known as broken-windows theory (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008; Ranasinghe, 2012).
Broken-windows theory assumes that communities are not capable of order on their own,
even if the smallest of offenses to the greater citizenry occur on a regular basis. Lawenforcement personnel proclaim that law and order must exist and be imposed for
minimal offenses, regardless of the circumstances or what the community understands as
norms (Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008).
CRT affirms that racism exists and is “ordinary” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2012,
p. 3), that is, ever-present for people of color in the United States. Race categories in the
national census existed in the United States since the late 1700s, noting Black and White
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people (S. M. Lee, 1993). Throughout U.S. history, people of European descent
migrating into the country consistently pushed for inclusion in the White category for
census purposes.
If a person was not referenced as White, that person was considered other or in
another category. For example, Mexicans, after a time, were swapped out of the White
category in the census (Haney López, 1997) into their own category, along with Blacks.
In fully embracing CRT as a racism–cultural excavation tool, the “Black/White binary
limits understandings of the multiple ways in which African Americans, Native
Americans, Asian/Pacific Islanders, Chicanas/os, and Latinas/os continue to experience,
respond to, and resist racism and other forms of oppression” (Yosso, 2005, p. 72).
Critical work explain how structural racism systematizes “public policies,
institutional practices, cultural representations, and other norms work in various, often
reinforcing ways to perpetuate racial group inequity,” allowing dominant cultures
privilege and nondominant cultures to acclimatize their existence without it (Lawrence et
al., 2004). Both those who benefit from structural racism, and those who suffer its
indignities, may experience racism as normal, routine, and familiar (Bell, 1995; Delgado
& Stefancic, 2012). Freire’s thematic practice in attaining critical consciousness occurs
in stages against oppression and practices by the oppressor that lead to an oppressed mind
to understand current circumstances, how the person came to be in oppressed position,
and how to thwart that ongoing oppression (D. E. Collins, 2000).
In 1991, King invented a new phrase to describe another form of racism that
quietly accedes to the U.S. dominant culture (White) norms and advantages.
Dysconscious Racism King explains

41
it is not the absence of consciousness (that is, not unconsciousness) but an
impaired consciousness or distorted way of thinking about race as compared to,
for example, critical consciousness [and] further, demonstrates an uncritical habit
of mind (including perceptions, attitudes, assumptions, and beliefs) that justifies
inequity and exploitation by accepting the existing order of things as given. (1991,
p. 135)
Youth of color remain particularly vulnerable to dysconscious racism and selfdoubt (Nicholson-Crotty, Birchmeier, & Valentine, 2009). Disproportionately labeled as
disruptive, youth of color experience school-based disciplined more frequently than other
students. Under the influence of dysconscious racism, African American and Latino
children often internalize these labels (Casella, 2003a).
Freire championed and popularized a concept created by Helder Camara, known
as conscientization, which combats specific internalized features of intransitive
consciousness in progressive pedagogy circles (D. E. Collins, 1998). These efforts, when
put into current practice, may also defeat the oppressive dysconscious racism visited by
many students of color.
Superpredator Phenomenon contributes to the School Resource Officer Program
This subsection describes how literature examined the creation of the term
superpredator, which became politically synonymous with children who got into any
kind of trouble on the playground or in school by just being children. What were once
teachable moments by caring adults explaining the differences between right and wrong
and peer modeling the differences between appropriate and inappropriate behaviors were
now exaggerated and highly exposed instances of criminal behaviors.

42
Socially, if law-enforcement agencies and the court systems are society’s general
answer to crime, then the first logical answer that occurred to address the child criminal
was to place police in their schools with the hopes of capturing future offenders before
their life of crime ensued. Thus, a cyclical pattern began: the more insignificant the
student infraction to the rules, the harsher infliction of school-sanctioned, criminally
labeled, police-enforced discipline.
Law-enforcement officers employed databases such as the Gang Reporting,
Evaluation and Tracking System (GREAT) and the Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN) to understand gang, drug, and other criminal activities. GREAT tracks youth
gangs (Langston, 2003). DAWN tracks drug use and monitors drug-trafficking activities.
Law-enforcement, legislative, and judiciary bodies purposely use exaggerated crime
statistics from sources like the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA). These statistics
combine disproportionately categorized Latino/a youth as drug dealers and gang
members. Statistically, they also disproportionately characterized African American
youth as gang members and crack-cocaine consumers (Fleury-Steiner, Dunn, & FleurySteiner, 2009; Reinerman, & Levine, 1989). By also labeling these youth as “thugs” and
“gangsters,” these databases target urban youth, threatening outsiders in their own
communities (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009, p. 7).
In 1996, Princeton social scientist DiIulio coined the termed superpredator in the
book titled Body Count: Moral Poverty—And How to Win America’s War Against Crime
and Drugs, for society’s youth, aged 11–17, at times including younger and older youth
as well (Bennett, DiIulio, & Walters, 1996). Superpredators would become a growing
rank of juveniles who were dramatically thoughtless and cruelly pitiless children who had
no fear of criminal labeling, incarceration, or a hint of morality (Haberman, 2014).
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DiIulio’s observations appealed to middle and upper-class faith-based communities
across America. DiIulio repeatedly pointed out to “moral poverty” of these youth
“without the benefit of parents, teachers, coaches, and clergy to teach them right and
wrong and to show them unconditional love” (Elikann, 1999) leaving them nowhere to go
but to a life riddled with remorselessness mayhem.
In March of 1996, Floridian psychotherapist and criminologist Heide’s story of a
teenager who shot a runner because the runner refused to give into being robbed,
commented “that many juvenile killers are ‘incapable of empathy’” (Elikann, 1999, p. 4)
Northwestern University Criminologist Fox labeled these teenage superpredators
“temporary sociopaths—impulsive and immature.” Fox, noted that the 1990s were the
“calm before the crime storm” (Fox, 1996, p. 1). The criminologist countered conflicting
evidence that juvenile crime is declining and “so long as we fool ourselves into thinking
that we’re winning the war against crime, we may be blindsided by the bloodbath of
teenage violence that is lurking in the future” (Elikann, 1999, p. 4).
In a report filed with the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, Fox
(1996) justified vehemently noting increases in juvenile crime because “the data on age
patterns also reveals that the overall decline in crime committed by people of all age
obscures the differing trends for youth and adults” (p. 1). As the superpredator phrase
fueled political rhetoric of the 1990s, children took the blame for an imagined spector of
the Me-Generation’s excesses and failings. It was far easier to defend fractured
communities against superpredators, who should be caged or contained, rather than
defending communities against children who need teaching and nurturing.
The media’s fascination and fear-mongering use of the superpredator term
legitimized the creation of the strictest and most punitive policies associated with even
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the lowest levels of juvenile infractions through compiled political urging for legislation
to be enacted inside U.S. public schools. Court systems from state to state began
receiving an influx of arrested juveniles for what would previously have been assessed as
“rowdy” teenage behavior (Aseltine, 2010, p. 40). By 1997, Florida Congressman
McCollum legislated a new level of tough-on-juvenile-crime bill targeted toward
children. This Violent Youth Predator Act, was lobbied as an ongoing deterrent to youth
gang and drug activities; however, the title was considered excessive and was eventually
changed to the more subdued Juvenile Crime Control Act (Elikann, 1999, p. 11). At the
bill’s core were block grants that incentivized state courts to prosecute youth as young as
12 years of age as adults, and in a few states as young as 10 years old (Gest & Pope,
1996, p. 28). The block grants not only awarded states for prosecuting younger offenders
as adults, it also awarded block grants to “impose increasing penalties against repeat
offenders; [to] establish a tracking system for minors who commit second crimes and
make their records public, and [to] allow juvenile court judges to issue court orders
against the parents or guardians of convicted minors who do not properly supervise
them”(Gray, 1997, para 13).
Executive Director of the Juvenile Law Center Schwartz, in Philadelphia, and
Chair of the Juvenile Justice Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, said in
1996, “It’s a no-brainer,” why politicians are leading the charge in this direction: “Kids
don’t vote” (Stansky, 1996, p. 62). Consequently, normalizing use of the term
superpredator for minors was introduced into the juvenile-justice system, eventually
introduced into the school systems, as that is the location of most children during daytime
hours (Haberman, 2014).
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Through partnering successive federal legislation throughout the 1990s, the SRO
program’s legacy accompanied exponential expansion, tracked backwards to see how it
would be made inevitable for armed law-enforcement officers to be placed inside U.S.
schools. Starting with the 1990 Gun Free Schools Zones Act (Giffords Law Center to
Prevent Gun Violence, 2017), prohibitive behaviors related to fire arms within 1,000 feet
of a school: a nationwide practice to thwart the combination of gang and drug crimes on
the streets and in communities from spilling over into schools.
New to the White House, in 1993, and holding to stringent crime campaign
promises, President Clinton continued to answer the public’s outrage about urban youth
crime affecting middle-class U.S. neighborhoods and schools by signing into law the Gun
Free Schools Act of 1994. The Gun Free Schools Act was an extension of the Bush-era
Gun Free Schools Zones Act, designating specific rules and punishments for the
possession of firearms in schools (Petteruti, 2011). The rules associated with the 1994
Act, describing these ultrapunitive restrictive practices, were formally understood as
zero-tolerance policies. Eventually, zero-tolerance policies expanded to include drugs and
other weapons as a part of the Clinton-era war on juvenile crime and drugs through White
House proposed changes to the Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997 (Gray, 1997)
and were to govern school spaces that were inside as well as outside of schools when
considering youth offenses.
The more conventional SRO programs, similar to the school-based lawenforcement programs that are readily recognized today, were in response to nationally
publicized cases of school violence that were closely clustered in a span of 6 months
from late 1997 to early 1998, located in “Pearl, Mississippi; West Paducah, Kentucky;
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Jonesboro, Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania and Springfield, Oregon” (Donohue et al,
1998, p. 2; Elikann, 1999, p. 3), and then later at Columbine High School in Littleton,
Colorado (Kennedy, 2001). These instances occurred as elected officials were responding
to community members expressing their affront to unabated gang violence and perceived
threats of the so-called “super-predators” (Heitzeg, 2009, p. 8) moving from the streets
and into schools. Congressman McCollum then introduced the Violent Youth Predator
Act, later changed to Juvenile Crime Control Act on the house floor in the U.S.
legislature (Elikann, 1999).
The superpredator phenomenon once thoroughly vetted by political and public
opinion, provided justification for transitioning police from the streets to the schoolyard.
The 1990s through to 2008, with statistics showing an increase in police due to a
federally funded police-in-schools program known as “COPS Safe Schools Initiative
Program (CIS)” (Haberman, 2014) accurately follows the money. The Columbine High
School and Sandyhook Elementary School shootings boosted funding, even when
evidence refuted the need for increased safety measures following the public’s
cataclysmic panic and fear of the superpredator in previous years (Fine et al., 2003;
Petteruti, 2011).
Before the existence of SROs (Mulqueen, 1999), police agencies had traditionally
provided many kinds of support to schools. The ideal community-based partnership
between police agencies and schools could be indispensable for creating and maintaining
supportive and safe schools (Canady et al., 2012). Arguably, through COPS, SROs would
represent a more interconnected relationship between local police departments and the
school community in that agency’s jurisdiction. The initial marketing rationale for
placing these SROs, sworn law-enforcement officers, in schools was to provide (a) safety
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experts and law enforcers, (b) liaisons to community resources, and (c) participants in a
school learning environment as informal counselors and educators (Jones, 2000).
The bonus for police departments that sought to enhance their image and
relationship with youth (West & Fries, 1995) was that they found a location to do so in
the more casual contained academic environment. SROs or embedded law enforcement
presence on K–12 public school campuses affected schools in one way or another
(Theriot, 2016). Through the CIS initiatives and federally funded programs enacted or
enhanced on the heels of mass school shootings by juveniles, exactly how many police,
SROs, or private security guards were currently working in U.S. public schools, paid by
federal funds, was unknown. The U.S. Department of Education, the DOJ, and even
state-level police agencies do not have accurate numbers because no mechanism was put
in place to track the numbers or the federal dollars from every presidential administration
since the program’s inception. Presidential support came from a combination of President
Nixon linking the two words war and drugs, then President Reagan championing the
phrase “War on Drugs” (Dufton, 2012) through to the Obama administration after the
Sandyhook Elementary School shootings (Aseltine, 2010).
Evidence accrued that by continuously keeping police in K–12 schools’ settings
(forming a normative scenario), by increasing the number of police in schools, or by
strategically galvanizing political and public opinion supporting police in schools,
reasoning that SROs and police were placed into public schools for safety and learning
(Lind, 2015; Weiler & Cray, 2011), the program would remain a staple in the educational
bureaucracy. Beginning in the 21st century, the National Association of School Resource
Officers and police departments across the country, through a coordinated strategic
public-relations campaign, marketed themselves to whole school communities (see Table
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3). Politicians engaged to gain voter support for safe schools (Canady et al., 2012). These
factors aligned with inferior record keeping and virtually no transparency or
accountability by the U.S. Department of Education and DOJ, despite millions of dollars
over decades (Dignity in Schools Campaign, Bay Area Chapter, 2017) being funneled
into these SRO programs. The police had become deeply embedded in U.S. K–12 schools
and their cultures (Lind, 2015; Weiler & Cray, 2011) with a free hand to designate their
on-campus responsibilities. SRO programs, such as CIS, maintain they are integral to the
school community and as significant as school teachers and school administrators
(Canady et al., 2012; Theriot & Anfara, 2011).
Table 3
Percentage of Sworn Law Enforcement Officers or School Resource Officers
Permanently Assigned to Public School from 2013–2014 in the United States
Scholastic level

% of law
enforcement

School districts

99.2

Schools

99.5

Elementary schools
(excluding justice facilities)

24.0

High schools (excluding justice facilities)

42.0

High Schools with higher Latino and Black Populations (excluding Justice facilities)

51.0

Note. Statistics from 2013–14 Civil Rights Data Collection: A First look: Key Data Highlights on Equity
and Opportunity Gaps in Our Nation’s Public Schools, by U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights 2016, retrieved from https://ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf

Training programs, such as the one conducted at the respected Johns Hopkins
University, teach police officers how to make themselves part of a school’s onsite
administration, attending staff meetings and all official school functions. The National
Association of School Resource Officers supports police in schools as educators and
counselors, as well as promotes the ideology that officers are an immediate and
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imperative bridge between school and a municipalities’ law-enforcement body (Canady
et al., 2012; Goralczyk, 2004). At schools, many SROs are so completely incorporated in
the school community that they handle any disciplinary matters; many researchers and
authors have posited this leads to the criminalization of student behavior, “wherein
students are arrested and introduced to the juvenile justice system for relatively minor
behaviors” that previously were handled by school-site principals, grade-specific deans,
counselors, or teachers (Hirschfield, 2008; Theriot, 2016).
Nevertheless, the superpredator phenomena deepened its traction through
mainstream media’s depictions of youth of color as remorseless criminals, regardless of
actual declining juvenile-crime statistics (Elikann, 1999). Furthermore, without the
political capitalization on the public’s mass and predictively racism-laced hysteria, lawenforcement officers and SRO programs may have remained a minor player in the on-site
education arena. The opposite, however, became the reality in public education. History
demonstrates that SRO programs became a mainstay of U.S. school systems, with much
of their focus on schools predominately populated with urban schools and students of
color (Casella, 2003a).
The SRO Program contributes to the Profiling and Marginalizing of Youth of Color
This subsection explained how SROs, once established in public schools, used
their programmatic mandates to enforce zero-tolerance policies as a part of the academicdiscipline structure on school campuses, which exponentially began contributing to the
profiling and marginalizing of youth of color. In some cases, school districts applied
zero-tolerance policies to different types of behaviors exhibited by students who did not
possess guns. The application of zero-tolerance policies to minor incidents, such as
pranks, talking on a mobile device in class, or standing in the hallway after the class-
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transition bell rang led to suspensions, expulsions, or, in extreme cases, ticketing, arrests,
and referrals to juvenile courts (Aseltine, 2010; Petteruti, 2011, Theriot, 2009). To
enforce zero-tolerance policies, school districts would use surveillance measures in
schools such as metal detectors, locker checks, security cameras, on-campus SROs, or
security personnel. Minor infractions such as scuffles, truancies, and cursing, traditionally
handled by teachers, counselors, deans, and school principals, were being handled
directly by SROs and criminalizing youth of color (Bernburg, Krohn, & Rivera, 2006;
Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008). When SROs handled discipline issues in schools (see
Table 4), they were often strongly supported by administrators and community members,
especially after “a high profile, racially charged” criminal case, publicized through local
media reports, allowed a new process of governing through crime (Fleury-Steiner et al.,
2009, p. 5).
In surveys conducted by Fine et al. (2003) of the 133 youth (ages 16–21), 83%
who participated in follow-up telephone interviews indicated that they (predominately
African American and Latino) had regularly experienced microaggressions equating to
“disrespect or suspicion” (p. 153) from police or security guards in neighborhood stores
or schools. Students also noted that simply wearing their own stylized “contemporary
urban attire” (Fine et al., 2003, p. 154) led to increasingly being profiled by school
authorities, assuming youth to be criminals.
Rios (2006) discovered that boys of color as young as 8 years were swept up into
the criminal justice systems and within their school settings were seen, Ferguson’s
research (2000) uncovered that youth of color in school settings with police present were
together treated as endangered species, but also as criminals that should be feared,
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essentially casualties of their own actions and situations (Cann, 2015). Cann’s research
supports Ferguson’s summary about media and “popular culture’s representations of
Black and Brown youth took on significance in schools as Black boys in particularly
were mistreated, underserved, referred to special education, suspended, and expelled at
higher rates than their White peers” (p. 292).
Table 4
Percentage of Juveniles, Aged16–19, Interactions with Police in the United States
Type of Interaction

% of U.S. population

All police contact

3.5

Use of police force

30.1

Use of police force, initiated by police

80.1

Note. From If Not Now, When? A Survey of Juvenile Justice Training in America’s Police Academies, by L.
H. Thurau, P. Buckley, G. Gann, & J. Wald, 2013, retrieved from http://strategiesforyouth.org/sfysite/wpcontent/uploads/2013/03/SFYReport_02-2013_rev.pdf

Executive director of the National Association of School Resource Officers
Canady, responding to a Los Angeles judge’s comment that SROs might have a difficult
time differentiating between handling discipline and handling disorderly conduct or
assault, said “the good officer recognizes the difference between a scuffle and an assault”
(Sanburn, 2015; Taylor, 2015). However, SROs from across the country are using tasers
and pepper spray on students spending too much time in the hallways or not moving
along during class transition.
Critics of zero-tolerance policies observed that instances of an enabled police
presence on school campuses, along with the media’s ongoing portrayal of Black and
Brown youth, particularly young men, has resulted in juveniles of color (Skiba &
Peterson, 1999; Witt, 2007) being subjected to harshest treatment and punishments for
minor infractions at much higher rates than other non-youth-of-color students with the
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same numbers or types of infractions (Aseltine, 2010; Colombi & Osher, 2015; Dignity
in Schools Campaign Bay Area Chapter [DSC Bay Area], 2017; Theriot, 2009). Youth
who even experience contact with police on campus, out-of-school suspensions, and
expulsions are statistically moved closer and closer to the school-to-prison pipeline, when
not in the classroom learning (NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 2013). In
2006, in Birmingham, Alabama, more than 1,000 students were directly or indirectly
exposed to police on campus pepper spraying. Elsewhere, one pregnant high school teen
was pepper sprayed by an SRO in a hallway because she was crying (Klein, 2015) and
was then hospitalized.
The continued uptick in instances of brutality toward girls of color by campus
SROs intimates a police culture from these news headlines:
•

Diabetic High School Girl Beaten by Police Officer and Arrested—For
Falling Asleep in Class.

•

School Guards Break Child’s Arm and Arrests Her For Dropping Cake.

•

8-year-old Special Needs Student Handcuffed, Arrested for Tantrum at
School.

•

Detroit Student Suspended For Rest Of The Year Over Pocketknife Found In
Purse.

•

SRO arrests 16-yr old in class after flipping her out of her chair and dragging
student across floor (Crenshaw, Ocen, & Nanda, 2015; Sanburn, 2015)

SRO programs and embedded in-school law-enforcement officers are often a
reflection of their police station’s culture and law-enforcement-community culture across
the country. That community and culture permeates law-enforcement agencies that reside
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in the culture of the prison–industrial complex (Davis, 1998) and mass incarceration
historically has targeted people of color. This culture has been the bedrock of mass
incarceration and tends to destabilize communities of color and unnecessarily traumatizes
youth from those communities.
Structural Racism and the School to Prison Pipeline
Through the CRT lens, racism is a normative condition in society. Structural
racism endures as it is fixed in and throughout policies, mandates, and laws that govern
the everyday lives of all citizens (Lawrence et al., 2004). Students of color are educated
and must exist in a system of structural racism that contains barriers and obstacles
preventing them from thriving or surviving outside the prison–industrial complex.
Many social scientists were markedly disturbed by the skyrocketing increase in
juvenile arrests, incarceration, and activity in the juvenile-justice system and youth court
cases, as well as the ongoing duration of activity in response to superpredator theory,
when statistically juvenile crime was dropping by nearly two-thirds from 1994 to 2011
(Haberman, 2014). Actual figures proved the opposite of the juvenile superpredator
theory and subsequent hysteria that had swept the country, but school-policing presence
continued to increase (Bowditch, 1993).
Most research on law enforcement in schools points to the creation and
enhancement of the school-to-prison pipeline (Eckholm, 2013; Kilpatrick, 2010) without
receiving substantive input from affected school-community members. Further research
needs to better understand the perceptions of high school students, for example, regarding
the presence of police on campus. Large gaps persist in the body of knowledge of what
influences embedded police on a public-school campus have when viewed through the
school community’s various members’ perspectives.
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In addition, further supportive inquiry needs to be understood from students who
have experienced trauma from interactions with on-campus police or SROs (Theriot,
2016; Theriot & Orme, 2014) assigned to enforce zero-tolerance discipline.
Current research directed at U.S. schools using zero-tolerance policies on K–12
campuses has paved a direct link into the juvenile- and criminal-justice systems (Brown,
2015b; Donohue et al., 1998; Ghandnoosh, 2014, 2015; Petteruti, 2011), and students are
regularly targeted for arrests when the offense warrants discipline in the education arena
(Thurau et al., 2013). Few comprehensive longitudinal studies in the United States
focused on links between zero-tolerance policies that lead to more suspensions and
expulsions that lead to more arrests for youth of color.
Monahan, VanDerhei, Bechtold, and Cauffman (2014) conducted empirical
research of 6,636 months of data over a 2-year period from students who were suspended,
expelled, or truant (n = 1354) as a result of the school’s zero-tolerance policies. The
study’s participants, aged 14–19 were 41.5% Black or African American descent, 33.5%
Hispanic or Latin American descent, and 20.2% White, with 86% identifying themselves
as male (p. 1110). During the study timeframe, all the students were enrolled in school
while school was in session and revealed in interviews that they were arrested while out
of school under suspension, expulsion, or truancy.
Results showed that students who were pushed out of school through an enforced
theory of deterrence have 2.10 more chance of being arrested when they are suspended
than students in school. Studies showed that students who were truant from school had a
2.42 higher chance of being arrested than those students in school (see Table 5, adapted
from Monahan et al, 2014). Because higher numbers of suspended, expelled, or truant
students were students of color (Black/African American or Hispanic/Latin American),
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they were more likely to be arrested than their White peers by not being in school, due to
zero-tolerance policies.
Table 5
Black and Hispanic Students More Likely to be Arrested Than White Students (When All
Were Suspended or Truant)

Decent

Percentage

Chance of being arrested
Chance of being arrested
while suspended
compared to suspended while truant compared to
truant White students
n = 1,354
White students

Black or African American

41.5

562

2.10

2.42

Hispanic or Latin American

33.5

454

2.10

2.42

Whites

20.2

274

—

—

Note. Adapted from “School Yard to the Squad Car: School Discipline, Truancy, and Arrest” by K. C.
Monahan, S. VanDerhei, J. Bechtold, & E. Cauffman, 2014, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 43, p.
1116. doi:10.1007/s10964-014-0103-1. Used with permission, see Appendix C.

Part of the ongoing debate on the widespread devastation and the long-term harm to
overall learning environments caused to students and their families involve police. This
remains true when they encounter law-enforcement officers on school campuses, turning
the school site into disciplinary institutions, with roads leading to the criminal-justice
system and not to higher learning.
The Culture of Mass Incarceration Traumatizes Youth of Color
Alexander explains in the book, The New Jim Crow (2010), that the U.S.
criminal-justice system uses mass incarceration as a newer form of racism, dubbed
colorblindness (p. 2). The colorblind lens was used heavily in the Reagan era War on
Drugs, intentionally criminalizing, prosecuting, and incarcerating people of color at rates
much higher than White counterparts, particularly more vulnerable youth. The War on
Drugs gave people of color “what they deserve” because the U.S. was now being “tough
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on crime” and “not coddling them,” operationalized through expanded budgets for
criminal-justice systems at the federal, state, and local levels (Alexander, 2010).
Black and white Americans conflicting evaluations of the criminal justice system
also extend to their differing explanations for African Americans’ higher rates of
arrest and incarceration. White Americans more often attribute this disparity to
higher rates of crime among blacks and to lack of respect for authority among
black youth; black respondents more often point to a biased police force and
justice system” (Ghandnoosh, 2014, p. 29).
The United States has had an ongoing understanding that in criminal-justice
systems, favor is extended and sometime permanent for imprisonment rather than
rehabilitation or restorative opportunities for those convicted of crimes, particularly when
the positive outcomes could serve communities of color (Alexander, 2010). The targeted
wave of mass incarceration has disrupted many homes and families that were already
struggling to balance economic and educational disadvantage. Researchers termed this
disruption that reaches beyond criminal-justice systems and into communities “the
collateral consequences of mass imprisonment” (Chesney-Lind & Mauer, 2003, p. 1).
Nellis, with the Sentencing Project, analyzes criminal-justice data and recently
authored a Sentencing Project Report (2016), that reflects U.S. incarceration rates for
people of color compared to those of Whites. The report shows that Blacks are being
jailed five times, and in some states, 10 times more than Whites; Hispanics are jailed at
least four times more than Whites (Nellis, 2016). In California, for example, Latino and
Black youth being tried as adults outdistance their White peers at exponentially
disproportionate incarceration rates. Black and Brown youth are “2.5 times more likely
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than white kids to be arrested, 6.2 times more likely to be tried in adult court, and 7 times
more likely to be sent to prison by adult courts” (Males & Macallair, 2000, p. 7) than
White children. The media’s depictions of jails filled with people of color paints a bleak
picture for youth of color and their future in the United States.
As long as CIS and SRO programs have existed, the U.S. Department of Labor
and DOJ have provided very little documentation, tracking whether CIS Initiatives have
created more instances of police brutality and police–student interactions, leading to
increased arrests of youth in public schools. The focus for these agencies had been
anecdotal evidence and strategic communications that led back to superpredator juveniles
and the unfortunate instances of mass shootings in public schools, employed to justify
directing the public’s attention to and calling public schools some of the most unsafe
places for our children to be in the nation (Kilpatrick, 2010; Taylor, 2015). The American
Civil Liberties Union has continued to file law suits across the country on behalf of
students, many with disabilities, who have been taunted, physically abused, and arrested
at the hands of school police officers using force as discipline for classroom behaviors
(Brown, 2015a).
The exponential growth of the racially motivated use of excessive force by police
noted that Americans have become accustomed and are at ease with a strong-armed
police force to manage issues with minority citizens that are perceived as problems
(Goldsmith, 2016). Mainstream media compounded this public perception through their
representations of youth of color, leading to implications of how students are seen and
“handled” in their own schools. The use of excessive force, on many occasions,
accompanied the zero-tolerance ideology and policy enforcement, tracked
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from a 1989 Supreme Court decision, Graham v. O’Connor. In that case, the court
misinterpreted the Fourth Amendment and established the modern definition of
“excessive force,” the legal term that references an enabled police force that
repeatedly equates to police brutality … couched in conservative theories of
personal responsibility, for a powerful police force. (Goldsmith, 2016, p. 192)
In a survey conducted by Weitzer (2000), published in the Law & Society Review
with 147 African American participants, youth participants noted differences in how
police treat Whites and Blacks through their lived examples. For example, “When Black
people walk with our hands in our pockets, we look like we’re up to something. When a
white man walk with his hands [in his pockets] we know he cold” (p. 138). A female
participant indicated when asked “Why,” stated, “If you’re Black there’s a presumption
of guilt, a presumption of wrongdoing if you’re stopped” (Weitzer, 2000, p. 138).
Another young male participant added an example:
If they stop a White guy at 3 in the morning, they’ll figure he was working late
and he’s on his way home to see his wife. You stop a Black person at 3 in the
morning and figure he was up to no good, or just got through robbing a store,
shooting somebody or whatever. Always assuming the worst when it’s someone
of color. (Weitzer, 200, p. 138)
The evidence and research indicated that police–student interactions on public
school campuses have long-lasting negative impacts on the lives of public school students
(DSC Bay Area, 2017; Thurau et al., 2013). Study data indicate that youth believed
police have undertaken the parental role and that if circumstances denote an arrest, the
police should explain the reason for the illegal behavior before an arrest happens “to help

59
them navigate the world of peers, parents, and schools” (Thurau et al, 2013, p. 10). Youth
believe police do not listen to them, their perspectives are disregarded, and lawenforcement officials assume they are guilty upon initial encounters. The effects of mass
incarceration have had rippling consequences for youth of color. These range from virtual
police states in neighborhoods to family caregivers being placed in jail for child abuse,
based on unsubstantiated accusations from anonymous callers.
Marginalization and Traumatization of Youth of Color
Students’ feelings about the treatment of youth/students, due to increased
numbers of police in their schools or the increased presence of law enforcement in their
neighborhoods were the focus of several researchers (Fine et al., 2003; Theriot & Anfara,
2011; Weitzer, 2000). The Fine et al. (2003) surveys noted that students of color had a
different perspective about police on school campus than their White peers: “in each
instance the youth were ‘scared’ or ‘shocked’ at the behavior of the police, and report
feeling as though it would be hard to trust police in the future” (p. 152). Students held
lasting and negative impressions about their interactions with the police, on-campus and
off-campus. One Caucasian student noted being targeted through an association with
“Black kids” (Fine et al., 2003, p. 153) when she was in a car with everyone behaving,
which left the student with negative impressions of the police. Struggling with their own
dysconscious racism, multiple African American students indicated that they were
resigned to the unfair circumstances, simply saying that they were “used to it” (Fine et
al., 2003, p. 154), and felt unwanted in their schools, neighborhood stores, and their own
communities.
Theriot’s (2016) surveys of various students’ feelings about whether on-campus
police presence hindered their ability to feel connected to their school, hinged on how
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many interactions students had with the SRO throughout the school year. The author
concluded that there were more positive attitudes about police for students with increased
interactions with SROs (2016), and most students surveyed were “predominantly
Caucasian (n = 1,266; 65%)” (p. 456), as well as “students who have witnessed other
students be arrested for less serious offenses may feel less connected at school if they
have recurrent fear or stress about making minor disturbances that may result in their own
arrest” (Theriot, 2016, p. 461).
The International Association of Chiefs of Police report acknowledged, in 2012,
that the police are not exhibiting enough of an understanding of youth vulnerability
during their interactions and interrogation sessions with youth. This lack of empathy
about juveniles’ developmental stages during questioning occurs whether the youth is a
victim, a witness, or a suspect in the given situation (Thurau et al., 2013). Proponents of
their removal from the education landscape advance that juvenile arrest rates tell the story
for both sides (Donohue et al., 1998; Petteruti, 2011). Youth of color are losing
psychologically, emotionally, economically, and educationally.
However, police are in school communities seeking to change these realities and
perceptions of law enforcement. For example, with all the turmoil that has occurred in
Chicago’s streets, specifically the violent interactions between police and youth, the
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement started a new program in which
African American police officers go into inner city schools and educate students about
their work and about how to interact with the police. Much discussion ensues on a
person’s “civil rights under the law,” explained by the officers to students in an ageappropriate manner (Brotman, 2015). This example of police working with children of all
ages is located in their most frequent setting other than home: the classroom.
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In Richmond, California, the police department offers training to SROs about how
to interact with youth, noting their developmental abilities and brain structures to
diminish the opportunities for clashes (Keierleber, 2015). These lessons are spreading
across the country, as in 2012, with Colorado’s Peace Officer Standards and Training
Board, which developed specialized coursework for SROs to have minimum
requirements that must be met before being assigned to an on-campus job. Through
structured youth-focused trainings and community partnerships that include psychosocial
and physical aspects of children, police and onsite SROs are finding many ways to
support positive school environments by fully embracing the whole school community.
These are instances of the effort of law-enforcement agencies attempting to shift their
internal cultures.
Pockets of law-enforcement agencies believe some of their impact on youth of
color can be harmful. Researchers documented law-enforcement officers’ behaviors
toward youth of color, supported by government leadership and academic leaders,
verifying the harm caused. The United States, and by extension, its law-enforcement
agencies have a culture in which race issues that play out every day detrimentally in
communities of color and for students of color in the schools, push them into the margins
of society.
Summary
This literature review assembled the four following claims of fact: (a) the
superpredator phenomenon contributes to the SRO program embedding law-enforcement
officers in U.S. schools, (b) the SRO program contributes to unwarranted profiling that
marginalizes youth of color in schools, (c) existence of structural racism and the schoolto-prison pipeline, and (d) the culture of mass incarceration traumatizes youth of color.
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Inundated by unjustifiable theories of deterrence, along with broken windows
zero-tolerance policies enforced by embedded law-enforcement officers in their schools
and neighborhoods, the literature review discloses how Black and Brown students
encounter overwhelming forces that distress the delicate balance of their tight-knit
communities. The review also used elements of a CRT lens, such as dysconscious racism,
to corroborate these claims experienced by youth of color, explaining their intransitive
consciousness. Dysconscious racism is largely due to inequitable dominant-class
privilege.
Each claim of fact taken alone did not lead to a distinct why or illustrate directly
how police in schools assist in ostracizing students of color from the academic landscape.
However, when the claims are combined with joint reason (Machi & McAvoy, 2016) as
one claim of interpretation, the needed logic to justify the conclusion that embedded lawenforcement officers placed in schools forces youth of color into the margins of their
academic environment, deeply traumatizing them.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study was to explore the experiences and effects of embedded
on-campus police presence for members of the TMAHS Community who were present
on campus on October 11, 2002 during the police riot. Specifically, this study used the
theory of deterrence and other supportive theories to investigate study participants’
understandings of what motivated SRO and law-enforcement behaviors on their campus.
Additionally, this study discerned how members of TMAHS Community have addressed
any personal issues propagated by the incident in their lives as students (and now as
adults), educators, and parents in SFUSD.
A secondary research component in this dissertation is a document analysis of The
San Francisco Chronicle’s news reporting articles from October 2002 through September
2004. The articles recount the events from the riot to the seating of the new San Francisco
Police Commission and their request for a public hearing and investigation by the OCC
on the event. The third and fixed research component to triangulate the data is that of the
experiences of the researcher, a longtime member of the TMAHS Community,
accompanied by the historical and contextual data presented to frame the TMAHS school
creation, community, and climate and the October 11, 2002 riot. Additionally, the
researcher provided context regarding the sociopolitical climate of San Francisco from
the late 1990s through the early 2000s as a reference of the events that occurred around
the school.
Restatement of the Purpose
This chapter focuses on the methodology of the study to explore the feelings and
beliefs of TMAHS community members about the actions of law-enforcement officers on
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their school campus and in their lives before and after the riot. This study sought to
understand how and in what ways their lives were impacted by permanently assigned
law-enforcement officers or SROs. Finally, the goal was to discern the impact on them
and the environment of their high school.
A Case Study
Qualitative research, as described by Creswell (2012), is a type of educational
research in which the researcher relies on the views of participants, asking broad, general
questions; collects data consisting largely of words (or texts) from participants; and
describes and analyzes these words seeking themes. The research for this dissertation was
a case study, inherently qualitative (Creswell, 2012; Yin, 2009) of the TMAHS October
11th riot. Case-study research, as described by Creswell (2012), was not so much a
methodology but a use of qualitative research design that was constricted by the time of
the occurrence in a binary place that investigated a real-world phenomenon, experience,
or situation with as much depth and detail as possible.
Other authors have defined case-study research as a strategy of inquiry (Creswell,
2012; Yin, 2009) that follows a path of deep observation to understand and describe a
phenomenon that occurred at a noted time and place. Roberts (2010) described the
important elements of case study as “rather than number, the data are words that describe
people’s knowledge, opinions, perceptions, and feelings as well as detailed descriptions
of people’s actions, behaviors, activities, and interpersonal interactions” (p. 143).
An influencing study factor for this research was the comparative case study
(CCS) explained by Bartlett and Vavrus in Rethinking Case Study Research (2016). A
comparative case study contains aspects that were an excellent fit for “social research
about practice and policy” (p. 1) traditionally associated with groups of people, an
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individual person, or a type of organization (APA, 2016) for the TMAHS 10/11 riot
inquiry. In CCS, the practice component considers study participants, their varying
behaviors and objectives, and their hierarchical positions, as ascribed to the environments
that regularly interact in the “social and cultural worlds” in which they exist.
Concurrently, the policy component of CCS is so deeply intertwined with the influential
political practices of those people, involved in denoting, defining, and directing how they
manage issues and problems, that it is hard to clearly distinguish each intersecting aspect
of CCS for its effective and more common use in other types research (Bartlett & Vavrus,
2016). This was exemplified when the TMAHS Community interacted with the city
government and SFUSD offices after the riot, on the school’s campus, at school board
meetings, or at police-commission hearings, explored during the inquiry with
participants.
Research for this study used these overlapping circumstances in the case study
through a historical narrative by the researcher, narrative-producing inquiry, and
reflections, as well as document analysis that contained the following descriptors:
1. Researched and verified recollections from this dissertation researcher,
introducing TMAHS, the TMAHS climate, the TMAHS Community, and the
TMAHS 10/11 riot.
2. Conducted face-to-face (or online video when face-to face was not possible)
interviews with 10 members of the TMAHS Community.
3. Extracted narrative historical timelines from all research participants, former
students, teachers, and parents of the TMAHS school community.
4. Analyzed multiyear documents from The San Francisco Chronicle newspaper
covering the TMAHS police riot and its aftermath.
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Through these inquiry processes and analyses, the study sought to gain a deeper
understanding of how each participant viewed events at TMAHS before the beginning of
the 2002 academic year, then specifically on October 11, 2002, and afterwards.
Furthermore, this study discerned how all of their TMAHS experiences impacted their
lives.
Research Setting
Using the snowball-sample technique, the researcher contacted potential TMAHS
participants, asking them to contact others with whom they maintained relationships over
the years from their time at TMAHS. The goal was to gain as many potential participants
as possible. The hope was that the snowball method would gain more participants than
needed for the study but understanding that time and place constraints eliminated some
participants from participation in the study. The researcher conducted interviews with as
many participants as were minimally required as a realistic sample size to be interviewed.
Once a participant’s contact information was confirmed, the researcher began
communicating through e-mail and telephone to explain the preinterview and interview
processes. The preinterview process consisted of the participant receiving a succession of
e-mail messages, an introductory human-subjects packet that contained (a) a
memorandum explaining what research was being conducted and why they were
requested for selection, (b) a review of IRB protocols for individual interview guiding
questions, and (c) a letter of consent to participate. All participants had to return approved
consent before further study communication took place with them, other than answering
questions about the process. The researcher provided participants with the researcher’s
contact information to elicit any questions, as well as the opportunity to ask any questions
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before interviews began. Participants again had an opportunity to ask questions about the
process after their interviews concluded.
All interviews were audio recorded and, if available with the permission of the
participant, video recorded. This manner of research allowed the researcher and
participant to focus on each other directly and casually, eliminating as many distractions
as possible to capture all the participant said. The researcher took some field notes for
general information about participants, taking care to observe participants’ body language
or behaviors throughout interviews.
All study participants resided in the State of California. More narrowly, the
research was conducted in the Greater San Francisco Bay Area, because most participants
lived in the geographic nine counties of the that area: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin,
Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, and Sonoma. Participants had the
option to take part in a quiet public location convenient for them such as a local library or
coffee shop. However, most interviews were conducted in participants’ homes, places of
work, or by video conference at a time and location most convenient to study
participants.
Research Population
This case study included several types of school-environment participants:
1. Five former TMAHS educators with historical knowledge of the TMAHS
mission and philosophies over a 4- to 5-year period, which included the
timeframe of the October 11, 2002;
2. Three former TMAHS students, who were at TMAHS before the October 11,
2002 riot, on campus during the riot, and were still enrolled at TMAHS after
the riot;
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3. Two parents of former TMAHS students enrolled at TMAHS before the
October 11, 2002 riot, on campus during the riot, and still enrolled at TMAHS
after the riot; and
4. The case-study researcher, noting the integral component played in presenting
and unearthing historical documents and perspectives important to the study.
Additionally, a wide net was cast for other participants that included people
capable of making decisions about TMAHS or in positions of power in SFUSD or San
Francisco. This outreach included those who had specific influence over the city’s
southeast sector, the Bayview–Hunters’ Point community (including then Mayor Willie
L. Brown and Supervisor Sophie Maxwell), where TMAHS is situated in Supervisorial
District 10 boundaries. District 10, historically, was a base of the African American
community in San Francisco.
The thickness (or richness of detail) for this case study was enhanced through
explanation and clarification by individuals that offered insight to the dynamics of the
school district and San Francisco politics during the late 1990s through early 2000s, but
preferred complete anonymity for this dissertation. Thicker detail was created with the
anonymous commentary combined with participants’ and researcher’s ability to
remember the Thurgood Marshall campus and surrounding environment before the event,
during, and afterwards, through differing lenses, consideration of their ages, their status
in the school, and their relationships to one another in the TMAHS Community (aligned
with Botelho & Ellis, 2015; Creswell, 2012).
In preparing for the fieldwork, the researcher conducted preinterviews to test that
all recording equipment worked well and notations could be made with minimal effort.
The fieldwork pretest provided guidance about the researcher’s demeanor and ability to
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ask semistructured interview questions, while gaining insight to participants’ actual
comments and answers in the allotted time for each interview. Interviews ranged from 20
minutes to nearly 4 hours in length.
Questions to Guide Initial Dialogues
The semistructured interviews and follow-up discussions for clarification and
corrections are listed below and were presented in an open-ended fashion to each study
participant:
1. Describe the school culture of TMAHS when you arrived.
2. Describe the school culture at TMAHS from 2002 to 2007, as you recall.
3. What type of interactions did you (as an educator, parent or student) have with
the SROs at TMAHS before 2002?
4. Why do you think SROs were stationed at TMAHS?
5. Since your time at TMAHS, have you been able to turn that riot into a driver
of positive change in your life? Can you share any examples?
Reliability
The researcher conducted interrater reliability (Roberts, 2010) in the prefieldwork
phase to make certain the questions consistently measured what they were meant to draw
from participants. The researcher then interpreted the data subjectively, when analysis
contradicted the software’s analysis. This discovery led to a rechecking of transcribed
dialogue to verify participant text. Each participant had an opportunity to review their
transcribed interview to check for completeness, edits, and what would be included in
dissertation.
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Data Collection
The data-collection methodology of the qualitative case-study research in this
dissertation targeted members of the TMAHS Community (students, educators, and
parents), newspaper articles from The San Francisco Chronicle (2002–2004), and from
the dissertation researcher’s historical experiences as a TMAHS Community member.
Former TMAHS students were (in 2017) between the ages of 29 and 32, assuming they
were between 14 and 17 years old in the second year of high school. In addition to
student participants, the researcher used a snowball approach and sought other TMAHS
educators and parents, to provide their perspectives. The participants, once they had
responded to a formal or informal request to participate in the study, were sent detailed
information about the study. After affirming a clear desire to participate, these individuals
were sent an e-mail containing an IRB consent form with research-process details and
information denoting their participant rights. Participant dialogues took place either as
face-to-face discussions or by scheduled video conferencing and ranged from 20 minutes
to approximately 240 minutes.
The recorded interview data, once collected from each participant, were
transcribed and read by the researcher for transcription accuracy. The researcher followed
up with participants to obtain clarifications. The researcher then asked participants to
review their interview excerpts for accuracy, edits, and questions for clarification. Once
completed, many of the approved excerpts appear in the dissertation document.
Generally, intimate personal information or specific details naming educators or students
not participating in the study was excised from excerpt consideration or labels were
substituted for names such as Teacher or Mr. X, with participants’ approval. Participant
identities were masked by eliminating race and gender and truncating occupation details
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to provide strict confidentiality. Some participants preferred to only offer guiding
contextual information and remain completely anonymous in the research. Anonymous
participants were not counted in study figures and are only referenced when their
contextual insight was necessary. Subsequently, each participant’s transcribed document
was entered into a qualitative text-analysis software to help the researcher categorize and
code the interviews, which eventually led to emerging themes and subthemes.
Data collection regarding The San Francisco Chronicle articles consisted of a
keyword research on the newspaper’s website and locating all the articles in the time
parameters of the riot and its aftermath: October 12, 2002 through to September 24, 2004.
The San Francisco Chronicle document analysis sought to reveal whether The Chronicle
lead its readership toward a biased perspective in finding who was at fault or accountable
for the riot (the TMAHS Community or law-enforcement personnel). The Chronicle
reported the events that occurred at the High School in the southeast sector of the city.
The data collected from the researcher’s experiences appear in the introduction (Chapter
I) of the dissertation, presented to familiarize the reader with TMAHS, its philosophy,
mission, and student population, aligned with the Consent Decree, the documented
circumstances leading up to the October 11, 2002 riot, and the sociopolitical history of
San Francisco as it pertains to TMAHS.
Data Analysis
From the semistructured interviews, the researcher unearthed emerging themes
and used coding to establish relationships for a more thorough understanding of the
current perspectives of these people today, as they recollected what happened to them,
their children, and their students 15 years ago. Deductive analysis of the interview themes
supported a comprehensive inductive analysis to evaluate data from specific and constant
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codes that emerged from the analysis. To further assist in the process of coding efforts
and theme production of qualitative and quantitative data, the researcher relied on the
data-analysis software.
Historical and detailed document analysis added to the thickness of the case-study
research, revealing trends in public perceptions of the school with or without police
presence. The document analysis encompassed reporting of The San Francisco Chronicle
from the time of the TMAHS October 12, 2002 riot through September 24, 2004,
following the initial hearing by the San Francisco Police Commission more than 2 years
after the incident (Yin, 2009). The print media featuring TMAHS served as the prominent
local news perspectives on occurrences in and around the City and County of San
Francisco, California.
In reviewing the series of articles, the researcher noted an emerging “collection of
instances” or repeated descriptions and metaphors that revealed certain types of reporting
themes about the event: public perceptions, relationships, and social codes about people
involved in the event, put forward in the ongoing articles. A pattern arose in the reporting
that indicated bias toward the students and staff of TMAHS regarding the actual riot
triggers, posturing the TMAHS Community against law-enforcement officers for this
catastrophe’s impact on the community (Creswell, 2012). The researcher coded an initial
analysis of themes, then revisited through matching by the researcher.
The coding helped sort through the mass of case-study interview data and print
media data to bring about patterns that retold the story of behaviors and underlying
actions of participants involvement at the school, as well as behavior patterns of
policymakers after the riot. The interviews revealed patterns that extended beyond the
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Thurgood Marshall 10/11 riot, with recollections about what led to the riot and what may
be learned from it, observed in the ongoing aftermath left in its wake.
Protection of Human Subjects
The role and responsibility of the researcher was to fulfill the complete obligation
to protect the rights of human subjects. The initial step was to finalize and submit the
application to the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects at the
University of San Francisco, which was also charged with the protection of volunteer
participants in research conduct through various projects. The application required
considerable explanation of the protection protocols employed by the researcher for the
protection of human participants in the research conducted. Once the application was
approved, the University of San Francisco (USF) School of Education, International and
Multicultural Education Department granted permission to conduct case-study research
and data collection.
A consent letter was sent by e-mail to participants, informing them of the scope of
the research and their involvement as volunteers, which occurred prior to conducting any
research. The consent letter notified research-participating TMAHS Community
members of their roles and responsibilities in participating in the data collection through
September 2017. The returned written consent forms with affirmative comment to
participate verified participants’ permission to conduct the research study by allowing
interviews for the expressed purpose of data collection. TMAHS Community members
retained the returned e-mail as their copy of the consent on behalf of the researcher.
All data and research records such as field notes, audio tapes, and transcribed
interviews were kept in a secured and locked filing cabinet in the researcher’s office, only
accessible to the researcher and hired research assistant during the data-collection
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process, when delivering and retrieving interviews transcribed by a paid and bondable
transcription service, during data analysis and writing of research results for the research
dissertation and university. The research assistant and transcriptionist signed a
confidentiality agreement to protect the rights of human subjects. The Institutional
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects reviewed the researcher’s
application and approved the study with human participants for this dissertation.
Background of Researcher
The researcher and her daughter lived near TMAHS several years before
becoming on-campus members of the Thurgood community. The researcher spent the day
on the TMAHS campus on October 10, 2002, as requested by the researcher’s daughter
(then a sophomore at the school) to witness the volatility of the school campus, described
then and again on October 11th (the day of the riot). Thus, the researcher is familiar with
the history of TMAHS. While at TMAHS, the researcher had been a walk-on girls’ track
and field coach (2001), a parent liaison (2001), and the Parent–Teacher–Student
Association President (2002–2003).
Additionally, the researcher was a citywide elected official on the SFUSD Board
of Education from 2007 through 2015. Over the years, the researcher has been in
possession of and had access to an inordinate amount of first-hand knowledge regarding
the October 11th events at TMAHS, and nearly all significant subsequent events since
that time, whether publicly documented or kept out of the public view. The researcher
also had ongoing relationships with a multitude of TMAHS Community members, the
school district, the CDE, San Francisco’s governing leaders, and leadership in the SFPD
and commission. The researcher made note of particular positionality (Louis & Barton,
2002) as an education policymaker and politician. Therefore, due to the richness of the
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researcher’s experience with the TMAHS Community, the researcher mediated bias by
memoing impressions before and after each participant interview to document ongoing
reflections of the researcher’s connection to the TMAHS Community.
Researcher Biography
The researcher is a former City and County Commissioner of the SFUSD Board
of Education, sworn into office in 2007 by then San Francisco District Attorney and now
U.S. Senator Harris, representing California. The researcher served as the Board’s vicepresident in 2008 and as its president in 2009, through the last major U.S. recession and
during the most difficult budgetary times for public schools across the country. The
researcher was reelected in 2010 and sworn in by then San Francisco City and County
Supervisor Campos, now Deputy Administrator for Santa Clara County.
The researcher was the initial and then leading Board of Education Commissioner
to champion all SFUSD graduates to complete the A–G course sequence as a
requirement, in addition to being the lead author for the district’s Restorative Justice
Initiative and the leading the SFUSD Infrastructure Implementation of Restorative
Practices. From these seminal areas of work on the Board of Education, the researcher
credits time as a parent, paraprofessional, and advocate for other educators and families
in the TMAHS Community. The researcher also cocreated and chaired the Board’s
Personnel and Labor Issues Committee to increase oversight and assist the Human
Resources Department in establishing a forum to discuss labor issues in an expeditious,
nonconfrontational manner.
The researcher recently completed a 3-year term with a global
Communication/Public Relations firm in San Francisco, collaborating with the highest
level of public-policy executives and political strategists in San Francisco to ensure
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government and client partnerships ran smoothly. During doctoral studies at the USF
School of Education, the researcher obtained a Teaching English to Speakers of Other
Languages Certification from UC Berkeley Extension in December 2016. The researcher
has also offered services, student-teaching English at night to refugees and recently
arrived immigrants while at USF and UC Berkeley Extension. The researcher plans to
attend law school, focused on education, once doctoral studies are completed.
The researcher is a Certified USA track and field coach who volunteers with local
youth and the Northern California Chapter of the International Special Olympics
Association. The researcher has one daughter, who also has one daughter who is
currently attending a Cantonese Chinese Immersion Elementary School and a Mandarin
Chinese Immersion Afterschool Program.
Ethical Considerations
Due to the nature of the police riot at TMAHS bringing up the details of that day
and its subsequent events, this study may have caused study participants some emotional
distress. Participants noted they felt anger toward the SFPD and the SFUSD. The
participants have not expressed suffering from any known or unknown psychological
issues, such as posttraumatic stress disorder (Meyerson, Grant, Carter, & Kilmer, 2011)
that may have not been addressed fully following their time at TMAHS and none arose
throughout the interview process.
The researcher was aware that traumatic events can serve as seismic challenges to
individuals’ trauma schema of themselves, others, their relationships, and the world, by
shattering their assumptions about the world and forcing a reconfiguration of goals,
beliefs, and worldview (as suggested by Meyerson et al., 2011, p. 950). Some participants
indicated they had worked through these issues over time and were continuing to do so.
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Specifically, participants commented on their own areas of difficulty when the researcher
had follow-up question(s) after participants recalled an unpleasant occurrence during this
period of the TMAHS 10/11 riot or afterwards.
Additionally, as a researcher who conducted research on and with members of the
TMAHS Community, of which the researcher is also a member, one must acknowledge
process dilemmas encountered. The researcher relived participants’ TMAHS experiences
with them through the interviewing and dialogue processes. The researcher experienced
moments of difficulty as participants’ painful memories and recollections prompted the
researcher to recall her own position, as well as time and place, in concert with each
participant in each discussion. To prevent interview bias, the researcher journaled and
memoed before and after participant dialogues as a debrief of researcher experiences.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to hear the reflective voices of TMAHS
Community members, particularly the sophomore class of 2002, about the October 11,
2002 police riot and the effects of SROs on their school culture before and after the riot.
This case study focused on the events of October 11, 2002, with comparative influences
from local historical print media. All participants received and were guided through IRB
protocols to ensure their clear understanding on what would happen before, during, and
after their interview sessions. Study participants were interviewed in a semistructured
manner with open-ended questions that sought the fullest reflection they could provide.
The local newspaper, covering the events that occurred at the school for nearly 2 years
after the riot, provided perspectives of the thoughts or perceptions of the larger San
Francisco community about October 11, 2002. The richness of the researcher’s
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background with the TMAHS, as noted in the researcher biography, was mediated
through pre- and postinterview memoing.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH FINDINGS
This qualitative case-study research focused on the unheard voices of the
SFUSD’s TMAHS community’s reflections on the school’s climate before, during, and
after the October 11, 2002 police riot. The intent of this case study was to explicitly
explore, from the perspective of TMAHS students, teachers, and parents, any unheard
thoughts or recollections about the school, its ambiance in the education community, and
what affects the October 11, 2002 event and time spent at the school had on their lives.
The qualitative research’s narrative/semistructured-interview format permitted the
researcher and participants to immerse in each individual one-on-one dialogue. The
sessions allowed for lengthy, free-flowing reflections from participants, with some
occasional follow-up from the researcher. Toward the beginning of each dialogue, the
researcher and participant spent time familiarizing themselves with each other. With the
exception of two participants, the researcher knew all participants from their previous
association at TMAHS. Of the two exceptions, the researcher and they met through an
online social-media platform specifically created for the TMAHS alumni community.
The researcher knew the second participant several years before becoming involved with
TMAHS. Although the platform indicated it was for school alumni, current and former
faculty, and family members of current and former students were granted membership in
the community. The general purpose of the platform was for the TMAHS Community to
remain in contact with each other, monitored by the TMAHS alum who created it. The
researcher had been granted membership long before this study took place.
This chapter has three sections. The first section of the chapter introduces study
participants. The second section discusses study findings from the themes generated from
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the participant–researcher dialogues that emerged from individual interview sessions and
follow-up clarification discussions. The third section summarizes study themes and
findings from the interviews with all 10 participants.
Overview
The study consisted of interviews with 10 participants who met the research
criteria. The criteria for participants were that they must have been either a student
enrolled, teacher working at, or parent with a student enrolled at TMAHS between the
years 2000 and 2007. This timeframe would have allowed the TMAHS Community
member to experience the school before the October 11, 2002 police riot, as well after the
riot. A document analysis of The San Francisco Chronicle’s 10/11 riot reporting, ranging
from October 12, 2002 through September 30, 2004, was used to observe the role of a
mainstream media source’s influence on the public’s opinion and whether it served as a
driver for future law-enforcement, political, and legislative activities.
All study participants’ identities were masked to provide confidentiality. Beyond
their relationship to TMAHS, participants had only a few attributes in common;
consequently, they were mainly unique and wide-ranging in background and reasons for
being at TMAHS (see Table 6). All participants still reside in northern California
counties. Participants’ ages range from approximately 30 years old to 65 years old. Of the
10 participants, five were women. All participants have worked directly in education, in
the education nonprofit sector. or with an education-support organization. Study
participants comprise of former TMAHS students, parents, and teachers.
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Table 6
Participant Demographics
TMAHS Community
member category

Self-identified gender

TMAHS Community
Current occupation
member resides within 9 considered ed-focused or
bay area counties
directly in education

Student 1

Female

No

Yes

Student 2

Male

Yes

No

Student 3

Male

Yes

Yes

Educator 1

Female

Yes

Yes

Educator 2

Female

Yes

No

Educator 3

Female

Yes

Yes

Educator 4

Male

Yes

No

Educator 5

Male

Yes

Yes

Parent 1

Male

Yes

No

Parent 2

Female

Yes

Yes

Note. All study participants were either a student, educator, or parent of a student at Thurgood Marshall
Academic High School between 2000 and 2007, stayed for more than 3 years, and were present on campus
on October 11, 2002.

Participants’ Narrative Profiles
During the interview sessions with participants, the preliminary moments of the
conversation were spent with the researcher and participant reacquainting themselves.
Participants answered preliminary demographic questions to prepare for their one-on-one
interviews. Using guided-dialogue inquiry, each participant shared their personal
background to update the researcher on their lives at the time of the interview. Certain
components of those experiences are not shared in participants’ narrative profiles to
protect the confidentiality of the participant.
Student 1
The participant attended TMAHS beginning in the 2001 academic school year
and graduated in 2005. Student 1 was born outside the United States, arriving in San
Francisco at 3 years old. Student 1 had a Ph.D. in a science, technology, engineering, and
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mathematics field and had worked in higher education. Student 1’s hobbies and interests
included spending time with family and friends, gardening, and caring for animals.
Student 2
The participant attended TMAHS beginning in the 2001 academic school year
and graduated in 2005. Student 2 was born in San Francisco. Student 2 had bachelor’s
degree in Business Communications and a Master of Business Administration and had
worked in organizations that supported students. Student 2 enjoyed sports, leisure and
travel, music, entertainment, and movies.
Student 3
The participant attended TMAHS beginning in the 1998 academic school year
and graduated in 2003. Student 3 was born in San Francisco. Student 3 indicated that they
had bachelor’s degree in social studies and had only worked in education-focused jobs,
working directly or indirectly with students of color or from underserved communities.
Student 3 spent free time with family and friends as well as participating in a variety of
fitness activities.
Parent 1
The participant had three children who attended and graduated from TMAHS.
Parent 1 was born in San Francisco and had some college but did not earn a degree.
Parent 1 had always worked in education. Parent 1 appreciated spending time with family
and friends, traveling, music, entertainment, and movies.
Parent 2
The participant had three children who attended and one who graduated from
TMAHS. Parent 2 has a bachelor’s degree. Parent 2 was born in San Francisco and at the
time of the study worked for a nonprofit organization that supported municipal-
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community members. In the past, Parent 2 had worked for education nonprofit
organizations as well as for-profit corporations. Parent 2 enjoyed health and fitness
activities.
Educator 1
The participant arrived at TMAHS in late 1990s and was eliminated from the
school staff before the mid-2000s. Educator 1 had an Ed.D. in education. Hobbies that
interested Educator 1 were animal care and spending time with friends from around the
globe.
Educator 2
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the early 2000s and left the school staff in
the mid-2000s. Educator 2 had obtained a bachelor’s degree. Educator 2 was born on the
east coast of the United States. Reading, studying, and world travel occupied Educator
2’s leisure time.
Educator 3
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the late 1990s and left the school staff in the
mid-2000s. Educator 3 indicated being born in the United States. Educator 3 had a
bachelor’s degree and relaxed with family and friends. Educator 3 also enjoyed
camping/hiking, sports/fitness activities, and traveling.
Educator 4
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the late 1990s and left the school staff in the
mid-2000s. Educator 4 had earned a bachelor’s degree. Educator 4 was born in San
Francisco and attended public and private schools. Educator 4 had hobby interests in
food/restaurants and beer.
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Educator 5
The participant arrived at TMAHS in the early 2000s and left the school staff in
the mid- to late-2000s. Educator 5 was born outside of San Francisco but in California.
Educator 5 indicated earning an advanced higher education degree and had only attended
public schools. Educator 5 welcomed time spent with family and friends. Educator 5 was
politically engaged and appreciated music, sports, travel/leisure, camping/hiking, and
entertainment/ movies.
Anonymous
Although the researcher had access to multiple sources of information about
municipal, law-enforcement, and educational processes, many sources were willing to
offer contextual insights to the zeitgeist of the City and County of San Francisco, the
SFUSD, and the primary law-enforcement organizations: the SFPD and Sheriff’s
Departments, as long as the origin of the insights were kept anonymous. Three
anonymous sources generously offered contextual insights to the data and themes,
corroborating what study participants revealed.
Generative Themes
Coded generative themes emerged from initial interviews and multiple follow-up
discussions with participants, after the initial coding of data with the qualitative analysis
software. Further, the researcher again listened to audio of participant interviews to
gather any inferences and intents from participants’ comments for thematic-coding
assurance. With the themes generated, findings for each research question surfaced for
discussion in this section.
Research Question 1: How did study participants remember the effect of
embedded on-campus police on the school climate of TMAHS? To answer this research
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question, participants distinguished their time at TMAHS in three phases. The first phase
was known as pre-10/11 or before SROs were known as a police presence on the
TMAHS campus and the TMAHS Community experience overall peacefulness. For the
second phase, participants recognized this as the day of 10/11, with a strong policing
presence and an uncontrollable riot. In the third phase, participants’ comments explicitly
differentiated from other phases as post-10/11 with a strong police presence, crumbling
school-community infrastructure, and the sense that TMAHS was intentionally destroyed.
Each phase has correlating themes, analyzed and united through code matching with
software, then checked by the researcher to ensure the code matching was true to specific
themes from transcribed interviews. Participants’ voices led in creating these three
distinct periods in their recollection of embedded police in TMAHS school-climate
timelines.
Figure 1 is a visual-concept map denoting the themed findings for Research
Question 1, representing the phases TMAHS Pre-10/11.

Figure 1. A visual concept map denoting the themed findings for Research Question 1,
representing the phase TMAHS Pre-10/11.

86
The subthemes that emerged under the TMAHS Pre-10/11 phase for the
participants were (a) The Thurgood Marshall Way, (b) Community/Diversity, (c) A Good
School/College-Going Culture, and (d) The Principal Cared About the TMAHS
Community. Multiple subthemes emerged under each theme. Under The Thurgood
Marshall Way, subthemes were (a) an expected rigor accompanied the higher graduation
credits requirement; (b) students, parents, and educators felt mentored in a particular
TMAHS style; and (c) most students and educators were unaware of an SRO on campus.
The few educators who were aware of the female SRO understood she was well-liked and
respected by the TMAHS Community. Under the emerged Community/Diversity
subtheme, all participants’ subthemes spoke to the friendly school climate and that
friendships were made easily across cultures and race boundaries. Under the Good
School/College-Going Culture subtheme, students and parents remembered that TMAHS
was a place where the students were exposed to (a) multiple opportunities that were not
offered at other public schools and all the participants conveyed a strong sense of
(b) hope for the students’ futures if they went to TMAHS. Finally, the last subtheme in
which each participant voiced a clear recollection was that the TMAHS Pre-10/11
principal, Dr. B., cared about the entire TMAHS Community. TMAHS, while this
principal headed the school, had subthemes that relayed (a) strong administration–staff
relationships, (b) strong staff–parent relationships, and (c) strong teacher–student
relationships.
The Thurgood Marshall Way
TMAHS, located in the southeast sector of San Francisco, was seen as a smaller
high school in the community it was supposed to serve, the Bayview district of San
Francisco. Each participant reflected on the school’s environment as one of high
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expectations and each person involved in the school had a commitment to education
leveling life’s playing field. Student 3 recalled his unconscious introduction to The
Thurgood Marshall Way during the daily welcome:
I remember sitting in class and over the intercom with Dr. B., rolling my eyes. I
think that when you’re in it it’s one of those things where you don’t appreciate it
until you don’t have it anymore, or you may not be able to recognize what about it
is a way or something that’s unique for somebody else’s experience. It’s
definitely engrained in my mind. “Have a good day the Thurgood Marshall way.”
That’s what he said over the intercom every day. “Have a good day the Thurgood
Marshall way.” All of those were very structural differences and tangible
differences to the way that the school organized itself, but I didn’t really realize it
until later, that was unique to Thurgood. And the Thurgood Marshall way was just
this very simple, I am—like I-am statements. I forget what they all are, it’s like, I
am respectful, I am something-something. I don’t remember now.
In hindsight, Student 3 thought the school took particular pains to make certain
students felt included in the school overall, noting,
I thought it was a very intentional way to get students grounded into a new school.
It’s “Hey, you’re here, you’re a part of this, this is what we value,” all the teachers
share students, so they can collaborate with each other.
Students 1 and 2 expressed the similar sentiments in understanding the academic
expectations at TMAHS. Student 1 remembered, “After school homework clubs were
offered and there was an emphasis on learning. The teachers were very kind and they
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really cared about the students.” In contrast, Student 2 thought about specific areas that
were a struggle and the teachers who helped students understand curriculum:
The work that I did, with my friends and with my teachers. Then another teacher,
she was a chemistry teacher, like she was one of the people that was on top of us
in the sense of making sure that we were doing well, like she would try to
communicate with us and like with our parents and stuff like that. My history
teacher, he was like always giving interesting tips and about stories and about
history. He was really cool about that. The other teacher was always on top of it,
making sure we were doing well, trying to communicate with our parents.
The Thurgood Marshall Way was not just a slogan that was repeated every day
during morning announcements; the TMAHS Community conveyed their understanding
of it as a calling to reengage and reinvest in each other at a higher level. Educator 1 put it
succinctly:
The Thurgood Marshall Way. That’s how I’d sum it up. It was an academic
culture with a focus on science, math and technology and students had rigorous
requirements of 280 credits, basically an additional year of work, and they were
getting into prestigious universities.
Educators 2 and 4 sharply recalled their career beginnings at TMAHS as intense.
Educator 2 remarked,
I was really struck by the intensity of the students, and the ambition, and the
intelligence. And the intensity, and ambition, and intelligence of my colleagues
who were not just there to receive a paycheck, by any means. Not one of them.
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Educator 4’s conferred this memory of initiation to TMAHS:
And yeah, it was just, I didn’t totally know it at the time, but over time I realized
it was just this kind of all-star team of teachers who had been compiled together
around this vision and this mission of 280 credits and giving kids from
Bayview/Hunter’s Point, Black and Brown kids from Bayview/Hunter’s Point,
like the best possible education.
Parent 1, with three children who attended TMAHS, had seen many types of
parents through the years, but at TMAHS, said,
But I looked at the parents there as being totally different. It was almost like: This
is Our school, right? We have a say in this school. The academic standards are
high, but it’s built for us. And I when I say “us,” I’m talking about those students
of color, and in particular we still had a significant Black population at the school
that were really buying in.
The parent also observed how intently his second child was about attending TMAHS,
regardless of the notion that other popular high schools around the city were attempting
to recruiting heavily at the time:
Thurgood Marshall is up and coming, so I thought Thurgood Marshall might be a
good place for [my daughter] because you can kind of establish your own identity,
be up and coming. And that was the thing that made me feel like—Wow, what are
we getting ourselves into? But [she] fell in love with Thurgood Marshall and said
that that’s where I want to go. And then the demand that they have more units, she
was really positive about that, which I thought was kind of “What? You want
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more?” I think it makes it special. In other words, she bought into the Thurgood
Marshall Way, which is what they all talked about from Day 1. I mean she was all
in.
Educator 3, who believed it important for educators teaching students of color to
use a race lens, insightfully remembered seeking out mentors:
And asked a friend there who was a grounded teacher, where is the anti-racist
work here at Thurgood? I’ll never forget what he said to me. He was like, “Hey
listen, I did that work here at the school and then I had to pay such a cost for it.
He told us a story about how his father had a heart attack, so he said you know
why, the work was too hard. I looked to my friend, that grounded teacher for
leadership there, for sure. But he was unable to give it to me. So then I just
worked with a small group of completely serious teachers who knew their craft
and who were willing to do anything to make sure all kids learned. Chief among
them was this woman. A physics teacher. That woman … that woman really had
an anti-racist teaching perspective. Do you know what I mean? Because she
changed the whole curriculum, changed the whole physics curriculum to make it
accessible to all students. And then another great teacher grounded, who’s not
pictured here, came to the school later. There was one other woman who lived in
the community who was totally doing work, political work, you know she’s
grounded in the politics.
The opportunity to collaborate and mentor newer teachers proved to be an
invaluable in-house teacher-training methodology. Educator 5 averred that the mentoring
TMAHS style felt like family:
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There was just a super solid, I mean, so many really solid folks, and then
structures in place. Like the family structure, and I think especially when we came
in, we had a prep period. Just thinking about what made Thurgood, “Thurgood.”
There were so many of these unique things that allowed us to do the work we did.
I just realized that all the 9th and 10th grade teachers had an extra prep period all
together a couple times a week to talk about kids and talk about our curriculum,
and cross curricular projects and things like that, right?
Educator 2 found the mentoring and collaboration favorable to her teaching
universe: “I liked the way we worked collaboratively with teachers. I liked the respect
teachers had for students and mostly vice versa. And I liked my colleagues. And it was an
exciting.”
When seeking supportive grant-funding opportunities to continue with TMAHS’s
extensive programs, Educator 1 recalled,
At some point, in a staff meeting, we were pitched the idea that we had this grant
opportunity that would bring a school nurse to the school—which everyone
wanted for our wellness center, it was a real need our students had… but to get
the nurse, we had to take an SRO. I can’t remember if we were, if we had the
chance to discuss and vote as a staff, or if we were just informed it was
happening, it was a done deal. This idea was introduced late in a staff meeting and
we had about 85 vocal, political staff and a once-a-week 60-minute staff meeting.
Everyone, well, lots of staff, always wanted to express their point of view and it
could kill the meetings. This grant was introduced with about 15 minutes left in
the meeting. I remember a fellow teacher—an English teacher—was really
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against it—and stood up and described this as the criminalization of youth—and,
if I remember, a different teacher stormed out of the meeting. But most people
didn’t want it. There was a small group of more conservative staff who wanted it,
saying it would make the school safer.
With the grant funded, a school nurse was placed in the wellness center and an
SRO on campus. Educator 1 added,
The first SRO was pretty cool. She was Samoan, I think, and it was probably good
for the students to see a woman of color have the gig. She was nice enough and
the kids seemed friendly with her. I’m sure she was taking care of business behind
the scenes, so I never saw her having an aggressive interaction with a kid.
However, most participants did not recall an SRO being on campus in an overt
way. No parent participants recalled an SRO at TMAHS before October 11, 2002.
Student 1, said, “Before 2002, I never noticed SROs stationed at TMAHS. Therefore, I
do not know what type of interactions students had with them.” Educator participants did
recall an SRO, but without a strong presence. Educator 5, indicated “I remember vaguely
police presence.”
While Educators 2 and 4 had some comprehension about an SRO on campus, it
was Educator 2 who sensed less about the SRO:
I don’t remember them as a force for good. But I don’t remember them as a force
for evil either. But I only remember one who I feel like was really good. They
must have stopped the program because I don’t remember SROs the last couple of
years.
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Educator 4 recalled the most of the two:
I don’t remember her name. But I remember the resource officer. The woman that
was Filipino? Yeah, I remember, kids loved her. That’s my recollection. I just
remember her being a warm—I mean I think it probably had everything to do
with the kind of school that it was that she could kind of—probably a combination
of who she was and also just the atmosphere. She wasn’t being asked to be a
police officer in the building in the ways that things, you know, things that were
wrong. That’s not what she was doing. Yeah, I think the atmosphere of the school
allowed her to be somebody who was there doing what a resource officer in an
ideal sense should do and not being a policeman in the building. That’s how I
remember her, yeah. I don’t think I’ve thought about her for years, but I have
warm recollections of her, for sure.
Community/Diversity
Thurgood began as a Consent Decree School (San Francisco NAACP, 1983,
p. 22) to support high school-aged children in the San Francisco Bayview–Hunter’s Point
neighborhoods with a zip code of 94124 (TMAHS-SARC, 1995) and then expanded to
include students from zip codes 94134 and 94110 (TMAHS-SARC, 1997). It fulfilled its
mandate by offering an academically focused high school for African American students
living in the Bayview–Hunter point neighborhoods and by serving underserved Latino
and Asian students of color living in the surrounding low-income area. Participants
provided examples of multiple instances of feeling like one diverse community as part of
the school’s overall popularity. Student 1 said,
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I truly enjoyed being exposed to such a diverse group of people. At TMAHS, the
diversity helped me to understand different cultures and perspectives. ... When I
was a freshman at TMAHS (2001), the school environment was very friendly and
there was no tension. I felt like everyone got along fairly well and I was never
scared to attend school. Overall, TMAHS during my freshmen year was filled
with positivity.
Student 2 indicated a freer existence when thinking about diversity of students:
I didn’t belong to any clubs, I’d just hang out with everyone. Like I used to talk to
everyone and people were cool about it, so I was cool with them. Yeah, that’s
what I did. I was there, I’d hang out with anyone. I’d talk to someone and I’d talk
to another person, like whatever. I was talking to everyone. I think the people that
were really athletic, to people who didn’t really care about anything, it was all
mixed. Yeah, there was lots of changes. The first year (2001) was pretty cool.
Student 3 recalled a more intentional approval of the diverse community feel of the
school:
I think Thurgood that was a school kind of like—I remember being, I think when
you’re a freshman my entire emphasis was just trying to get along with people. I
think I changed at Thurgood. Thurgood served a lot of students from Hunter’s
Point. I think most of the people from Hunter’s Point and Sunnydale, and
everything that was happening in the community was an aspect of Thurgood, so
the types of students, you know, I think at that time too there was just more
violence in the community than there has been recently. We’ve had a large part of
the Black population leave the city, as a teenager everyone was trying to get
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along. I think the interesting thing about Thurgood was it took us on a journey
where the perceptions of how we saw ourselves started to shift, I think, as a result
of the types of experiences that we did as a school community.
Additionally, Student 3 believed in family structure was set up at TMAHS to support the
notion of students from differing backgrounds coming together:
One of the big things in the freshman and sophomore year were this focus on
families. 9th grade and 10th grade family cohorts where all of us, what happened
was you had this thing, teachers for your core subjects and they all shared the
same students, Spanish, math and science all had the same cohort of students that
we all did electively to build school spirit and camaraderie amongst each other.
There was also this sense of competition too amongst the different families. The
way families were broken down were in three different sections. For 9th grade
there was a 9X, 9Y, 9Z. It was like we built this connection. And then within the
families and amongst the three families, the competition piece was also academic,
and school spirit. We would get shirts for our families and I think we would have
attendance or GPA things that we did.
Educator 5 agreed that family cohorts helped create a sense of community in the
diverse school environment:
My first year I was teaching world history and US history and at the time we had
familias, which was this really unique thing I came to realize that wasn’t
happening at other schools. Basically, these small cohorts of three teachers, a
hundred students, so it was kind of like this small school within a large school
model in the 9th and 10th grade where three or four of us, a math teacher, a
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science teacher, a history teacher, and English teacher all had the same group of
students, so we could like focus in on our cohort of students. I was crazy
overwhelmed, I worked 12–14 hour days—every day, and I was there until like
7:00pm at least every day.
Good School/College-Going Culture
Thurgood had begun to realize the Consent Decree mandate as it graduated it first
class cohorts that attended as freshmen in the mid-1990s. The results showed in the
increased numbers of families that did not live in the school’s prescribed enrollment
preference zip codes of 94124, 94134, and 94110 applying to Thurgood through a district
lottery. Parent 1 specifically remembered the shift in enrollment:
It began to be a sought-after school by the Asian community because they could
not get everybody into Lowell, and so they started looking around. Wait a minute,
what other school is here? And that’s when I found out about that phenomenon
called: Graduate from Thurgood Marshall and having more students admitted into
UC Berkeley than Lowell, you know? And getting admitted in to parts of the UC
system. And you know, that’s when I started taking notice of it. Wait a minute,
this is a good school, you know, a really, really good school.
Educator 4 named this thought as the center piece for shaping the school’s core
belief system:
There was certainly a sense that you got that there was a real pride taken in the
place and feeling like they were in a place where expectations were higher and the
hopes were great. But what we did have is just a belief in the kids and the
possibility to build a really great school. I think that’s what stands out for me.
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Student 3 spent much of the discussion focusing on the different ways that
TMAHS captivated students and families through a TMAHS college-culture mantra and
practice that emphasized attending college:
There was a huge emphasis when we got to campus that students here go to
college. You’re here, you’re going to college, this is what we do here. That was
evident by the graduation requirement. The graduation requirement was higher. I
think that also did something, at least for me, that you sort of felt, I think, a deeper
sense of self-worth because you had higher requirements. Oh, I’m working harder
than kids in other schools. Yeah, I remember years later the big emphasis on
academic, and it was funny too, this is something that still happens, about
academic being in the name. Because it was called Thurgood Marshall Academic
High School, and I think because of that graduation requirement we really held
onto that word Academic it was an important part of the school name.
And everyone was—Well every school is academic, I don’t get it. But it
was the association with the higher requirements that people held to that one word
because it made it like we were set apart because the bar was higher. We felt like
we associate this sense within ourselves that we can do more than what was
required. At least for me. That was part of the intention. We had the families, we
had the higher grad requirements, we had this emphasis on you’re here, you’re
going to college, and we all got computers. We talk about even today, the laptop
or computer give-away program where every freshman that came in that wanted a
computer to take home, they would get a computer. So that’s what your grounded
in your first year, your first semester at Thurgood.
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Then summarized this aspect of the environment that also provided opportunities:
You know, it’s that the world can get a lot bigger, especially if you are coming
from a community that lacks resources. A lot of educators come into the school
having their own network and having had some expanded education for kids like
me … but it’s like an entire different cross-section of people that I got to see and
be more up close as a result of my teachers taking me to games or encouraging me
to do different things. So Thurgood became a place that just really broadened my
world.
Educator 5 had similar thoughts about TMAHS opportunities for students and
queried, “Or you think of the inter-session and post-session, right? Do you remember the
trips we did where each teacher would organize a camping trip?” The Educator also
reflected on the school’s enrollment at one point in the dialogue, believing that because
of the school’s location, it would certainly house a large cohort of students enrolled from
surrounding neighborhoods as well as many who were college bound. Educator 5 then
pondered aloud,
It was unique in that way as well because there were a lot of families, it would be
interesting percentage-wise, that clearly chose Thurgood intentionally for that
reason. … So, there was a mix of what I think, families who had that educational
priority or motivation, and families that were just there because it was the closest
school. The 7th period day and the 280 credits, all those things that were built into
the structure, and the idea was that we’re going to get these students who have
been under-served for so many years, to college, then these are all the things it’s
going to take.
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With the college culture thoroughly embedded into what graduating from
TMAHS meant, several Educator participants expressed they were hopeful for their
students’ futures. Educator 1 said that “Every kid counted at TMAHS. … Every student
was important and mattered.” Educator 2 commented,
We thought we were making the world a better place. We thought we were
offering kids better options. Knowing that everybody there had chosen to be there
and nobody had landed there by accident; we all were on a mission.
Educator 4 said,
I think my main initial feelings about Thurgood Marshall and my first few years
there was like it was kind of a place that was filled with hope and a lot of energy,
and really a place that we ended up learning a lot of business in education, like
looking back on some of the things that we did, and that we tried to implement,
we certainly weren’t doing everything perfectly.
Educator 3 insisted on not putting TMAHS education on a pedestal. The
participant made clear that certain embedded practices were problematic at the beginning
of every school year, potentially initiating and perpetuated a White-savior mentality
among staff who were not people of color teaching in a school that, since its creation had
more than 90% of students of color attending (TMAHS SARC, 1994; 2002; 2012):
There was something I hated about it; the teaching staff was so full of themselves
and they were so young and inexperienced. And I’ll never forget that week in the
faculty meeting, in the beginning faculty meeting after summer, starting in the
fall, kids were introduced by their college credentials. I mean the new teachers. It
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was so problematic, I was like losing it. They were like, and you know, so-and-so
just graduated from Yale. And I’m like, Really? I’m like, teaching is not Ivory
Tower. Teaching is dirty. Feet on the ground.
The Principal Cared About the TMAHS Community
Student participants primarily remembered interactions with their teachers when
they reflected on Thurgood, which would make some sense because theoretically, those
were the school-site staff with whom students had the most contact. The Parent and
Educator participants’ culminating subtheme about TMAHS Pre-10/11 was that the
principal of the school cared about everyone in the TMAHS Community. Parent 2,
humorously remembered him:
Dr. B. was strict. He got on people’s nerves, but you knew that he cared about that
school. You knew that he cared about the kids. You knew he cared about the
teachers. You knew this. Even though he got on your nerves, you knew that he
was a principal that cared. He made that school. You know? And you go up there
now and the first name you say: Dr. B., Dr. B. He was like the father there.
The Educator participants had varying degrees of interaction with the Pre-10/11
principal. However, the principal’s influence on the school and in shaping its mission was
irrefutable, according to the Educator participants’ voices. Educator 5 said,
And it was like just—I’ve been mostly at small schools and charter schools since,
but having been in other large comprehensive schools, it’s crazy how that team of
teachers was brought together, you know? Between the principal and assistant
principal. Like they really, their whole theory of action was like put together the
most passionate, strongest group of people, put them in front of young folks and
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that’s how change is made. It was unique in that way … Dr. B’s vision and his
leadership, and he was there for 8 years? 9 years?
Educator 4 thought that teacher support could have been stronger from the schoolsite administration but believed in the vision set forth by the principal:
At Thurgood Marshall, we were trusted almost to a fault. Like Dr. B’s main
philosophy was: I hired you, I trust you, I believe in you. I’m not going to be the
principal who walks in and is checking up on what you’re doing. I think that has a
lot of power but at the same time there’s a way to do both. To have supported
teachers and to push teachers to actually understand how you can get better at
your craft. But I don’t think I had that sense while I was there. … It was a great
working environment. We were trusted to work hard and do a really good job. I
don’t want to suggest—and I think unstructured is the wrong word—I think in
retrospect, just having kind of gone to the administrative side, and been a part of
like trying to figure out how do we better support teachers, as my career went on I
kind of fell more on—looking back on those years—more on how did I as a
younger teacher get support to be a better teacher?
Educator 1 affirmed that the Pre-10/11 principal set the tone of the school:
The culture was really established and driven by Principal B. He was way ahead
of his time, was implementing research-based strategies that schools are just
starting to use, 15 years later. I remember I was chaperoning a dance shortly after
I started and I walked in and Principal B. was wearing overalls, painting over little
chips on the wall. He had everything invested in those kids and that school and
when you have high expectations, students respond. Something I liked was he was
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willing to hire staff he knew were political or challenging the system and he
brought them and fostered dialogue to advance student learning and grow staff
leadership. This is a trait I’ve always admired and he is one of very few leaders
I’ve seen who was willing to do this.
With the support and encouragement of the principal, staff tried many ways to
keep lines of communication open with families and guardians about students’ progress.
The TMAHS Community, sanctioned by the school leadership, worked not just in
conjunction with peer educators, but pulled in other community members, collaboratively
in small teams, testing ideas and strategies to see if they would benefit the community
cohort. If staff deemed they would benefit the community, then the idea or strategy was
expanded further to accommodate the entire school community at grade-level
appropriateness. If not, the team might strategize to see if the idea could be reworked and
salvageable in another iteration. Parent 2, reverenced,
And the staff there was beautiful. I liked the staff there. And my son was in
Special Ed, so when I moved out of San Francisco, so I had to get an inter-district.
The teachers told me, we’re going to fight you on this because we want [my son]
to stay here [at Thurgood] because we know [my son]. They knew his needs. You
know? And they told me that. I think we’re living in in the Eastbay. And they
said—No, we’re going to fight you on that. They were so serious. So, I got the
inter-district to stay here and my son graduated from Thurgood.
Student 1, echoed the same feeling: “Many of the teachers even invested their
time to learn about the students and to create a positive learning environment.” Educator
1 characterized the teacher–student bond as “It was definitely a ‘warm demander’

103
atmosphere, with lots of emphasis on academics, and teachers willing to put in extra time
on projects or after school tutoring.” Student 3 underscored that sentiment by retelling
some experiences:
And there were people that didn’t have the best reputation as teachers, you know,
they were hard, they weren’t nice or something like that. And we really built
really great relationships. They were very supportive of me. This teacher, he’s
right there, he was my 12th-grade pre-calculus teacher. I had his wife for AP
History and also went to do an independent study class where I read a bunch of
books by this fiction writer that was from New England. I read seven books on
this guy and I wrote this long report about all of his books. She was my adviser
for the class. I was trying to do … I wanted to do something challenging. I wanted
to dig deep into this one writer that I really liked and she supported that and
helped me set it up and we went back and forth about it.

I went through this religious phase in high school and I used to write these articles
in the school paper. The article author was Brother C. There was another student
writer whose name was Doctor D. He focused on issues and current events at
school. His point of view was funny and risqué. They would kind of get at each
other, but they were really respectful. I found all these ways to express myself and
really come into my own academically and present my ideas and have ideas
encourage. … I’m thinking about all these people now. I had all these academic
pursuits and I think with my teachers, I found ways to express that, to dive deeper
into those things. Everything though was outside of it. I guess with the Newspaper
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advisor and the History paper advisor, I feel like that’s the good thing about
teachers; teachers that are really committed to the school community.
Three theme phases and their subthemes encapsulate responses to Research
Question 1. The first themed phase denoted the TMAHS Community and environment, in
Pre-10/11, referring to the date of the police riot. Notably, participants fondly
characterized and explained The Thurgood Marshall Way: how well the school’s diverse
community got along with each other and growing the college-going culture among
students and their families while having the lead support of the principal.
The TMAHS October 11, 2002 riot, was the result of local law-enforcement
agencies sending a total of 126 (OCC, 2004) armed police in riot and tactical gear with
helicopter and fire-department support. The themes that emerged under the second phase,
TMAHS 10/11 day of the police riot had some participants admitting their struggle to
recall: (a) Chaotic School Environment, (b) SRO/Police Presence, and (c) Three Powerful
African Americans (see Figure 2).
Under the second-phase theme, A Chaotic School Environment, leading up to the
day of 10/11, subthemes emerged from all participants about the TMAHS Community:
(a) the new principal and administrative staff, (b) the staff feeling intimidated by the
district offices, (c) the false gang threat and (d) the impression a campaign existed to
destroy TMAHS. Educators, parents, and students express the subthemes of SRO/Police
presence as (a) all possessed a painful permanent memory of 10/11/2002, (b) it was
remembered as an uncontrollable riot, (c) the police presence caused more problems,
(d) many participants witnessed police brutality, (e) participants feared for students’ and
staff’s safety, (f) educators observed targeting Black and Brown students, and (g) parents
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and educators feared for staff safety. The final subtheme under the TMAHS 10/11 phase
of Three Powerful African Americans in positions of authority over the city, school
district, and police department are the subthemes (a) Mayor Willie Brown,
(b) Superintendent Arlene Ackerman, and (c) San Francisco Police Chief Earl Sanders.

Figure 2. A visual concept map denoting the themed findings for Research Question 1,
representing the phase TMAHS 10/11.
Chaotic School Environment
As the 2002 academic school year began in August, TMAHS staff, students, and
families were met by an entirely new administrative staff, except for one counselor who
was selected to remain to help acquaint the new team to the site staff, students, and
families. Parent 1 saw the difference immediately in how the school was run and voiced
concerns with other parents:
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After Dr. B. left? The school went down. I’m going to tell you; the school went
downhill. It was disorganized, nothing was the same. It wasn’t right once he left
there. And like I said, maybe he got on parents’ nerves, but when the parents
found out he was leaving the parents was fighting for him to stay because Dr. B.
made that school.
Student 2 spotted the difference in the overall school atmosphere as well with the
school leadership: “The changed principal. It changed the school a lot. And then like, for
example, when we graduated we were kind of happy to leave because we were done with
like the mess that was going on.”
Educators also watched the decline of school-leadership attributes with the new
administration. Educator 3 recognized a continuous issue of the interim principal:
The interim principal, who was scared of the kids. And she made numerous small
little maneuvers and comments that made that clear. I even had conversations
with her where I said something to her about it. And it was known among a small
group of us that she was afraid of the Black kids. She overreacted to everything
Black kids did.
Educator 5 corroborated this perspective about the interim principal’s issues with
students:
The interim principal coming in and being like what is she, like how is she the
principal of the school, you know? She had no presence. She was just really offputting and negative and who knows what she was told about Thurgood, if she
was supposed to come in and be the enforcer, but man, I remember just feeling so
off-put by her, and just seeing her interactions with kids and being like I don’t
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understand how she is the principal of a school. There was some fear there and
some discomfort.
Educator 1 recalled:
When the woman came in as the interim principal, things just started to crumble.
Students started acting up, there were incidents of violence between students and
between students and teachers. The new assistant principal was intolerable. He
had hidden under his desk during the riot and after, he would harass newer
teachers, but not someone like me who would stand up to him. He touched me
once (on the arm) and I told him to not put his hands on me, and he did it again
later and it just creeped me out.
Regardless of the steps taken by staff to support students throughout transition of
new administration, Educator 4 said the lack of leadership undercurrent was felt by the
whole TMAHS Community:
We didn’t know it was coming in that way, but the school, from the very
beginning of that year, and that’s kind of what I was saying at the beginning, like
from the get-go of that school year it was just falling apart. From the outset, there
was no leadership and the school clearly needed leadership. That was clear
instantly, and people recognized from the get-go, the kids recognized it, the adults
recognized it, that there was no leadership.
Educator 1 confirmed the sense that the Community could not mend what had
been broken:
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Teachers were under continuous pressure and we had a letter from HR saying if
anyone called in sick without a note it would be considered a wildcat strike. We
had that on us from October to March. It was ridiculous.
Subsequently, Educator 1 remembered overhearing a foretelling gang-related
discussion:
I remember there was a lot of talk when McAteer closed—which was end of
spring 2002. McAteer had a gang problem. There were no doubt kids at Marshall
that were in gangs, but it wasn’t obvious and it wasn’t a big threat or school issue.
… When McAteer closed, kids were transferred all over the city—and then every
school had a gang problem. I know this had been a concern for people.
Educator 5 matched the end of the previous school year’s issues with the
beginning of the 2002 school year issues:
And then the year of the—like the battle over the credits and the removing of Dr.
B, like that energy was shifted in a way toward the political fight, right? To
basically keep Thurgood what it was. I don’t know how many folks left, but a ton
of folks left after that year. I remember there were still a lot of us left, but not a lot
from the original cohort of the first few years. Hiring was super hard, and the
folks that were hired were not, you know, clearly one of the key mechanisms was
like with previous administration and who was being hired, right?
Educator 3 struggled with the school infrastructure coming apart under the
administration: “And the feeling of the school while she was the interim principal was
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that the school was in disarray. With her it just felt like it was in the midst of a
dismantling. It just felt awful.”
Educator 4 also asserted he had not realized the toll that the previous year’s battle
for graduation credits had taken on the TMAHS Community:
I think I at the time kind of underestimated the impact of the 280 credits and what
that did. I was kind of oblique when that all went down. I don’t see why we can’t
be a great school even if we don’t have that, and I think we shouldn’t get hung up,
but I think ultimately it did matter. It didn’t matter enough to have what happened
happen, but yeah, I think that’s my main memory of it.
SRO/Police Presence
The new administration’s perplexing circumstances of not knowing TMAHS
staff, students, or families, combined with the influx 300 McAteer High School students,
created a chaotic environment. The new administration insisted on an increase in the
TMAHS on-campus police presence. New SROs were assigned to the TMAHS campus.
Several SFPD officers walked the hallways daily in shifts. Educator 4, said,
A group of teachers went to—it might have been in the middle of like an English
department meeting—I think that’s what it was. I think the English teachers were
in a meeting and we were feeling like how tense things were in the hallways
because all of these police were suddenly in our building. It wasn’t just a resource
officer, there were like a handful police that were patrolling the building.”
Educator 1 took the same concerns to the new administration:
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At one point I remember three cops taking pictures of graffiti with a polaroid
camera and I remember thinking—it takes three cops to take a picture? And who
uses a polaroid these days? I asked the assistant principal about what they were
doing, and he said they collect graffiti to follow it through the city and try and
make arrests, so one of my feelings was they integrate—and infiltrate—into the
system to try and identify kids as criminals—it wasn’t about school safety.
The increased police presence spoke to an understanding between organizations
that had not fully conveyed the information to the TMAHS Community. District and
TMAHS school-site leadership were preparing for events that the TMAHS Community
had not experienced in any of its previous years’ history. The bubbling of tensions and
eerie feeling of dread came over teachers and students. What happened over the next few
days was foretold to the school leadership; however, no one in the TMAHS Community
would have predicted the magnitude and ramifications of future events. Educator 4,
forewarned,
We went to the interim principal and sat in her office and said “Something is
going to happen. It is bad, they shouldn’t be here. They don’t belong in the
school, we’ve got to figure out some other way because something bad is going to
hap. This does not feel good, you can feel it in the air.” It was that blunt, like we
said that, and it was said out loud. And then yeah, a week or 2 later, yeah, it all
went down.
Educator 4 added, “Teachers started to organize. … We started taking action
because we saw the school falling apart. That was Wednesday, October 9—and the riot
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happened October 11.” Educator 3, also believed, “the school that year was so different
that we had this interim principal, the woman.”
Each participant had a permanent memory of 10/11/2002 and realized it was a
painful memory to recall. Student participants’ voices reflected less detail about the days’
events than the Parent and Educator participants’ reflections of the day. This may be due
to their location in the school at time; their access to certain details of the riot; their
teachers serving as protectors, shielding them during the riot; and their ages (between 14
and 17) on October 11, 2002. Student 1, recalled
There was an incident where a big fight broke out between a few people. From
what I recall, there was an Asian student who got into an altercation with an
African American student and both sides had a lot of family members who joined
in the fight.
Student 2 said, “The second year, with all the things that were going on with like
riot.” The detail from Student 3 included that of a school-district official sharing
understanding of the riot:
A School Board Commissioner was telling me it was like the largest police
presence at the school since Columbine. You know, that’s how many police were
on campus there. It was such a gross exaggeration of the incident … the incident
also as a way to really oppose the leadership change and they refused to build
back the teaching.
The Educators remembered riot specifics as well as their efforts to protect their
students from the riot milieu. Educator 2 mentioned how the 10/11 riot recurs in
conversation with education colleagues and the visceral pain it causes through reliving it:
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I was a little afraid to get my head back in that time when you asked about it
because it was really so traumatic. And I can go months without thinking about it
and then it will come up and/or maybe a year or 2 and it will come up in
conversation every couple of years and I have to go through and explain this. And
people can’t believe it. When I talk about it people just can’t believe it.
Somebody was out on the yard, on the quad crying and calling up to the
kids. And the kids in my room were talking to her through the window, which
normally I would not allow, and for some reason I did allowed it. I have no idea
now in retrospect why. They said the police are beating up on so-and-so, and soand-so in the office and blah blah blah, and she was crying and crying. And at that
point, I wasn’t going to be able to keep the kids in anymore. I went with them to
go downstairs and out onto the quad. And from the quad but I kept them with me.
And I called my partner on my cellphone. The first time I’d ever made a call to
him during the day, and I said “Something terrible is happening here. Police are
beating on our students and a faculty member.”
Educator 5 had a classroom on the top floor of the school that faced the football
field and quad area; however, with all the commotion, Educator 5’s entry into the melee
was delayed:
My classroom was facing the football field, yeah. I was really late. Like when I
got down there it was chaos. I remember I saw the teacher coming down with his
video camera, I remember seeing the police coming after him.
Educator 3, informed the researcher of a permanent memory as well as the
intensity of being in the midst of the ordeal:
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I remember everything in great detail. It was a life-changing event. At the time
that this happened, that this event happened, where the police came in and
attacked the children. … When the shit came down I was right in the middle of it
on the first floor, and the interim principal and a few other administrators and
secretaries locked themselves in the main office. Locked the doors. And were in
the main office as the police filled the halls during passing period and made one
of those circles back to the inside of the circle to the outside and blocked the
hallway, and then started getting into it with students. She locked herself in the
office. … It was for real shit.
Educator 4’s visual recollection brought forward forgotten personal pain:
The thing that was hardest for me personally, other than just like the day itself,
that just brings back such horrible memories of seeing the kids out in the streets
with the hundred police or whatever ended up happening, and just trying to keep
kids safe, and just the rage in kids’ eyes.
Educator 1, added later,
That riot happened the day our students were scheduled to take their SAT tests—
how do you think that affected their scores? The rookie SRO calling the wrong
code, a racist issue between the Filipino and African American youth, a million
explanations.”
The Parent participants bore in mind the law-enforcement response level of the
school and still expressed disbelief. Parent 2 recalled witnessing events while locating
their last child to attend TMAHS:
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I’ll never forget this. I just got off work because I was doing security for the
school district. And my son called me. He said, “Mama, come get me.” I said,
“What’s wrong?” He said there’s a riot up there. Lucky, it wasn’t that far, so
when I went up there it was unbelievable. It was truly unbelievable. I said it’s a
shame where there’s no control over this situation. It was really, really bad. I had
never seen anything like that at school. Never. I have never seen anything like
that. And I had three kids in school. And I’ve never seen anything like that. The
police were coming in, and I told my son, “Get in the car now.” He was trying to
protect his friends, and I said, “No, you get in the car, we’re leaving here.” I said
this is ridiculous. And my son has a shunt in his head and I didn’t want the police
hitting him in his head. I didn’t want no students hitting him in the head. Let’s go.
Let’s go. And the next thing we know we see it on TV. It was horrible, it was just
horrible. Anyone could have got hurt, seriously hurt because kids were just acting
crazy, the police were acting crazy, and one policeman told me, “You get out of
here”. I said, “You don’t tell me what to do. No, I’m coming to get my child.”
And I had to tell one police officer, “You don’t be shoving. Don’t you shove my
child.”
Parent 1’s permanent memory of the day envisioned what the students and
teachers experienced on campus during the riot:
So it’s like, you know, those that got arrested because of standing up for justice,
gets the San Francisco Police Department and Sheriff’s Department, and those 90plus officers between the two departments, that invaded that school on that day,
will never, ever leave my mind. When I think about that many police officers at a
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high school with all those students, and that bell going off and those students not
being on lock-down, and being released into a gauntlet, basically, of police
officers coming in from every single doorway in that school at the same time as
the students are coming out of class into that environment.
Comprehension that the TMAHS Community was in the midst of a full-blown
and expanding riot become apparent when various participants illustrated some of their
summaries. Educator 3 said, “I remember that a lot of us felt like we had to protect the
Black kids.” Parent 2 commented:
It seemed to me that once the police got there it just really got out of hand. They
were trying to break it up, but they just caused more problems. Yeah, so I don’t—
I wouldn’t know how to handle something like that. That was a large crowd to be
handled … a teacher got hurt. I just thought my child was going to get hurt. I
really did. I thought I was going to get hurt. That’s how bad it was. There were
parents up there that was truly, truly upset. You know? The police were shoving
the kids, like Thurgood Marshall kids did it.
Three Powerful African Americans
Immediately after the riot, TMAHS was closed for a week as parents demanded
answers from city, school, and law-enforcement leaders about the police brutality
inflicted on their children and community. San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown, SFUSD
Superintendent of Schools Arlene Ackerman, and SFPD Chief of Police Earl Sanders
were heads of their respective bureaucracies in San Francisco and accountable to their
individual constituencies: the citizens of San Francisco. Teachers refused to return to the
school, backing parents’ concerns. Student 3, remembered the voices of teachers:
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They were like we’re not going back. This is October, you know, like the school
year starts—we’re in October now, the school year starts in August, we’re 8
weeks into school and teachers are refusing to go back to class. Like that’s how it
was. Whatever type of—thinking about it now as an adult too, trying to build a
working relationship with somebody over the course of 2 months. In something,
okay I’m going to give this a shot, let’s give it 6 months. Teachers are like, No.
This person is toxic to the school, I refuse to teach. They had like look at what
happened under this person’s leadership, you know? Kids are being beaten up by
cops. Teachers are being arrested. It was like, it was like insane.
Parent 1 summarized the three city- and state-level authorities that had oversight
on the TMAHS 10/11 police riot:
It was almost like a Black triumvirate of leadership in the city and county of San
Francisco. Willie Brown, and we talked about this excessively, as mayor. You had
Ackerman as superintendent of schools, the public schools, and then you had San
Francisco Unified School District, then you had Earl Sanders. Yeah that’s it,
Prentice Earl Sanders, and then he was chief of police.
Once the Parent 1 deduced the highest-ranking member of the three, he reached
out to the Mayor and had a telephone conversation with him about the TMAHS 10/11
riot:
“I know you’re really busy, but we have a crisis here and I just felt like I had to
speak with you directly just to make sure that you had multiple perspectives on
the event, circumstances, and have it from the vantage point of a parent with a
child here at the school and what we have seen and experienced.”
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He says “Okay.” He said it real early on, “So what are you expecting me from
me?”
But it was like, you called me so what do you expect me to do, right? What are
you expecting me to do?
And I said “Well, I thought it would be…if you could talk to the students and talk
to the parents.”
He said, “Nooooo! I don’t think you really want me to do that.”
And I’m curious, “Why would I not want you to?” You know, what’s he know
that I don’t know, right?
He says “I’m going to tell you. These kids were out of control. They didn’t follow
instructions. Blah-blah-blah … under the police officers’ command!” He said that
they were out of control almost like they were hoodlums or hooligans.
I said something almost like, “Wait a minute. Who’s telling you? Who’s giving
you this?”
He said, “Don’t worry. As Mayor, I have all the … I have more than enough
information. And I don’t think it would be a good thing for me to be there.”
Now he could have been saying that for more than just the reason that I’m
thinking. He might have been saying it because maybe he felt like the community
wasn’t going to receive him well.
Educator 1, remembered,
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These powerful I heard later Ackerman, Willie Brown and the police chief—all
African American—made some of the kids who were beaten—all African
American—sign off that they wouldn’t sue—that the city wouldn’t press charges.
… All of this political wrangling when kids’ lives were at stake just stank. And
then these adults want to CYA and take advantage of kids.
The second theme phase emerging in response to Research Question 1 was
TMAHS 10/11, focused on the TMAHS Community and environment on Friday, October
11, 2002. Speaking to the new-school-year chaotic environment with the dismissals over
the summer of the founding principal and new administrators, the TMAHS Community
and environment was overwhelmed by the strong police presence and minimal response
from the three powerful African Americans in charge of the city, school district, and
police department (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. A visual concept map denoting the themed findings for Research Question 1,
representing the phase TMAHS Post-10/11.
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The third phase in the TMAHS Post-10/11 theme findings that arose in response
to Research Question 1: How did study participants remember the effect of embedded oncampus police on the school climate of TMAHS?, as (a) blaming the TMAHS
Community for 10/11, (b) nonexistent race wars now exist, (c) destroy TMAHS, and
(d) superintendent/central office reactions to 10/11. Participants’ visceral subthemes
came to light under the theme, Blaming the TMAHS Community for 10/11: (a) police
blame TMAHS, (b) central office blames TMAHS, and (c) mainstream print media blame
TMAHS.
As participants recalled the mainstream media’s role in the TMAHS riot, The San
Francisco Chronicle’s coverage of the riots added another voice to the incident, although
it was outside the TMAHS Community. The Chronicle perspective of TMAHS coverage
is valuable as it spoke to the sociopolitical tone across the paper’s readership, considered
San Francisco’s primary newsprint source. Under the subtheme nonexistent race wars
now exist at TMAHS are two subthemes brought forward primarily by the educators,
indicating a strong awareness of intentional (a) targeting of Black and Brown students
and (b) a race divide that took hold in the student community. Participants’ subthemes in
observing the superintendent/central office’s reactions to 10/11 from their own TMAHS
perspective echoed one another’s as (a) the ongoing exodus of teachers, regardless of
method, blaming teachers for 10/11 continued, (b) the overall poor school culture assured
that TMAHS could not return to the school cared for so much, and its ultimate
destruction, and (c) blaming teachers for 10/11.
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Blaming the TMAHS Community for 10/11
As the TMAHS Community tried to address the devastation of the 10/11 riot,
multiple strands of information and processes operated. From the TMAHS-community
perspective, the police, the school district, and the city tried to blame them for not
educating children well enough, not parenting children well enough, not conforming to
protocols that oppress students of color, and not submitting to labeling practices that do
not allow diverse communities to thrive. A new cohort of administrative leaders was
placed at Thurgood after the riot. After several months, a replacement administration
replaced the previous leadership. This occurred several times over the next year. As with
traumatic occurrences, assigning blame may assist in dismantling a once tightly woven
community, such as TMAHS.
Student 1, recalled the ever-growing conflicts between students and teachers that
coincided with the turnover in school-site leadership:
There arose more conflicts between students and teachers, and I think the reason
for this was due to teachers completely blaming the student for lack of progress.
Towards the end of my high school career, I did not feel like there were more than
two to three teachers who thought of me as a person.
Student 2, became disinterested in school:
Not every day, like it was, like so my sophomore year was really tough. Like
since the incident happened with the rioting, that was like really tough. I barely
went to class, like I just hanged out and did whatever I wanted. The teachers
didn’t care at that point. That’s how I felt. Like I just remember the security
guards, that they were hanging around every day. I mean I think I saw a police
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officer once, but I never did again. Like the discipline was mostly by the security
guard and like once in a while it would be a counselor.
Student 3 saw the effort to continue the school’s original philosophy repeatedly thwarted:
It was not the same. When Dr. B. left, there were teachers there that still wanted
to try and stay and continue, and the principal they put in effectively killed the
spirit of all those really incredible educators. And it was always arguments and
tension.
Educator 1 recollected the blaming of the McAteer students due to a lack of
understanding of previous information:
When the riot happened, top brass tried to blame it on kids who transferred from
McAteer. I had several of those kids in my classes. I didn’t have any issue with
those kids. It really felt like bullshit. We were getting bullshit from all over.
Parent 1, observed information about the riot as it unfolded over time and the
riot’s trauma that deeply affected students:
I mean these kids are going on record, they arrested them unjustly in my opinion,
and I think in the opinion of many. They were set up, it was—we later found out
it was a police exercise gone haywire. It victimized, it traumatized our children.
To this day. It altered lives, careers, you know, educational paths, and everything
else when the kids went through it. Some actually rebounded and became stronger
having gone through it. But there were others that were dramatically changed
from what they possibly could have been because of going through this trial.
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Educator 2, bitterly summarized the TMAHS students’ 10/11 reactive behavior as
a response to what adults in positions of power had modeled for them:
Afterwards, [it’s as if] we started the year telling the kids, you know, you’re not
good enough for 280 units. We started the year telling the kids you’re not good
enough. You can’t do that. Maybe the kids at Lowell can do that. You can’t do
that. And then beat them up. Then called the kids names, the cops came in to beat
them up, and I think about that year, that was my student’s senior year?
Parent 2, after experiencing what was happening at the school, reading the
newspaper accounts, and viewing the aftermath of the TMAHS 10/11 riot on television,
issued a stern warning to the son that remained at the school:
And that’s what I told my son that day, at this incident. If this happens again, you
go in the bathroom, you go in the classroom, you protect yourself first. Don’t get
involved, don’t look at nobody, don’t say anything to anybody. Because you don’t
know what these people have on them and they can seriously hurt you.
Nonexistent Race War Now Exists
As the TMAHS Community strove to pull itself together after the riot, educators
began to notice an increasing racial divide among students. Educator 1 made it a habit to
walk the campus to photograph students interacting with one another. The photos would
show up on classroom screens during the mornings announcements, unless students did
not wish it. Considering what had occurred, Educator 1 thought it particularly pertinent to
continue the practice. However, the participant noticed a behavior change on campus:
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In the old days, we never had segregation issues, but now, all the Asian students
were in the cafeteria, the Latinos on the stairwells and the African Americans on
the blacktop. This was terrible. We had never had these racial divisions before.
Student 1 concurred, noting the ongoing SRO presence: “Ever since that incident, SROs
were stationed at TMAHS in an attempt to prevent further ‘race-wars’ from occurring.”
Student 2, who regularly spent time with all students, perceived the following years as,
“It was a roller coaster ride for 4 years. It started really well and then it went really bad
and then it had some twists and turns.”
Educator 5, had a discussion years later with a TMAHS graduate:
It was no longer … there was a pride at being at Thurgood and doing this thing
we were trying to do with Black and Brown youth from the southeast side. And
making up for the way that so many students had been undereducated and
marginalized. And I remember a student when he came back from college and he
started working and mentoring at Thurgood, him saying it’s just different. I
imagine you have numbers around the student population, but I know when I was
there it was 1,200, 1,100 students, and then it got down to like 500 students. I
think when they got down so low they were fighting off charter schools.
Educator 4, sadly expressed how the school had changed:
I would get to my room as quickly as possible in the morning and I would try to
stay there all day because if I had to walk through the hallways it was just too
depressing to be out and see what was going on, and just how kids were thinking
of themselves. It just became the kind of stereotypical caricature of an urban
school.
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Student 1 was the only student participant who speculated on the guiding
dialogue, “What would have happened at TMAHS if it didn’t have SROs?”:
If TMAHS did not have SROs, I think issues with students would have been
handled how they were previously handled. Whenever a conflict broke out,
students were sent to go talk to the advisor and/or principal. Both sides of the
stories would be heard, and the advisor/principal would serve as a mediator.
When the SROs came, they were more prone to using physical interventions
instead of mediation, and I think that causes more misunderstandings and conflict
than a resolution. A mediator is able to effectively communicate with both sides
to resolve the issue.
Superintendent/Central Office Reactions to 10/11
As the TMAHS’ culture plummeted and test scores sank, students’ options to
attend high-ranking colleges dwindled. Enrollment figures for the upcoming school year
were not promising. Educator 1 noted a comment from an SFPD SRO Supervisor, “I was
walking back in and the Officer was there—with maybe three other cops. She said to me,
‘I can’t get anyone to come to this school!”’ Further, Educator 1 reflected that years later,
Years after the riot, I was in Safeway and one of my students worked there. He
came up to me and said, “Teacher, were you at Thurgood when the riot
happened?” I said yes. He said, “That one kid sold that other kid bad weed.” I will
say, our old dean, Principal B. and the Assistant Principal, while there were times
they may have needed to contact the cops, they could deal with these type of
issues … and they maintained a culture that kept this kind of activity out of the
schools.
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Student participants complained about the level of rigor in their education
standards declining. Student 1 thought this was due to as different administration, focused
on raising TMAHS’ adequate yearly progress through testing:
From 2002 to the time I graduated (2005), I felt like caring teachers were being
replaced with those who did not care so much about the students. I became
displeased with the school culture as the years progressed. TMAHS focused more
on getting high scores on the standardized tests than focusing on the needs of the
students. They become absorbed in boosting scores rather than trying to determine
how they can help students to perform better.
Student 1, grasped that the future for students at TMAHS would be difficult:
But there were sometimes that like it just seemed like it was chaos. I wish we all
had a better learning experience. I personally kind of did but not in a sense of
where I was like woohoo! And happy. No, I was like whatever then eventually it
just finally, we were done.
Parent 2, attended an SFUSD superintendent meeting for TMAHS parents and
believed there was still no resolution to addressing the riot and school disintegrating
culture:
What really upset me was when Ackerman was the superintendent. We had a
meeting in the library to discuss this the next day or the day after, I mean 2 days
later. And she came in—to me, I saw a woman coming there with attitude. First of
all, she was late. That was the first thing that irritated. This is serious, lady, and
you’re late. Okay, and then you come in with an attitude, and this one parent, she
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just stood up and she just went off. She just totally went off on us. Then
Ackerman was gone. She left and left her assistants to talk to us. That irritated me.
You are the Superintendent of the San Francisco Unified School District and you
didn’t even say—Okay, let me see how I’m going to handle this, like be all
concerned. You just walked off. And there I lost respect for her then. Because this
was serious, you know? Now I was wondering if your child—not yours, but
hers—would have been in this, would she have reacted in the same way?
Educator 1 continued to support students and staff under the newer and disturbing
TMAHS identity as a bad school with poor school culture; this view was partially media
driven and partially actualized dysconscious racism that had infected the school:
After the riot, a central office administrator was our principal and I was on the
school leadership team that met weekly. I can’t remember who brought it up, but
some girls had gotten a key to a room in the basement—the bomb shelter—near
the band room—and they had started a prostitution ring and were giving boys
head for 20 bucks. And a teacher told the central office guy, “allegedly!” I said,
“These are kids—we shouldn’t be talking about them ALLEGEDLY starting a
prostitution ring! This is what girls do when they have no other choices!” Where
was the SRO then?
Educator 5, also remember the central-office administrator serving as interim
principal and that the new regime made it clear how the school was going to work or the
staff could leave:
A lot of them were pushed out, for sure. Yeah, for sure. And I mean, whether it
was direct push-out, like by conversation with the central office guy placed at our
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school, or the push-out of changing what it was that brought folks there. Yeah.
But yeah, it was an incredibly quick shift from one year to the next. … [I was
told] basically, you need to stop speaking up and you have a job to do. And where
is your department at and your job is to run your department. Telling me, sort of
sideways, I’ve got to shut the fuck up and get with the program or my job is in
trouble.
After months of the central-office administration serving as the interim principal,
the district authorized the TMAHS teaching staff to be part of a hiring committee for a
next new principal. Educator 2 recalled the experience as one that was not supportive of
the Thurgood Marshall Way:
And you know, we thought that, well maybe we’ll get a new principal and they’ll
be decent. I was on the principal selection committee, and they were all awful.
They were all truly awful. One of them said racist things. You know, and there
were better options than the assistant principal too. And second interim was the
best of a terrible bunch. And look how terrible he was. I don’t know anybody who
was on that committee who felt good voting for him, but the others were so much
worse. Kind of like a choice between Bush and Trump. You know, if somebody
held a gun to your head and said you’ve got to vote, I would vote for Bush over
Trump, but … because somebody’s holding a gun to your head and says you
don’t get to choose who’s holding the gun to your head or something. And I mean
Bush the younger, not Bush the elder. The worse one.
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Educator 4 knew that the TMAHS staff and central office had differences of
opinions; however, none of what transpired supported repairing the harm and damage
inflicted on the TMAHS Community:
In retrospect, things happened between administrators, district administrators and
principals, there was clearly a disagreement about things, but the district didn’t do
anything to take any steps to make our school successful, and they should have
recognized that. All I can conclude is they didn’t care about it continuing to be
successful, and then just once it happened I think it was just wholly, completely
depressing. To everybody. What had happened and that nobody on the district
level had any interest in really accounting for it and wanting to kind of get to the
bottom of what had happened and really wanting to look into it. It felt like from
that moment forward we just became like kind of a throw-away school.
Educator 5, vigilant in indoctrinating new teachers hired into the original
Thurgood Marshall Way, retraced the good history of the school:
The same lens for hiring wasn’t in place. There were still a cohort of folks, that
teacher was still there, another teacher was still there. I remember this new
teacher arrived, he was there. He came a few years after I came, but it was like a
lot of people had left so it wasn’t—you know, it sort of was lost. There were still
pockets of that energy and really inspired teachers, but there wasn’t that collective
thing we were working towards, right? It wasn’t … I think the people who had
been invested, weren’t invested in the same way, but just that vision was lost.
Individuals were still doing that, but their collective vision around that was lost.
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As the reality emerged of TMAHS as an emotionally broken school, participants
expressed their reluctant decisions to leave. Parent 1, understanding that the TMAHS his
other children attend didn’t exist any longer, said:
After that incident, I was focused on [the other daughter], the youngest who was
there. And she wanted to leave. We gave her a choice. We said, “Hey, you can
stay, or if you want to leave we’re going to support you, right? If you want to
transfer.” She decided she wanted to go.
Educator 3 was particularly disturbed by another educator leaving in the middle
on the 2002 school year:
After it, the whole thing, like one teacher quit before the year even ended. One
young teacher … and she was like, I’m quitting. I was like, “How could you leave
these students?” If you quit, I’ll never talk to you again as long as you live. And I
haven’t. And now people are picking up her name like she’s somebody special,
and I’m like, “Are you kidding me?” She left those kids after they were attacked
by the police.
Educator 5 struggled to make sense of the stark differences between TMAHS a
year before and a year after the riot:
Definitely from 1 year to 2 years later. I mean it’s crazy and I think the year I left
there were a handful of folks that were still there 2 or 3 years ago. The year I left
there were probably less than 10 teachers left from the year I started, which was
only 4 or 5 years previous.
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Educator 2 reflected on unrest about leaving a school where the participant felt so
invested:
And I stuck it out. A lot of people left in 2002, a lot more left in 2003, and I stuck
it out for one more year, and I just saw no way things could get better. And I don’t
think they did for a few years. And I think when I lost that, that’s when I had to
leave. It was just so painful to stay at Thurgood when that wasn’t there anymore.
Educator 4 contemplated, through lengthy inner turmoil, before making the
decision to depart TMAHS:
You point to that year, and that day, and I just think it was a total just loss of faith
in the system that you couldn’t rebuild because there was no way to rebuild it.
There was no leadership to rebuild. I mean maybe it could have been rebuilt if
they had been really thoughtful about who’s going to do it, but that didn’t happen.
I left there in 2004 or 2005; I think I left in 2004, and I just couldn’t be there
anymore. I had kind of done that thing and I couldn’t do it anymore. It didn’t feel
good to be there anymore. I had kind of hung in there the last few years because I
never wanted to be that teacher that left the kids. Because it felt like that’s what I
was there to do but then I got to the point where I just couldn’t do it anymore. It
was just too depressing to be there. But yeah, that day was kind of the culmination
and we didn’t have the means to recover from it. It seems like it never really has
recovered. … missed Thurgood Marshall a lot and missed the kids a lot and you
know, I still communicate with a lot of them. I’ve got a very fond place in my
heart for Thurgood Marshall. It’s too bad that that happened there, for sure.
Horrible.
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The third theme phase responses to Research Question 1, were TMAHS post10/11 and the TMAHS Community (students, educators, and parents) managing their
feelings of being blamed for the 10/11 riot by law-enforcement agencies, the district’s
central office, and mainstream media accounts. The environment bred distrust among the
school’s community members. Participants also recognized new race issues at the school
that did not exist before 10/11, as well as trying to work with the school district’s central
office reactions and responses to riot. Although many left the school, their reckoning with
blame and the riot rested on bureaucratic powers and law-enforcement agencies. This
understanding did not assuage their concerns for one another or the students’ futures.
Research Question 2: To what extent did the TMAHS, October 11, 2002 police
riot impact or affect students, teachers, and parents? In responding to this question,
participants included their reflections of how TMAHS, itself, impacted their lives. All
themes developing from this research question show each participant’s distinct and
significant life decisions made in reaction to what they experienced at TMAHS, as well
as what they experienced on October 11, 2002. Figure 4 is a visual-concept map denoting
the themed findings for Research Question 2.
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Impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Riot on TMAHS Community

Figure 4. A visual concept map of the themed findings for Research Question 2, realized
impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Police Riot on TMAHS Community.
Participants’ life-impact themes begin with the realization they could recreate The
Thurgood Marshall Way elsewhere. Additional themes evolving from participants’
responses predicted a future life of mentoring, TMAHS style when “room can be made for
great things to happen, anywhere,” even in the most challenging circumstances imagined
(Educator 5). When participants considered the events that occurred at TMAHS before,
during, and after 10/11, an Impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Police Riot on the TMAHS
Community theme developed. Assembled under the impact of TMAHS theme were
disparate subtheme perspectives from (a) students, (b) parents, and (c) educators. The
researcher attributes the subtheme category divergence to the ages and life roles of
participants when considering their next steps after TMAHS. The subthemes for former
TMAHS students raised the following: (a) diversity/community helped in their
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development, (b) TMAHS alum support underserved student communities and feelings,
(c) self-empowered and motivated to take on a variety of life challenges, and (d) although
each student participant had a deeply rooted indoctrinated TMAHS hope, they also feared
that a 10/11 riot could happen again. The subthemes from former TMAHS parents
surfaced as a person should (a) watch out and protect themselves, foremost, and as
parents (b) will not be bought, bribed, or silenced. Last, subthemes for former TMAHS
educators were that (a) educators gained administrative credentials, empowering
themselves to recreate TMAHS equity models; (b) educators left TMAHS, (c) educators
developed an awareness of the fragility of success for students of color, and (d) educators
also became acutely aware of dismantling components.
Students
All student participants were leaving TMAHS and heading to college. All have
bachelor’s degrees, one has attained a master’s degree, and one a Ph.D. Their voices
reflect the traditional transition time period in their lives.
Student 1 noted that the diversity encountered at TMAHS impacted education
goals and selected pathways in achieving them:
Also, many people like myself who attended TMAHS, were from underserved
communities. I felt like there was not enough outreach programs or people who
encouraged us to pursue a higher education. During my graduate career, I have
volunteered to teach STEM courses to children in hopes of encouraging them to
believe in themselves and understand that they have the capability to achieve any
degree they choose. … That is why I am trying to increase the diversity in my
program.
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Student 2 mentioned that toward the end of his time at TMAHS, he acknowledged
that the current structure at the school was not going provide the supports required for
college admission.
There was like a lot of work and me wanting to go to college eventually. I was
like okay, the only way I’m going anywhere is if I get it together. I had to do it
because like I’m looking at how things are going and like I can’t be here the
whole time. I first started at SF State college, and then I went to University of
Phoenix and I got my Bachelors in business communication, and then I came back
and got a Master’s in business administration.
Student 3 departed from TMAHS closest to the 10/11/2002 riot, graduating in
2003. Student 3 also experienced more of The Thurgood Marshall Way and it’s
mentoring style than any other student participant. The outlook on educators reflects that
perspective:
It really puts our trust in … we have some standout educators that come to our
city and that’s not the case for everybody that works in schools. I think at
Thurgood, the people that taught there have become leaders in a lot of different
fields so it’s important to be very thoughtful about the decisions we’re making on
behalf of schools. On the other, there’s so much excitement for me about what’s
possible for kids and for our educators. … I don’t know. I guess what I’m trying
to say is that gives me as much hope as it does fear that experience there.
Parents
The parent participants each had three children who attended TMAHS. Parent 1
had only one child graduate from the school, whereas all three of Parent 2’s children
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graduated from TMAHS. Their reflections focus on their TMAHS experiences while
their children attended TMAHS, before and after the 10/11/2002 riot.
Parent 2 revealed a manifested fear of what could be the worst possible outcome
when confronted with dangerous circumstances:
I look at it like this, that could happen anywhere, so what I try to do is think if I
see something that’s happening I try to stay clear of it, so I don’t want to get
involved, you know what I mean? Like for example, I have seen where there have
been pickpockets on the bus, and I can see it’s happening and I want to help, but
my thing is, I don’t know what these people have, who’s going to get hurt besides
myself. You either help or you don’t. Just for your safety, you know what I mean?
And this is what happened on Friday, the same thing, and this woman intervened,
and I’m like—It’s good that you want to help, but then you’ve got to think of
yourself. My thing is, to answer your question, I just go the other way. Just for my
own personal safety.
Parent 1 recounted a memory based on an extended interaction with the
superintendent of schools and district leadership. Parent 1 recalled,
All the leadership were there, everybody was there. It had to be at least 15 people
in the room. And so whatever she was doing, I guess she wanted to mitigate
against not having the information, not being able to work on it, you know?
Whatever it was. Because I can’t figure out why she had so many leaders in that
room and it was just me and partner presenting, who had been discussing this with
the Superintendent. There wasn’t nobody else before us, we were the agenda.
Make a long story short, I get a call late at night one night, when I say late, I don’t
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know, 8:30–9:00 at night, and it wasn’t the Superintendent, it was it was her
attorney, the school district. So, she calls me and she says, you know, the
Superintendent wanted me to let you know that they looked over the proposal. It
was very detailed, very well written, very well structured, however, due to the fact
that we have a lot of pending things that we have to deal with the budget, there’s
not enough time to get the approvals, the money, and so for that reason she
wanted to let you know that they would not be able to move forward with the
proposal as written, and wanted to thank you for the value and the consideration
that you put forth in presenting it to the school district. It is so greatly appreciated.
However, she did ask me to ask you if—and I’m paraphrasing this—because they
don’t have it in the budget, but bottom line is that what they said is there’s $5,000
to extend to you, but they can’t go forward with the program. And I listened to
that, and you know what I told her? I said, I’m going to tell you right now what I
would tell the Superintendent. We appreciate the opportunity to present, but this is
an insult for you to tell me what you just told me. I said that is an insult.
“I don’t want your money, I feel that this is an insult. You insulted me, you
insulted my partner, you insulted our integrity. I can’t be bought.” I said, “You
tell that to the Superintendent!” and I hung up the phone.
Unbossed and unbought: that’s what I want to be. I want to go to my grave and I
want it to be known that he was just like Shirley Chisolm: he was unbossed and
unbought. I don’t give a damn if I leave with a nickel. I don’t care.
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And they felt like, Oh, we don’t need to do [this plan], we already know. How the
hell are you going to tell me you already know when you let this 10/11 crap
happen?
Educators
The educator participants’ lives were irrevocably changed because of (a) the work
they did at TMAHS and (b) the 10/11 TMAHS police riot. Little doubt exists of the
incident’s toxicity that spread through the TMAHS Community, exposed in an air of
bitterness and cynicism during the dialogues. However, during the dialogues, that
cynicism was overshadowed by the multitude of positive experiences embodied by these
educators through their TMAHS Community building and mentoring. They began the
next life chapters fueled by their practices, yet it was The Thurgood Marshall Way that
sustained them.
Educator 1 transitioned to administration when recalling the impact and influence
of TMAHS:
A few things. First, I decided to activate my administrative credential and become
an administrator and I have done a few major projects that contribute to equity in
our district. Second, I also decided I wanted to pursue additional education, so I
earned my Ed.D. studying equity and teacher renewal.
Maybe the most important change is it has become an anchor in my life in
defining my beliefs and actions regarding equity. When needing to make a choice
regarding equity, I recall our students being beaten by police, being threatened in
the streets by the sheriffs, being lied to by our political leaders—I have used it to
focus my actions providing high quality education to all students. The opportunity
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to work with Principal B. was really a touchstone for me. Especially after seeing
the same site with poor leadership. I hope, one day, I can be as strong and rooted a
leader as he has been.
Educator 2 wondered if the TMAHS model of educating students was to too naïve
and described other ways TMAHS was an influence:
I wonder in retrospect, maybe we were just a little bit too idealistic about the
amount of freedom the kids could handle.
How did it impact my life, well I quit the school. I moved schools. When I came
to Thurgood I made a real commitment to the kids, who made a commitment to
work harder. And I made a real commitment to the Thurgood Marshall way. I
remember the embracing, that embracing mural that greets you as you walk into
the school. I remember embracing everybody from all cultural and class
background, and to the activism that was in the system, to making things better
within the system. To see that destroyed, not so much by the incident, but by the
280-fight beforehand, which I see as the Superintendent trying to make herself
look good, I guess. I don’t know. After the incident, I was part of a meeting with
the Superintendent with half a dozen Thurgood community members. I have no
idea how I got invited to that meeting. Nor I don’t even remember what was said.
But I remember being sort of afraid that she knew my name. … And some years
later, you know how Facebook occasionally suggests you Friend people? Her
name popped up! Like at the top of the list one day.
Educator 3, who remains in the classroom with students today, did not only reflect
on the future of self but on the teacher who was arrested for videotaping (charges were
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dropped): “What happened to the teacher videotaping was, jeez, he left education
altogether. I don’t know. I took a sabbatical at the end of the year and then went to
another school the following year.”
Educator 4, indicated a desire to replicate The Thurgood Marshall Way with less
constraints, as well as move into school administration:
In the classroom, what I drew on from Thurgood Marshall was just a solid
foundation around what I knew students were capable of learning. I knew that
even in a dysfunctional school environment, you could still have a strong
classroom environment. Those things were possible to do because I lived it. I
[later again became] stuck in a dysfunctional school system … was all set to leave
and then somebody that I worked with a little bit got hired as the principal there.
She asked me to help her reshape the school. We started that summer working on
it and trying to put things back together. In 12 years later, we built an incredible
school and it continues to be an incredible school.
The second thing I took was how fragile it all is, you know? That leadership in
these schools is incredibly important, that if you don’t have strong leadership it
will be gone quick. And like a constant push to always be better. It’s right when
you start saying you’re fine and that everything is okay and that we’re doing fine.
That’s right when things can slip. It just has to be a relentless pursuit of being
better and better because like the rest of the infrastructure doesn’t expect a whole
lot out of you. If you can’t sustain it yourself, or if the district is trying to tear you
down, then it can happen quick. So you better watch out, better keep your eyes on
things, better pay attention to the details because the little details are what matters.
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Educator 5, who still does some classroom teaching and also contributes to his
school as an administrator, credits starting at TMAHS:
I really feel like it’s one of the reasons why I’ve been in education for so long, for
almost 20 years now, because I had that foundational experience, that mentorship,
and it really gave me a sense of what was possible with some really inspired,
passionate people.
It feels most important to me that piece around having Thurgood being in this
place with this very clearly shared vision or mission that folks made it what it
was, and its why people came to the table. It was held by the leadership and
afterwards it was a very purposeful dismantling of that and very effective.
As the final themes and subthemes in findings in response to Research Question
2, participants identified the impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 riot on their lives. These
themes are separated by participant category to offer a more clustered perspective of
students, parents, and educators and are extremely revealing of the steps individuals have
taken for themselves and their education or work paths. Their ages, combined with their
roles at TMAHS between 2000 and 2007, may have been contributing factors in the
differences in subthemes that came to light, but retained a connectivity to their core being
from TMAHS.
The San Francisco Chronicle Reporting
The Chronicle’s initial coverage of the riot during the month of October 2002,
when comparing the language in the articles, reflect a running point–counterpoint
narrative that is fixed on assigning blame. The press coverage, based on the available
information, sought to uncover who among the multitude of actors in the TMAHS 10/11
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riot were the provocateurs or riot instigators/escalators: TMAHS Community members
(students and staff) or law enforcement (SFPD and San Francisco Sheriffs). For the
month of October, Chronicle reporters wrote three articles that contained 23 direct or
indirect inferences that the TMAHS staff and students were the provocateurs, escalating
the incident, compared to 17 direct or indirect inferences that San Francisco lawenforcement officers were the provocateurs, escalating the TMAHS 10/11 riot.
Examples of Direct Inferences That Students Were the Escalators in the Reporting
“Police officers were brought in to break up clashes among students in the
hallway.”
“There was a riot going on in that school. If we do nothing, we are derelict in our
duty, and someone might get killed in there.”
“The kids were confrontational.”
“Officers were facing an angry crowd of 150 to 200 youths inside the school, and
that one had snatched a baton.”
“I saw some extremely angry children.”
Examples of Indirect Inferences That Students Were the Escalators in the Reporting
“Simmering tensions at Thurgood Marshall High School in San Francisco’s
Bayview district erupted into disturbances Friday.”
“The unrest forced the midday shutdown of the 1,100-student school.”
“An undercurrent of tension has run through Marshall High since last spring.”
“Police said they had no choice but to come to the school and react as they did.”

142
Examples of Direct Inferences That Law Enforcement Were the Escalators in the
Reporting
“Several teachers and students said police had used their batons, grabbed the hair
of students involved in the melee and handcuffed innocent youths.”
“I was jumped, then I was put under arrest for being jumped and then the police
started jumping me.”
“As I was getting ready to walk away from the crowd, one of the police officers
struck me in the face and they pulled a gun out on my friend.”
Examples of Indirect Inferences That Law Enforcement Were the Escalators in the
Reporting
“Students watching this cannot believe it. … They were being treated like
common criminals.””
“Police added a second officer at the campus in response, and the district posted
five security guards.”
“Teachers and students felt the new principal and the district have created a
police-state atmosphere, unnecessarily bringing in officers to deal with minor
clashes.”
In November 2002, The Chronicle reporters wrote two articles that contained 10
direct or indirect inferences that the TMAHS staff and students were the provocateurs
compared to six direct or indirect inferences that San Francisco law-enforcement officers
were the provocateurs/escalators of the TMAHS 10/11 riot.
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The next two articles about the riot did not appear in The Chronicle until late
February and mid-March 2003 containing nine direct or indirect inferences that the
TMAHS staff and students were the instigators, compared to four direct or indirect
inferences that San Francisco law-enforcement officers were the instigators/escalators.
These were the only 2003 articles published by The Chronicle (see Table 7).
Table 7
San Francisco Chronicle’s Coverage, Themes Emerged That the Thurgood Students/Staff
Were Reported More Times as the Instigators or Provocateurs of the TMAHS 10/11 Than
Riot Law Enforcement
SF Chronicle’s article dates “direct or indirect” inference
Police were the
Students/Staff were the
(12 articles reviewed)
provocateurs on 10/11 provocateurs on 10/11

Totals

10/12/02

12

17

10/16/02

3

4

10/17/02

2

2

11/16/02

5

6

11/29/02

1

4

2/27/03

4

9

3/14/03

0

0

6/18/04

3

1

7/15/04

2

7

9/3/04

1

1

9/23/04

8

5

9/30/04

7

0

48

56

On June 18, 2004, a Chronicle article was published with one direct or indirect
inference that the TMAHS staff and students were the instigators of the riot compared to
three direct or indirect inferences that San Francisco law-enforcement officers were the
instigators of the TMAHS 10/11 riot. The article highlighted news that the San Francisco
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OCC would reveal multiple SFPD policy violations that occurred at TMAHS on October
11, 2002.
The executive director of the San Francisco OCC, would present a full report and
findings to the San Francisco Police Commission, the official SFPD oversight body
(Gordon, 2004), essentially absolving the police of wrongdoing at the school or the
TMAHS Community beyond their policy violations. After the July coverage that had the
TMAHS as instigators in seven instances compared to the police with two, the balance of
The Chronicle’s 2004 coverage inverted their coverage perspective. Chronicle reporters
attended police commission meetings, heard OCC findings, and published articles
through September 30, 2002 that showed law-enforcement officers with a total of 16
instigator/provocateur instances versus TMAHS students and staff with six instances.
One connecting feature of The Chronicle’s press coverage of the TMAHS 10/11
riot, which has not been acknowledged is that over time, the coverage, combined with
subsequent events in San Francisco’s history such as the Fajita-gate police-misconduct
cover-up, the replacement of Police Chiefs Earl Sanders and Alex Fagan, and the passage
of local Proposition H in 2003: The Police Reform Measure, the issue remained
somewhat in the public’s purview. This purview helped the newly seated police
commission call for a meeting on the TMAHS 10/11 riot and the investigative report
from the OCC.
Summary
In this chapter on research findings, the researcher described the semistructured
interviews with TMAHS Community members to obtain their unheard voices that reflect
the TMAHS climate before, during, and after the October 11, 2002 police riot. The 10
participants met the research criteria through their direct affiliation with TMAHS
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between 2000 and 2007. Participants were students who attended TMAHS, parents of
students who attended TMAHS, and educators who taught at TMAHS. All participants in
this study continue to reside in northern California and were accessible for initial
dialogues as well as subsequent follow-up clarifications, with few scheduling constraints.
The dialogues took place either in-person (five) or through video conferencing (five),
followed by video, e-mail, and telephone communications.
Participants either introduced themselves or updated the researcher about their life
paths taken since graduating or leaving TMAHS. All student participants have graduated
from 4-year colleges or universities and two have gone on to obtain advanced degrees.
Students have also worked directly with underserved communities and with K–12
students of color. Parent participants also worked directly with underserved K–12
students during their professional lives. Educator participants remained in education after
leaving TMAHS, with none immediately leaving the field due to the 10/11 riot, although
participants indicated that the riot definitely influenced their practice going forward.
The generative themes that emerged, based on the two research questions, were
partitioned into three themed phases (with subthemes following each). The themes and
subthemes spoke strongly about how much the school and community in the school
meant to study participants. The participants accessed compartments of their memories to
candidly share their triumphs and challenges experienced while at TMAHS. The
memories retrieved from participants unearthed a multitude of themes and subthemes
during the dialogues, primarily due to the nature of the semistructured discussions. These
discussions took participants’ time, thoughts, and energy before, during, and after their
scheduled interview concluded, through follow-up and clarifying inquiry. The topics
broached were often sensitive and at times visibly distressing for some participants.
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Many took a few moments during the discussion to gather their thoughts and themselves,
while enduring the dialogue fully present and in an unguarded state with the researcher.
Chapter 5 presents the findings, summarizes the dissertation study. The
researcher’s reflections also appear in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides recommendations
for further research.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Chapter 5 contains the discussion of research findings from the reflections of
TMAHS study participants. Following this introductory section is a summary of the
dissertation that consists of an overview of Chapters 1, 2, and 3, as well as a brief review
of Chapter 4. The next section in this chapter discusses, in depth, the research findings
before leading to the Chapter 6 conclusions and recommendations.
Summary of the Study
This dissertation and study began with an introduction to the October 11, 2002
TMAHS police riot from various published official and unofficial perspectives. These
perspectives are from service providers, reporters, youth advocates, human-rights
investigators, and the researcher who were present at Thurgood after the 10/11 riot to
document and investigate the occurrence with students, educators, and family members
over a sustained period of time. On October 11, 2002 at TMAHS, the embedded SRO at
the school placed a call to the local police department for increased support in managing
a nonweapon school fight on the southeast side of San Francisco, which housed the city’s
most diverse student population of African American, Latino American, and Asian
American youth. In the United States, SRO programs that place embedded lawenforcement officers in schools has increased exponentially over that last 2 decades with
little input from those impacted most by law-enforcement officers. The voices of
students, teachers, and families about police permanently placed on their school
campuses has had limited representation in the scholarship regarding the need for SROs.
In 2002 San Francisco, three African Americans led the city’s top bureaucracies.
Mayor Willie Brown, Superintendent of Schools Arlene Ackerman, and Police Chief Earl
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Sanders held positions of power and were able to play a substantial role in determining
the ultimate consequences of the 10/11 TMAHS riot. Following September 11, 2001,
Columbine active-shooter tactical training for law enforcement began in 2001 and that
militarized style was used to respond to a school fight at TMAHS. Executive powers
including municipal oversight bodies influenced every strategy and the media to
minimize the riot, suppress the facts, and mislead the public by blaming the students and
staff at the school.
The purpose of this qualitative research was to let the TMAHS Community’s
narrative voices reflect on their experiences at Thurgood Marshall, the police or SROs
embedded on their campus, and the 10/11 riot. The participant criteria indicated that the
TMAHS Community member had to have been a part of Thurgood Marshall between
2000 and 2007. This would allow time for the participant to have been indoctrinated in
The Thurgood Marshall Way as well as experience the 10/11 police riot and any changes
to the TMAHS culture after the riot.
Through a narrative inquiry, participants answered questions in a semistructured
dialogue that allowed them to fully reflect, at their own pace, on the impact of TMAHS
and the 10/11 police riot on their school’s culture and on their lives. The two research
questions for this qualitative case study were, (a) How did embedded on-campus police
presence affect school climate at TMAHS? and (b) To what extent did the TMAHS
October 11, 2002 police riot impact students, teachers, and parents?
The study sought to answer the research questions by applying a theoretical
framework and by paying particular attention to the voices of student participants,
notably those in the sophomore class of 2002. The sophomore class of 2002 would have
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experienced the school’s coveted Thurgood Marshall Way indoctrination, the 10/11 riot,
and if they remained at the school, the effects of the riot on the school culture.
Using the theory of deterrence as a theoretical framework that calls out racism
and the practices of dominant culture and White privilege, this study connected the
following two theories to the study: dysconscious racism and CRT. Entrenched in the
TMAHS philosophy were educators using CRT, recognizing that dysconscious racism is
a type of internalized racism that plagues youth of color through media depictions and
dominant-culture norms, labeling them as less than even when trying to break from the
inferiority complex cycle. Deterrence theories were regularly present with practiced zerotolerance policies inflicted on youth of color in school settings and their communities,
making ordinary life consistently inequitable. High-level school personnel were unable to
differentiate the detriment that these policies and practices wreaked on the TMAHS
school community of students, educators, and families in 2002.
The literature review for this dissertation used claims of fact to build an argument.
Claims of fact accrued in the following areas: (a) the superpredator phenomenon
contributes to the SRO program that has exponentially, over time, placed permanent lawenforcement officers in schools, (b) the program contributes to the profiling and
marginalization of youth of color in schools where they should feel safe, (c) students of
color have experienced structural racism and have been pushed into the school-to-prison
pipeline, and (d) this overall societal culture of mass incarceration thoroughly traumatizes
youth of color. These facts, when partnered with joint reasoning, satisfy the argument’s
conclusion that embedded school-based law-enforcement officers marginalize and
traumatize youth of color in schools. The major findings from qualitative case-study
research were partitioned in multiple themes and subthemes that emerged for each
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research question from individual participant discussions. The framework for the findings
in the conclusion and discussions of the study are formatted similar to the literature
review.
Discussion
This section builds from discerning the themed reflections of participants into
subtheme findings, such as Community/Diversity, Good School/College-Going Culture,
or Chaotic School Environment that were either directly supported or closely supported
by the literature.
Findings generated for Research Question 1: How did study participants
remember the effect of embedded on-campus police on the school climate of TMAHS?,
were separated into three theme phases or time periods, as voices of participants
emerged, regardless of their role at TMAHS in the research criterion timeframe.
The first themes within the TMAHS Pre-10/11 phase that participants revealed
were a) The Thurgood Marshall Way, b) Community/Diversity, c) a Good
School/College going culture, and d) the Principal Cared about TMAHS Community.
The Thurgood Marshall Way
By the 2000s, a consent decree created TMAHS high school on the southeast side
of San Francisco to support underserved students in the community with a rigorous
education that had been missing for African American students. SFUSD met its mandated
mission. Thurgood was educating a diverse mixture of African American, Latino, and
Asian students from nearby surrounding neighborhoods so well that it was sending more
of its students prepared for college success than the nationally ranked Lowell High
School in San Francisco.
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Study participants reflections revealed much admiration for the school’s
philosophy, The Thurgood Marshall Way, and subsequent academic accolades, that the
researcher does not believe has ever been documented thoroughly. Although the
participants could not recall the specific tenets of TMAHS beliefs, the impression of the
values has been recalled repeatedly in differing ways that held deep meaning for
educators, students, and parents. Student and parent participants acknowledged a level of
excitement and expectation with the higher 280 graduation-credit requirement, instead of
the district’s 230. Student participants also felt a level of mentoring from educators that
went well beyond normal teaching and tutoring.
Educators mentored families in academic structures such as the A–G course
sequence and block scheduling (UC Office of the President, 2017), and students and
families developed reciprocal relationships with TMAHS educators by mentoring them.
Freire’s “conscientization, the process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social
reality through reflection and action. Action is fundamental because it is the process of
changing the reality” (Freire Institute, 2017, para 5) epitomizes The Thurgood Marshall
Way and the mentoring TMAHS style.
Student participants believed TMAHS educators gave of themselves for the
betterment of TMAHS students’ lives. Additionally, only a few participants could recall
the SRO assigned to TMAHS before 2002. Educators who did recall the SRO presence
on campus noted that the relationship between the SRO and student population was
supportive and noncombative in nature. Educator 4 commenting that the SRO was
“beloved” by the students and felt that was permissible due to the nature of TMAHS
philosophy.
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Community/Diversity
Again, although Thurgood’s mandate demanded diversity, participants indicated
that once involved with TMAHS, one believed they were a part of the Thurgood Marshall
Community, which intentionally brought new students and their families into the fold of
members already enrolled at Thurgood. Educator participants expressed similar thoughts
as they entered the workforce at TMAHS, even remembering the embracing mural of
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall that is outside the school, depicting him
encouraging those of every culture, every type of student, and their family to enter. This
critical-race ideology of respecting voices of people of color as they enter a community
with one another with the social capital that is inherent in the family’s cultural
background (Yosso, 2005) was seen as an asset by participants. Student 3 remembered
vividly coming to Thurgood where there was an expressed expectation that students and
families would get along with one another, regardless of race, class background, or past
social histories. Students did find easy friendships across racial and cultural boundaries,
once indoctrinated in The Thurgood Marshall Way.
Good School/College-Going Culture
Educator participants’ reflections indicated they were not aware at the time that
many TMAHS practices, which they so valued, were written in the structure of the
school, such as additional preparation periods for teachers to collaborate. The TMAHS
families structure for incoming ninth- and 10th-grade students allowed teachers to
support cohorts of students simultaneously with the assistance of other teachers working
with the same students (D. E. Collins, 1998). Educator 5 mused about a time when
clusters of students in families gained support from teachers not just academically but in
extracurricular activities as well. These activities, through thoughtful consideration,
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pleased the staff as well as the students. Parent 1 expressed a deep appreciation for the
rigor as well as the school’s specific recruitment from one of the last neighborhoods in
San Francisco that had large Black populations. This memory corresponded with LadsonBillings (1998) CRT, legitimizing generational wisdom from communities of color
introduced into the school community, which are equally essential with other social
attributes revered in U.S. schools and society.
Educator 1 and Student 3 both underscored a warm demander sentiment (aligned
with Ross, Bondy, Bondy, & Hambacher, 2008) when reflecting on TMAHS school
climate and experiences. This outcome was not part of the research inquiry; however, it
emerged as an entire phase of reflections voiced by participants. A warm demander is an
education professional who has strong, caring, respectful relationships with each student;
supports caring, respectful relationships among peers; creates a culture in which everyone
feels safe enough to take risks; observes a task-focused, calm environment that enables
everyone to concentrate and learn; and provides high and clear expectations for academic
performance (Ross et al., 2008). Students 1 and 2 also recalled teachers supporting them
academically and bringing their families into the development of multifaceted academic
relationships.
The Principal Cared About the TMAHS Community
Efforts of the Pre-TMAHS 10/11 administrators’ and educators’ in providing
reparations to a community of students who had been historically underserved for most of
their academic lives meant the work product had ramifications. Strategies must work to
provide needed outcomes for students to rise to the next levels in academic excellence.
Collaboration and creation, assessment and more collaboration had TMAHS and families
laboring together, corresponding with Freire’s conscientization concept through “action-
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reflection-action,” as a process inherent in their regular practical pedagogy (C. Collins,
2001).
Freire saw it as an educational process, that is grounded in the experiences and
daily lives of the participants, but which requires clearly identified
teachers/coordinators to initiate the process. Teachers have to be concerned with
social and political responsibility, and with the development of the learners to
critically understand both society and their capacity to change it. Teachers and
students then act as coinvestigators, engaged through dialogue in the process of
understanding their lives in relationship to the world. Only then can an action plan
be developed to address the problems. (C. Collins, 2001, p. 90)
Parent participants agreed their relationship with TMAHS educators and
administrators seemed to be driven consistently toward seeking improvement. Educator
participants found multiple instances in which family collaboration and passion to make a
difference for youth of color was as enriching for them as it was meant to be for students.
This format models the adapted behavior rooted in Freire’s praxis in changing
dysconscious racism and transitive consciousness toward critical consciousness.
A central concept of Freire’s model of conscientization is praxis, a cycle of
action-reflection-action. It is from this process, he postulates, that people come to
understand the systems of oppression within which they live and ways in which
they can challenge and change those systems both individually and collectively.
The move from semi-transitive consciousness to transitive consciousness to
critically transitive consciousness does not occur automatically, however. (C.
Collins, 2001, p. 90)
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The second set of themes foreshadowed the upcoming riot, as themes of the
TMAHS 10/11 phase were (a) Chaotic School Environment, (b) SRO/Police Presence,
and (c) Three Powerful African Americans.
Chaotic School Environment
All participants opened this phase of theme remembrances that reflected a
collective dismay at the new administration’s heavy-handed tactics in managing the
student community and behaviors that often did not exist. Participants, while observing
the implementation of several theory of deterrence (Skiba & Peterson, 1999) practices,
resisted implied meanings of the practices aimed at students of color, focusing regularly
on African American and Latino students.
Student participants knew and felt the difference in the way the school was being
run and how their peers were being treated. Without the supportive culture to fight
systems of oppression from the previous year, students lacked the tools needed to prevail
against the onset of dysconscious racism and self-doubt (as suggested by King, 1991).
Student 2 remembered one reason: “the changed principal. It changed the school a lot.”
Adding to the declining school climate were the growing rumors of student gang
members descending on TMAHS due the closure of McAteer High school and their
student body’s disbursement across the city into schools of rival gang members. Educator
participants witnessed issues between the new administration and the African American
students escalating on campus. African American and Latino students, in conjunction
with a racial gang-style affiliation, were labeled troublemakers and the source of the
school’s problems (Bernburg et al., 2006; Heitzeg, 2009; Hirschfield, 2008).
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Issues with the TMAHS’ student population were exacerbated by the previous
year’s Columbine school shooting in Littleton, Colorado, for which superpredator fearmongering still lingered heavily in the air for all school districts and sites working with
high school-aged youth. Although the Columbine school shooting involved White
perpetrators, urban school administrators with large student-of-color populations across
the country were urged to add more SROs for security purposes (Kennedy, 2001). The
new school administration took full advantage and doubled the SRO presence by two, as
well as adding four more security guards to manage the students-of-color community.
Large groups of officers patrolled hallways throughout the week, adding to the numbers
of newly assigned law enforcement to the Thurgood campus (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009).
The superpredator phenomenon contributed to the SRO program on the Thurgood
campus.
SRO/Police Presence
The administration patrolled TMAHS hallways daily with newly assigned SROs
and security, integrating and acclimating them to the school site and student body
(Canady et al., 2012; Goralczyk, 2004). The TMAHS Community had no evidence for
the amount of police present on campus. Signs emerged of a situation brewing, when
Educator 1 noted the police photographing graffiti; however, those concerns seemed out
of alignment with what the TMAHS had experienced (Heitzeg, 2009). Educator and
student participants commented on the crushing police presence on campus and began to
organize themselves because, as Educator 5 put it, “we were feeling like how tense things
were in the hallways because all of these police were suddenly in our building. It wasn’t
just a resource officer, there were like a handful police that were patrolling the building.”
Regardless, the SRO program at Thurgood was supported as part of a schools’
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disciplinary team by school-site administrators and outside community members (FleurySteiner et al., 2009). TMAHS teaching staff met with the principal to share concerns,
clearly voiced by Educator 4 recalling, “Something is going to happen. It is bad, they
shouldn’t be here. They don’t belong in the school, we’ve got to figure out some other
way because something bad is going to happen.” Educator participants portrayed an
understand of the potential consequences for such intense SRO presence on campus, with
the harshest treatment for Thurgood Black and Brown students (Skiba & Peterson, 1999;
Witt, 2007).
For TMAHS students experiencing the exponential SRO campus patrols, their
environment aligns with research results from Fine et al. (2003) where 83% of the
students (aged 16–21) with police or security guards in their schools feel profiled and
labeled as criminals by school authorities. Student participants remembered that the SRO
caused more problems for TMAHS during the riot and the school’s culture afterwards;
however, they did not describe their own location or position during the height of the
riot’s activities. Student 2 depicted the school after the police riot as being like a
“rollercoaster … then it went really bad and then it had twists and turns.” Student 3 was
troubled at the number of police on the Thurgood campus during the police riot: “You
know, that’s how many police were on campus there.” Educator and student findings
supported that the SRO Program contributes to the profiling and marginalization of youth
of color.
Three Powerful African Americans
With the citizens of San Francisco and the country watching, arguably the most
influential people to address the 10/11 police riot were then Mayor Willie Brown, then
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Superintendent of Schools Arlene Ackerman, and then Police Chief Earl Sanders. Even if
San Francisco had had other people in those positions of power, the ultimate oversight for
the entities and organizations that were involved in the Thurgood 10/11 riot rested in the
hands of the mayor, the superintendent of schools, and the police chief. Ancillary San
Francisco authorities involved would have been the district attorney, the public defender,
and the youth commission. The district attorney holds jurisdiction in charging and
prosecuting crimes, whereas the public defender is the attorney’s office that holds
jurisdiction in defending people who cannot afford legal counsel. The youth commission
in San Francisco advises the mayor and board of supervisors on strategic policies, laws,
and recommendations for unmet needs pertaining to young people (City and County of
San Francisco, 2017).
In the aftermath of the 10/11 police riot, several TMAHS Community members
were arrested (Delgado et al., 2002). The incarcerated students were suspended from
TMAHS and reenrolled in other schools in the district. TMAHS students who were
arrested and the remaining students of the Thurgood Community experienced varying
shades of structural racism. Although news reports indicated that two students were
arrested, a total of 16 students were detained and arrested during and after the riot (OCC,
2004). These additional students were simply attending school and were swept up in the
police melee during class passing time.
Students and their families grappled with the riot, striving to understand the facts
of the 10/11 riot and subsequent changes in school locations, either for safety reasons or
an unspecified cause deemed necessary by the district. Additionally, a growing anxiety
hovered over pending TMAHS cases, unresolved by the district attorney’s and public
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defender’s offices regarding the arrested students. TMAHS students went before city
commissions asking for assistance in resolving issues.
Parent 1 recalled what occurred for those students who chose to speak truth to
power after the riot, “So it’s like, you know, those that got arrested because of standing
up for justice, against the San Francisco Police Department and Sheriff’s Department,”
making an indelible impression on him. Parent 1’s remembrance of Mayor Brown’s
telephone comments resonate disappointment that the person who could have advocated
for the TMAHS Community members refused.
Zero-tolerance policies and practices, initiated at the beginning of the 2002 school
year for TMAHS, included placing more SROs on campus, seeking gang- and raceclashing activities at TMAHS, had immediate ramifications for the school’s community.
Students were part of a riot that research participants declared was started by the heavy
police presence on campus, supported by the new school administration at the beginning
of the school year. Students arrested at TMAHS on 10/11/2002, who may never have
interacted with the juvenile-justice system before, were introduced to it on that day.
Students witnessing the arrest of their classmates were also introduced to the criminaljustice system. Researchers clarified that zero-tolerance policies that target students of
color lead directly into juvenile-justice systems (Petteruti, 2011; Thurau et al., 2013).
Student 2 indicated that the riot changed his mind set about school:
Since the riot happened with the rioting, that was like really tough. I barely went
to class, like I just hanged out and did whatever I wanted. The teachers didn’t care
at that point. That’s how I felt. Like I just remember the security guards, that they
were hanging around every day.
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Students disinterested in school tend to choose the world outside of school and
may become truant. Truant students of color, Black and Latino, have more than double
the chance of being arrested than their White peers. When students of color are
suspended or expelled, they are also doubly at risk for being arrested than their White
peers whom also may be suspended or expelled (Monahan et al., 2014). With the original
TMAHS structures were being dismantled as Educator 5 indicated, the normative
structural racist systems activated as school bureaucracies took over the school’s
management, running it like other high schools throughout the district. Instead of the
school running more efficiently, its culture and climate continued to disintegrate as the
dominant culture’s systematic privilege and institutional practices ineffectually overtook
the school’s identity, providing a false sense of caring. Findings from participant
experiences aligned and concurred with research showing that students of color who
experience structural racism are pushed into the school-to-prison pipeline.
The third set of themes in response to Research Question 1, hailing from the
TMAHS Post-10/11 phase, were (a) Blaming TMAHS Community for 10/11,
(b) Nonexistent Race Wars Now Exist, (c) Destroy TMAHS, and
(d) Superintendent/Central Office Reactions to 10/11.
Blaming TMAHS Community for 10/11
During the multiple investigations regarding the Thurgood 10/11 riot, the San
Francisco police and Sheriff’s departments largely refused to accept any responsibility
for their actions at Thurgood Marshall on October 11, 2002. The OCC’s Report and
Recommendations for Police Response to a Non-Weapon Fight Including Crowd Control
Techniques in a High School Setting points to department failings for recommendations
but “concluded that SFPD’s use of crowd control tactics was within department
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guidelines” (OCC, 2004, p. 3). This report points blame back to the TMAHS Community
as the cause of the 10/11 riot.
The Report on Police Misconduct at TMAHS by Coleman Advocates for Children
and Youth and their Families (N’T. Lee, 2004) contains findings from the SFUSD Task
Force convened by the district and Coleman Advocates’ Youth Making a Change
investigating the events at Thurgood on 10/11/2002 for nearly a full school semester. The
report’s findings are below:
•

October 11 began with an ordinary student conflict.

•

Aggressive police action created a second conflict between African American
students and the police.

•

The police response to Thurgood Marshall High School was excessive—
perhaps the largest police response to a school conflict in U.S. history.

•

The incident was not a student riot.

•

Police used excessive force against unarmed students and adult bystanders.

•

At least 90% of youth who experienced verbal or physical abuse by the police
were African American.

•

An African American teacher was wrongly harassed and arrested.

The Coleman report, along with the SFUSD TMAHS Task Force, added
legitimacy to the TMAHS Community’s assertion that the new school site
administration’s zero-tolerance policies enabled law enforcement to use aggressive
crowd-control tactics on unarmed students, overwhelmingly targeting African American
students for abuse (N’T. Lee, 2004, pp. 2–6). Unfortunately, the Coleman Report was not
as readily available for public reading as The San Francisco Chronicle’s initial coverage
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of the riot, and the reporting left an impression that the Thurgood Marshall Community
was not only at fault but somehow deserved the treatment the police gave them on
10/11//2002 (Alexander, 2010; Cann, 2015).
Nonexistent Race Wars Now Exist
The Chronicle’s coverage also repeatedly fueled racial clashes that were present
at the school, citing unresolved issues with McAteer High School’s closure. The issues in
question concerned African American students already present at Thurgood and the
incoming McAteer student of Latino descent. It was not until after the riot that students
and teachers on campus noticed students eating and clustering in their homogenous ethnic
groups. The prophesied racial issues had come to fruition. As Educator 1, noted, “This
was terrible. We had never had these racial divisions before.”
The presence of SRO and security guards on the Thurgood campus was constant
and the police department received a stipend for handling the gang/racial tensions that
escalated into a student riot, according to their depiction of events at TMAHS on 10/11.
Student 1 recalled a different perspective: “The SROs interpreted the fight as an
altercation due to race; however, that was not the case.”
Weitzer (2000) studied the differences African American youth perceived in how
police treated Whites and Blacks. Youth questioned why they were presumed guilty of a
crime when doing the same ordinary things that a White person would do, like walking
down the street with hands in their pockets because of the cold, not because of something
suspicious. Alexander (2010), in The New Jim Crow,” noted that it not an accident that
youth of color are incarcerated at higher rates than White youth; rather it is the contention
that youth must understand what rules are and will not be coddled.
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Superintendent/Central Office Reactions to 10/11
Parent 2’s assessment of the parent meeting with the superintendent strikes a
chord of disappointment that the district’s educational leader could not be present for the
TMAHS parents who wanted answers. This meeting set the tone for how for many other
contentious meetings would thwart healing efforts between the superintendent and
different faction of the Thurgood Community. The district did assemble a task force to
work with the TMAHS Community to fully understand the 10/011 riot. The task force
comprised 29 people under local organization headers like community-based
organizations (nine), local churches (six), SFUSD administrators, two of whom were
attorneys (11), educators (one), and city officials (two). Due to the high number of
district-related members, Task Forces’ efforts were considered questionable and their
recommendations were included in the Coleman Advocate Report published in 2004. The
Thurgood Community had little faith in the Task Forces’ effort to help heal the wounds
caused by changing the site administration in conjunction with the police riot that
occurred on campus. No TMAHS or other youth were allowed to sit as a Task Force
member.
Youth of color believed police did not listen to them and assumed that they were
guilty from first impressions. This was clear when student involved in the original
conflict at Thurgood on 10/11 said, “I was jumped, then I was put under arrest for being
jumped and then the police started jumping me” (Delgado et al., 2002). Limited research
indicates that when police interact with students on public school campuses, negative
effects are long lasting (Thurau et al., 2013). The TMAHS riot illustrates another
example of students of color feeling unwanted in their schools, neighborhoods, and
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communities (Fine et al., 2003). TMAHS’ school climate and unique culture, as voiced
by Educator 4, never recovered.
Educator 2 reflected that after the riot, a meeting took place with six other
TMAHS Community members. Educator 2 only remembered from the meeting that the
superintendent was fearful because a teacher was in the room. This occurrence connotes
the intimidation exerted over TMAHS teachers and reasons for their exodus over a brief
period of time. By the mid-2000s, Educator 5 believed only a handful of teachers left
from who had been at the school in 2002, stating “probably less than 10 teachers left
from the year I started, which was only 4 or 5 years previous.”
Marginalization and Traumatization of Youth of Color
When the finding subthemes are place sequentially, youth of color were targeted
by embedded law-enforcement personnel and SRO programs placed on their school
campuses. The school was traditionally a place for learning and growth when youth are at
vulnerable stages in life but had become a place that lacked empathy and labeled students
of color as criminals. Youth of color then equated school as a place to which they were
not connected and developed a fear of recurring threats from law-enforcement officers
(Theriot, 2016). Youth of color with SROs and embedded police in their schools
addressed ongoing marginalization and traumatization.
Findings were generated to answer Research Question 2: To what extent did the
TMAHS, October 11, 2002 police riot impact students, teachers, and parents? When
participants considered the events that occurred at TMAHS before, during, and after
10/11, a theme developed explaining the impact on their TMAHS Community’s lives.
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Impact of TMAHS and the 10/11 Police Riot on TMAHS Students, Teachers, and Parents
Subthemes emerged on student participants, who noted that their diverse and deep
community association helped in their worldview develop (D. E. Collins, 1998). Their
career choices regularly included working closely with underserved students of color,
providing mentoring, TMAHS style, to facilitate overcoming challenges and navigate
dominant culture and bureaucratic norms (Yosso, 2005). All student participants also
have kept in contact with some members of the TMAHS Community, forming long and
meaningful relationships with other TMAHS alum. Each participant expressed an
enthusiasm for a future they felt empowered to help shape, as well as a deep-seated fear
that a 10/11 riot could happen at any time, destroying all foundations on which they built
their work and efforts.
Parent participant subthemes arose in two arenas. One was the lessons around
preparing oneself for a dangerous encounter, no matter in a large crowd or in a one-onone confrontation. One parent participant averred that one must take care of one’s person,
do whatever is necessary to survive by avoiding conflict, and absolutely not get involved.
The other parent participant experienced several encounters with district staff. An
agreement existed to assist the district at the highest level with creation of a school-site
safety plan, as Thurgood had none in place at the time of the riot. However, through a
series of occurrences, the plan was reviewed over time and rejected. After further
discussion with district counsel, Parent 1’s response to the conversation was that
community members would not be bought, bribed, or silenced.
Educator participants’ subthemes ranged from recognizing that as educators, the
only space where teachers hold dominion is their classrooms. Three of the five educator
participants took steps to gain administrative credentials and recreate equity models,
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similar to those with which they trained at TMAHS, which they knew students of color in
underserved communities would benefit from understanding. All educator participants
left TMAHS, citing how painful it was to stay once the vision was destroyed by the
administration and 10/11 riot experience.
Historically, the efforts of dominant-culture privilege will not acquiesce, as it is
intrinsic in every academic setting. Educator participants spoke to combating directly the
internalized racism infiltrating the minds of students of color from their earliest academic
interactions (aligned with D. E. Collins, 2000; King, 1991). Participants also expressed a
sense that they had acquired an air of vigilance for the delicate and vulnerable state that
success can be for students of color.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Chapter 6, the first section presents the research findings and provides
conclusions from the findings, as well as discusses any surprises that occurred. Following
is a presentation of the recommendations for future research. Finally, the chapter includes
reflections from the researcher and closing remarks.
Conclusions
A key query and primary concern of this research study has been to understand
how a nonweapon school fight devolved into the SRO-led law-enforcement melee that
enveloped the Thurgood Marshall Community on October 11, 2002, as stated in Chapter
1. One way to understand is to recognize the sizable burden placed on students of color in
public school. Public schools across the country are filled predominantly with ethnic
youth. Youth have an ongoing fight against stereotypes that have mislabeled them as
unfeeling, remorseless superpredators (Bennett et al., 1996) whose time is spent either
with gang members or dealing or consuming drugs, and whose only rewards are found in
intensifying their thrills by causing mayhem and death (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009).
Although, schools in rural, suburban, and urban environments experience similar
behavioral issues with youth, it has been the urban youth of color and their schools that
receive an exponential amount of exaggerated media attention. This type of attention has
a systematized way of regularly spreading false images on the nightly news and in
mainstream movies. These media formats show more youth of color than White youth as
disruptive forces in the community (Goldsmith, 2016). Over time, the depictions remove
the humanity of Latino and Black urban youth, further fueling the long debunked
superpredator phenomenon. These depictions also work to dismiss urban youth of color’s

168
cultural contributions and their community’s assets in society because the contributions
and assets neither fit quantifiably into dominant White mainstream culture categories nor
match dominant cultures’ ideal youth activities (Yosso, 2005). Hence, urban youth of
color find themselves labeled the other or the outsider (Fleury-Steiner et al., 2009).
However, the culprits who have not been held accountable for their egregious
actions are the social scientists and higher education scholars who, in the 1990s,
promoted the superpredator phenomenon. These scholars authored literature counter to
actual declining data on juvenile crime and watched as the phenomenon took hold in
urban settings without refuting its devastating effects to communities of color. Public
accolades were heaped on these social scientists for providing unfounded and
unsubstantiated scholarly support that contributed to the ongoing use of systems (like
GREAT, DAWN, and National Institute on Drug Abuse) still targeting urban youth that
grew from their inception in 1980s (Langston, 2003). These enhanced systems trained
federal, state, and local law-enforcement officers in lobbying lawmakers, elected
legislators, and criminal-court systems with their embellished statistics to create
initiatives meant to enhance ways to contain urban youth. The outcome stifles the natural
growth and hinders progress of students of color when they are in in schools. The
Juvenile Crime Control Act takes this strategy a few steps further, incentivizing state
courts to criminally try younger children and convict youth as adults. Block-grant funds
are distributed across the country, increasing penalties for Black and Latino youth (Gray,
1997). The culture that supports the overrepresentation of youth of color in the criminal
courts is the same culture that helps feed those youth into the culture of the prison–
industrial complex (Davis, 1998), and the school-to-prison pipeline.
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The correlation with the school-to-prison pipeline emanates from the increased
placement of law-enforcement officers in schools through SRO programs that quote
tracking-system statistics as justification, along with school shooting tragedies like those
at Columbine and Sandyhook (Elikann, 1999; Kennedy, 2001). Only a few presidential
elections yielded administrations that were tough on crime, evolving from the Gun Free
Schools Zone Act of 1990 to the Gun Free Schools Zone Act of 1994, to initiating the
Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Act of 1997, which triggered the COPS Safe Schools
Initiative Program funded annually by the federal government (Petteruti, 2011). These
laws created and enhanced zero-tolerance policies that offered the structure that supports
the mass incarceration of students of color and lays waste to communities of color
(Alexander, 2010). The aforementioned national-level mandates affect urban youth of
color in their communities and in their schools, causing them to fight for survival while
fighting for an education.
At the local level, California and San Francisco’s youth, and particularly students
of color, experience these same issues in their schools and communities. Cal STAC and
the STAS’s monitoring systems and training for law-enforcement officers have been
implemented in urban schools, specifically preparing for in-school attacks that resemble
Columbine or Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Vossekuil et al., 2002). When one couples
the tracking and monitoring systems that contain schools and youth with an SRO that is
acculturated to an enabled policing community, documented instances emerge of police
brutality against youth of color in San Francisco-Bay Area communities and in schools.
The plethora of themes and phases that 10 TMAHS study participants produced
from their own reflections merely begins to identify the need to include and promote the
voices of impacted school-community members (students, educators, and families) when
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considering embedding police on a school site. These decisions, made by educational
leaders who are far removed from the school site, speak to the silencing experienced by
TMAHS students, educators, and parents regarding the significant changes in their
school’s climate, partnered with zero-tolerance-policy enforcement and an increase in the
embedded SROs regularly patrolling the school’s campus.
Surprises Occurred During Research
Although interrater reliability (Roberts, 2010), explained below, vetted well the
research process, a few surprises occurred while conducting research for this dissertation
that often confounded the researcher. The two sample participants, acquaintances of the
researcher, were unaffiliated with the TMAHS riot or school community but understood
some of the circumstances about the event. They were sent information as though they
were study participants and asked to reply as such. After the explanation of the study, one
sample participant who was about the same age as a TMAHS senior in 2002, now an
adult (age 32) chose not to participant and did not respond further to inquiries. The other
sample participant who was about the same age as a teacher working at TMAHS in 2002
(age 45) returned all messages, agreed to participate, and answered dialogue questions.
The sample participant did not understand some questions, which may have been due to
not being completely familiar with the school’s history or the SRO-related riot. However,
by asking follow-up questions after the initial question guiding the dialogue, responses
reflected inquiry.
Regardless, one of the first experiences of the researcher was the lack of response
of potential research participants, once the research was underway in earnest. Many
potential participants (students, educators, and parents) as well as law-enforcement
personnel and people who were on the TMAHS campus the day of the riot had expressed
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interest in participating in the research; however, as time for the study drew near, these
potential participants failed to come forward or communicate further with the researcher,
despite multiple and varying outreach attempts. The research began with an initial 12
participants who indicated they desired to participate; however, two declined
participation by not responding after the details of the study were revealed to them and
the researcher made several follow-up attempts.
Another surprise revealed during the study were study participants’ comments
that created the three-themed phases of TMAHS. It was not surprising that participants
began their reflections when they began working at TMAHS, attended TMAHS, or had a
child attending TMAHS, but what was surprising is that participants continued after the
first guiding dialogue question onto the next phase and then the next phase with little or
no prompting, with the riot buffered between the pre- and post-TMAHS. It seemed as
though participants already had a timeline mapped out internally, waiting for the inquiry
to release long-buried memories.
The final surprise was that participants articulated (in one way or another) an
overshadowing theme. One participant shared having figured out a forewarning for other
successful organizations to recognize subtle or unsubtle elements that could compound to
build and lead to the dismantling of communities created for students of color to succeed
and thrive.
Recommendations for Future Research
While conducting research for this dissertation, three recommendations for future
research came to light. One suggestion came from a participant in dialogue with the
researcher and the other recommendations are from the researcher.
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Educator 4, posited that many families intentionally selected Thurgood through
the school-lottery process with preference offered to those living in the 94124, 94134,
and 94110 zip codes: the neighborhoods nearest to TMAHS. A future study could discern
if students and their families who did not intentionally choose TMAHS but had defaulted
into the school because they did not complete the selection process, also adopted The
Thurgood Marshall Way. Were those students able to thrive in the environment,
developing a conscientiousness of their own, carried out into the world after their time at
Thurgood?
The research for this inquiry could be a mixed-methods study, combining
quantitative and qualitative research that considered data from SFUSD enrollments by zip
code. The qualifier for the SFUSD data mining, would be to find school district
applications where TMAHS was at the top of the list of schools selected by families
during the enrollment cycle. Enrollment-cycle data includes all schools open to
enrollment, as understood by applicants and their families, rather than when applying
after the first round of school selection, when applicants may not have received their
primary choice of school. Once the specific criteria were met, research would entail
locating those families or students to inquire with them the reasons for their selection of
TMAHS as a high school of choice. A qualitative study, including conversations with a
cohort of families or students, could provide rich detail about why they chose TMAHS
and their expected outcomes for having attended the school, paired with quantitative data
for research question results.
Further study about The Thurgood Marshall Way would discern how that
philosophy and practice compared to some more famous academic-intervention models,
such as the Harlem Zone and Lorraine Monroe’s original Dream Schools on the east
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coast. Appropriate research would engage the original administration team and their
selection to lead TMAHS, as well as how they worked together to recruit and build a
cohesive team of educators and site support staff. This qualitative case study would aid in
understanding the opportunities advantaged, challenges met, and disasters thwarted in
ideologies coming to fruition. Culminating the study should be the query of how this
model may be made sustainable in the face of adversarial efforts to make this educational
environment inaccessible to the student populations that need it the most.
Another suggestion for future study revolves around the experiences of TMAHS
students who graduated in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. While interviewing three students
for this dissertation, one graduating from TMAHS in 2003 and the other two in 2005,
participants reflected on their experiences at TMAHS and the influences on their lives as
a result of the year they graduated from TMAHS. Students 1 and 2 said the initial school
experience reflected a warm demander environment, but the school culture quickly
shifted to an experience filled with negative aspects as they strove to attain their high
school diploma.
This study would look at their college experiences, understanding whether they
felt prepared to succeed in the rigorous collegiate environment, what careers they chose,
whether they experienced periods of unemployment, and if so, for what reasons. The U.S.
financial crisis leading to the Recession of 2007–2009 also occurred during the time
when these TMAHS graduates would have been completing their college degrees, if they
chose to attend or be entrenched in the workforce. Their experiences as working adults
would be particularly interesting in understanding how much of their TMAHS education
played a part in their preparation for life issues that occurred during that time period.
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These are some of the recommendations for further study that can be applied to
other like school settings, using the same criteria. They center on students of color or
more generally how youth of color manage events. Focusing on multiple paths for
research for how to young people who live in an impoverished life circumstances manage
to achieve when supported?
Recommendations for Professional Practice
To take all possible preventative measures against having an event recur, such as
the TMAHS October 11, 2002 police riot, the following recommendations are presented
for those presiding over and working in the K–12 education system as well as other types
of academic settings.
The first recommendation is to advise governing bodies prior to deciding that
armed law enforcement should be placed into a K-12 school setting, there needs to be a
deep understanding of the consequences of adding such personnel to a school’s campus.
An assessment of community policing practices as well as what measures are present in
the surrounding community that already impact students’ lives when they are not in
school can be attained from local non-profit organizations supporting students and
families. It is strong recommendation to use cross cultural data-driven research to better
understand what zero-tolerance policies currently exist near schools, the effects of zerotolerance policies on youth of color within a school district, and at the level of school
sites. Data from the statistics department may be quite revealing and provide insights on
how many and which students are experiencing suspensions and expulsions as well as
offenses attached to them outside of school grounds. The goal is to diminish the harsh
impact on youth of color experienced when broken windows and theories of deterrence
compound their daily existence and leave them with little hope for bettering themselves
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within their communities. Researchers can partition the data by gender and ethnicity.
Many schools and school districts have implementing an empowering restorative-justiceand-practices and student-peer court models. Entire school communities work together to
reduce community harm, increase harm-caused accountability, and move toward true
reconciliation. Such models strengthen a school community and its members through
trust building. Included in the trust-building process, is to consult student-led advisory
boards and commissions that have been created to offer the perspectives of youth in
determining policies, practices, protocols that are enacted and placed in environments
that they inhabit. The voices of these empowered youth should be sought, documented
and taken into consideration when considering placement of law enforcement on school
campuses.
The second recommendation is that a memorandums of understanding (MOU) be
established between the governing school body or board and the municipal lawenforcement agency whenever an assigned SRO or other embedded law-enforcement
officer has a presence on a school campus. The MOU should denote clear protocols of
behaviors for the officers, with the government school body delineating what behaviors
are allowed and prohibited on school grounds (aligned with Kim & Geronimo, 2009). For
example, the rights of students and staff at the school site should be respected; any
student interrogation or questioning should only occur when parent or guardian has been
notified and is present; unless urgent circumstances dictate, the student should be
provided the opportunity to have an adult ally of their choice present until parent or
guardian may be present; arrest of a student should not occur in the classroom setting and
all care should be taken for students’ physical, emotional, and mental well-being; officers
should not be a part of nor take part in the school’s disciplinary processes.
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Further, Bracy (2010) and Kupchik (2010) noted that law-enforcement officers
serving as school-site counselors do not have the training or skills to serve in this
capacity. Their mere presence in student disciplinary processes tend to escalate
circumstances by asserting a law-and-order approach into the setting, whereas a minor
offense would not have warranted contacting law enforcement (Bracy, 2010). Procedures
should only be managed and handled by trained and certified school-site personnel. In
circumstances that require escalated police activity on campus, unless the situation is lifethreatening or denotes immediate impending danger, the school staff should remain in
full charge of the school site while officers handle the issue, preferably in the office or in
the immediate area of the disturbance. Last, all officers assigned to schools should have
mandatory youth-development guidance and juvenile deescalation training, with frequent
continuing-education updates. These tenets should be outlined in an initial draft of the
MOU and circulated to parent groups, student organizations, teachers’ unions, and
community-advocacy organizations for feedback. The MOU draft should go through
many iterations including presentation of best practices examples from other school
districts and municipalities before the final draft is signed by the district superintendent
and chief of police at a public meeting (as suggested by Kim & Geronimo, 2009).
However, since there is a recognized culture of over-policing communities of
color (Davis, 1998) and the more vulnerable youth of color, it is also recommended that
there be a comprehensive review of local law enforcement’s general orders, as they
pertain to juveniles and police interactions with juvenile in the community and on school
campuses (OCC, 2004b). These rules and regulations should also have a thorough
evaluation by youth advocacy and juvenile justice organizations through a collaborative
partnership with law enforcement.
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Implications of the Research
The TMAHS and the 10/11 police riot will remain in the psyche of the students,
educators, parents, families, and neighboring community for quite some time, still
remembered vividly in 2017. Their lives and lessons devised from the TMAHS
experience in its entirety have impacted their decisions, behaviors, and conversations
regarding zero-tolerance policies, the ramifications of policing in schools, underserved
Black and Latino student communities, and the school-to-prison pipeline.
TMAHS study participants impacted directly by embedded police in schools have
offered a glimpse into their universe and the destructive results when enabled and
embedded SROs are present (Goldsmith, 2016) and focused on enforcing harsh and
unwarranted punishments where students are vulnerable, in school trying to obtain an
education. This study also reflects two types of school-site administrators. One type was
described as nurturing for educators and empowering for Black and Brown youth.
Despite consensus that this type of administrator was not perfect, a strong belief emerged
favoring an environment set on repairing the harm caused by decades of academically
underserving students of color (D. E. Collins, 2000; Yosso, 2005). The other type of
administrator was one who adhered to demeaning stereotypes for student of color,
initiating theory-of-deterrent policies for behaviors that had not taken hold of the school
in the beginning of the 2002 academic school year. However, when expectations were
lowered, and systems of oppression were put in place, youth of color quickly succumbed
to stigmatizing labels (Bernburg et al., 2006) placed upon them. King’s ever-present
dysconscious racism (1991) manifests in youth following labeling and overly harsh
treatment (Casella, 2003b).
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Some law-enforcement agencies seek to change a history of enabled police
brutality to community peace officers when engaging with youth and students of color in
their schools and connected neighboring communities (Brotman, 2015). Youth-advocacy
groups, social-justice coalitions, and civil rights organizations may point to this case
study as an example of voices that were never heard or respected when speaking to
persons in positions of power about changing school communities and their structures.
The participants held onto their recollections and suppressed their voices. However,
through this study, they had an opportunity to share their voice with a larger community
of education policymakers and school-district governing bodies that may be considering
placing SROs or embedded law-enforcement officers in schools.
Reflections of Researcher and Closing Remarks
As I conclude my dissertation journey, I feel a huge sense of accomplishment
after carrying TMAHS Community member’s voices for accountability and closure from
the 10/11 police riot with me for the last 15 years. Upon my arrival at the University of
San Francisco, I had in mind another topic that remains meaningful to me to investigate:
native English-speaker remedial literacy and the application of Teaching English to
Speakers of Other Languages strategies; and I will someday. However, I knew deeply
that I wanted my final dissertation research to be about TMAHS and the 10/11 police riot.
Over time, and with the encouragement of my professor, Dr. Lance T. McCready, I
stepped back in time with members of the Thurgood Marshall Community to remember
our history and that fateful day in October 2002, as well as its aftermath, embracing all
that came with it. I truly believe and trust that there are proven, respectful communityhealing avenues that enable peace and have our students, particularly of color, feel safe in
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schools without embedding armed law-enforcement officers on their campuses or having
them handle school-student discipline.
The study participants continuously expressed their support for me to take on the
TMAHS 10/11 Riot because its effects still ripple through the southeast sector of San
Francisco today. Several participants mentioned they had thought to address TMAHS and
the 10/11 Riot in their post-TMAHS life but had not done so. Their ongoing
encouragement of the researcher’s work and effort to bring forward their collective and
reflective involvement in TMAHS, before, during, and after the 10/11 police riot, has
been heartfelt and truly appreciated.
As a school board member for the SFUSD, policies that I advocated and created,
such as restorative justice and restorative practices, a completed A–G course sequence
requirement for all SFUSD graduates, and more, stemmed from operationalizing the
ideologies I learned from educators and families while I was a parent at TMAHS. I have
benefitted from the profound generosity of the shared learning and mentorship
environment present at TMAHS through The Thurgood Marshall Way and I intentionally
seek opportunities to advocate by modeling its tenets in life, in academia, and when I
work mentoring others.
It has been a long process (far longer than my 3-year doctoral program at USF)
that brings me to the end of this particular road in my life. Although many other roads
have opened during this journey traveled, most were a direct result of my involvement
with TMAHS and the deep love I have for the school’s community and folk doing serious
community work in the southeast sector of San Francisco. I’ll never tire of saying the full
name of that school, which was so beloved by its students and their families, its
educators, and the community it served. I used to think that Thurgood Marshall
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Academic High School and the 10/11 riot changed the course of my life, but about 10
years ago, I began to recognize that the school, the community, and the riot were all part
of the plan for my life. I was supposed to be there at that point in time, just as I’m
supposed to be here at this point in time, discussing it.
For all of the experience, I’m humbled.
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APPENDIX D
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
The following terms have been operationalized for this study:
A–G Requirements. Widely used and accepted for University of California (UCs)
and California State Universities (CSUs) as well as private colleges and universities, the
A-G course requirements, also known as A-G course sequence is a list of subject
requirements created in the high schoolers course schedule from the freshmen through to
senior year. Its purpose is to ensure that students have obtain a general body of
knowledge that will provide breadth and perspective to new, more advanced study. The
list of courses in the sequence are History/social science (“a”), English (“b”),
Mathematics (“c”), Laboratory science (“d”), Language other than English (“e”), Visual
and performing arts (“f”), College-preparatory elective (“g”). “These courses are to be
academically challenging, involving substantial reading, writing, problems and laboratory
work (as appropriate), and show serious attention to analytical thinking, factual content
and developing students’ oral and listening skills (UCOP, 2017,
http://www.ucop.edu/agguide/a-g-requirements/)“.
Block schedule. “A system for scheduling the middle- or high-school day,
typically by replacing a more traditional schedule of six or seven 40–50 minute daily
periods with longer class periods” (e.g. 90 to 120 minutes) that meet on every other day
schedule throughout the week. One of the bonuses for block scheduling is that student
become accustom to this schedule, which mirrors college campus schedules for classes,
making the transition to a college campus seamless (Glossary of Education Reform,
2017).
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Board of education/Governing education body. A body of persons/board
controlling an educational system or a unit of it; especially, a board of citizens controlling
especially the elementary and secondary public-school education in a state, county, city,
or town — compare school board (Meriam-Webster, 2016).
Broken-windows theory. Social scientists James Wilson and George Kelling
(1982) generally posited that if a broken window on a building remained unrepaired in a
neighborhood for an extended period, no matter the socio-economic level of the
neighborhood’s demographics, then other windows in the building would be broken by
any number of residents and/or passing strangers because the population had concluded
that no cared.
Case study. Creswell defines case study as “a methodology: a type of design in
qualitative research that may be an object of study, as well as a product of inquiry.”
Further, case studies have bounded systems, are detailed and use multiple sources of
information (2002, p. 97).
Classroom management. Refers to the wide variety of skills and techniques that
teachers use to keep students organized, orderly, focused, attentive, on task, and
academically productive during a class (Glossary of Education Reform, 2017).
Conscientization. The process of developing a critical awareness of one’s social
reality through reflection and action. Action is fundamental because it is the process of
changing the reality. Paulo Freire says that we all acquire social myths which have a
dominant tendency, and so learning is a critical process which depends upon uncovering
real problems and actual needs (Freire Institute, 2017).
COPS, Secure our Schools Initiative. COPS Secure Our Schools (SOS) grants
provide funding to state, local, or tribal governments working in partnership with public
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schools to improve school safety. Successful programs are based on a comprehensive
safety assessment that identifies the individual needs of the schools, and law enforcement
agencies receiving funding will collaborate with school administrators, teachers, students,
and parents to implement solutions to school safety challenges. (DOJ, 2017).
Critical consciousness (in education). a level of consciousness characterized by
depth in the interpretation of problems, through testing one’s own findings with openness
to revision, attempting to avoid distortion when perceiving problems and preconceived
notions when analyzing them... affirming the mutual and coequal roles of teachers and
learners (Heaney, 1995).
Critical race theory (in education). Are a set of basic insights, methods,
perspectives, and pedagogy that seeks to analyze, identify, and transform those cultural
and structural aspects of education that maintain dominant and subordinate racial
positions inside and outside of the classroom. The theory in education challenges
biological and cultural deficit stories by using a variety of efforts such as “counterstories,
historiographies, corridos, oral traditions, films, poetry… (Solórzano & Yosso, 2002)”
(as cited in McNee, 2015, p.12).
Discipline. Is the practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behavior,
using punishment to correct disobedience (Lee, 2004b).
Enabled police force. A police force unhindered by legal scrutiny and empowered
by deregulation in a deliberate attempt to preserve the racially disparate criminal justice
system (Goldsmith, 2016).
Generative themes. Generative themes are codifications of complex experiences
which are charged with political significance and are likely to generate considerable
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discussion and analysis. They are derived from a study of the specific history and
circumstances of the learners (Heaney, 1995).
Impact. Measure of the tangible and intangible effects (consequences) of one
thing’s or entity’s action or influence upon another (OCC, 2004).
Intransitive consciousness. The state of those whose sphere of perception is
limited, whose interests center almost totally around matters of survival, and who are
impermeable to challenges situated outside the demands of biological necessity
Lock-down in a school setting. An emergency measure or condition, in which
school-site staff and students are temporarily prevented from entering or leaving a
restricted area or the whole building during a threat of danger. (OCC, 2004)
Off-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law enforcement officer).
An SRO patrols perimeters of a physical school location or site, along with the
surrounding neighborhoods (Lee, 2004b)
On-campus (as it pertains to the stationing of an SRO/Law enforcement officer).
An SRO patrols and may have designated space within the physical school location or
site (OCC, 2004).
Police/Law-enforcement officer. A person whose job is in keep the peace, handle
routine calls for service, respond to emergency calls or in progress crimes, enforce
criminal, traffic, health and safety code violations; assist during major emergencies and
natural disasters with evacuations and perimeter security; arrest and book prisoners and
transport, file crime and incident reports, conduct basic investigations, evaluate and
secure crime scenes, render first aid in appropriate situations, make death notifications;
locate and interview witnesses, serve arrest, traffic and search warrants, patrol assigned
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beat or arena in a car, on foot, on a bicycle or horse; a member of the police force (Police
Test Guide, 2018).
Prison–industrial complex. Considering the corporate economic and dividend
structures being attributed to the prison industry, with close reflecting that of the US.
Military, the profitability of privatized business-government linkages with corrections
and public punishment, the exponential expansion of penal system can now be
characterized as a “prison industrial complex” (Davis, 1998).
Restorative justice. Is a social science process that studies a harm-causing offense
and uses methods involving the primary stakeholders in determining how best to repair
the harm done by that offense. The three primary stakeholders in restorative justice are
victims, offenders and their communities of care, whose needs are, respectively,
obtaining reparation, taking responsibility, and achieving reconciliation. The degree to
which all three are involved in meaningful emotional exchange and decision making is
the degree to which any form of social discipline approaches being fully restorative
(Wachtel, 2013).
Restorative practices. Is a practiced social science process that negotiates how to
build social capital and achieve social discipline through participatory learning and
decision-making. The use of restorative practices helps to: reduce crime, violence and
bullying, improve human behavior, and strengthen civil society (Wachtel, 2013).
School campus. The physical location of the school site within the school district
jurisdiction (OCC, 2004).
School community. A school community consists of person associated with the
school on a regular and/or integral basis. These members consist of, for example:
students, teachers, onsite administrators (principal, vice/assistant principal), janitors,
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cafeteria workers, counselors, deans, parents of students attending the school, school
district officials assigned to oversee the school, and neighboring residents, nearby
merchants, and non-profit organizations near the school location that provide services to
the school’s population.
School Resource Officers/SROs. A school resource officer, by federal definition,
is a career law enforcement officer with sworn authority, who is deployed by an
employing police department or agency in a community-oriented policing assignment to
work in collaboration with one or more schools (McNicholas, 2008; Canady, James &
Nease, 2012).
Social justice. Goldfarb and Grinberg define social justice “as the exercise of
altering these [institutional and organizational] arrangements by actively engaging in
reclaiming, appropriating, sustaining, and advancing inherent human rights of equity,
equality, and fairness in social, economic, educational, and personal dimensions”
Goldfarb & Grinberg definition (2002, p. 162), (as cited in Theoharis, 2007).
Stop and frisk. A legal practice used by in the United States, predominantly by the
New York City Police Department (NYPD) that has its origins on London, in which a
police officer may detain, ask questions, and search a person who appeared to be
suspicious. Stop and Frisk laws were a direct descendant of zero tolerance practices and
the broken windows theory. However, after 10 years of the practice, it was discovered
that majority of the persons that were stopped and frisked by the NYPD were AfricanAmerican and Latino males between the ages of 14-24 (Devereaux, 2012).
Structural racism. A system in which public policies, institutional practices,
cultural representations, and other norms work in various, often reinforcing ways to
perpetuate racial group inequity. It identifies dimensions of our history and culture that
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have allowed privileges associated with “whiteness” and disadvantages associated with
“color” to endure and adapt over time. Structural racism is not something that a few
people or institutions choose to practice. Instead it has been a feature of the social,
economic and political systems in which we all exist (Lawrence, 2004).
Superpredator. A term used to describe youth deemed as violent and
unredeemable in the eyes of society. In late 1995, John DiIulio, a criminologist and
political scientist, wrote a magazine article entitled “The Coming of the Super-Predators”
(Drum, 2016). DiIulio said “We’re talking about kids who have absolutely no respect for
human life and no sense of the future. And make no mistake, while the trouble will be
greatest in black inner-city neighborhoods, other places are also certain to have
burgeoning youth-crime problems that will spill over into upscale central-city districts,
inner-ring suburbs, and even the rural heartland.” (Botelho and Ellis, 2015).
Three Strikes Laws. ““Three strikes and you’re out,” requiring that criminals
involved in three serious, violent felonies be sentenced to prison for guaranteed terms up
to life imprisonment” (Meese, 1994). The Three Strikes Laws are also a part of the
United States tough on crime policies and zero tolerance practices.
U.S. Department of Education (ED). The Education Department’s mission is to
promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering
educational excellence and ensuring equal access (ED, 2016).
U.S. Department of Justice. The Office of the Attorney General was created by
the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93), as a one-person part-time
position. The Act specified that the Attorney General was to be “learned in the law,” with
the duty “to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United
States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when
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required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of
the departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments” (DOJ, 2017).
War on drugs. Is an American term commonly applied to a campaign of
prohibition of drugs, military aid, and military intervention, with the stated aim being to
reduce the illegal drug trade. The term was popularized by the media shortly after a press
conference given on June 18, 1971, by United States President Richard Nixon—the day
after publication of a special message from President Nixon to the Congress on Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control—during which he declared drug abuse “public enemy
number one” (Dufton, 2012).
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APPENDIX E
HISTORY OF STUDENT ASSIGNMENT IN SFUSD (2016)
SFUSD Student Assignment Redesign

History of Student Assignment in SFUSD
In 1978, the San Francisco NAACP brought a case against SFUSD and the State of
California. The NAACP argued that the District and the State engaged in discriminatory
practices and maintained a segregated school system in violation of the U.S.
Constitution, federal statues, and the State of California Constitution.
In 1983, the U.S. District Court approved a type of agreement between the parties
called a “Consent Decree” which had two primary goals for the San Francisco Unified
School District:
1. continued and accelerated efforts to achieve academic excellence for all students
with a particular focus on African American and Latino students; and
2. elimination of racial/ethnic segregation or identifiability in any school, program, or
classroom to the extent practicable.
In implementing the 1983 Consent Decree, SFUSD created a student assignment plan
and a transportation system designed to support SFUSD’s efforts to desegregate its
schools. The student assignment plan used a combination of schools with both
contiguous and noncontiguous attendance areas, alternative schools (without
attendance areas), and optional enrollment requests which allowed students to transfer
to schools outside of their attendance area school. In addition, no school could have
fewer than four racial/ethnic groups, and no racial/ethnic group could constitute more
than 45% of the students at attendance area schools or 40% at alternative schools.
In 1994, a group of San Francisco parents sued the District for using race as a
factor in school assignment, and as part of a 1999 settlement, SFUSD was prohibited
from using race or ethnicity as a consideration in student assignment. In attempting to
comply with that agreement, SFUSD initially proposed an assignment plan that used a
lottery process in which race/ethnicity was one factor, but the Court rejected that plan.
In 2001, the Court approved a settlement agreement that included a new student
assignment method called the Diversity Index, which was implemented for the 2002-03
school year and has been in use ever since. The Diversity Index is designed to:
1. give parents choice;
2. ensure equitable access; and
3. promote diversity without using race/ethnicity.
On December 31, 2005, the Consent Decree expired, and for the first time in 22
years the SFUSD student assignment process was not regulated by the courts.
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SFUSD Student Assignment Redesign

Hearing from the Community
SFUSD has partnered with different community members and organizations over the
past five years to gather feedback on the student assignment system. SFUSD has
heard from thousands of parents and other community members regarding their
experience, concerns, and suggestions for student assignment. Families consistently
report wanting quality schools and a fair and equitable system that is easy to
understand.
While families consistently report wanting quality schools, there are many divergent
perspectives on what a new student assignment plan should prioritize and support. For
example, some parents want a school close to home, while others feel that choosing a
school with particular programmatic features is more important than having a school
close to home.
Here is a high-level summary of key findings from the community reports. For the
purposes of the summary, we have pulled out findings that relate only to the student
assignment system. However, within these reports there is also rich material regarding
the kinds of schools parents and other community members want.
•

Some parents, particularly elementary school parents, want a quality school close to
home or easy to get to. Other parents feel that choosing the school that is best
suited for their child is more important than having the school in their neighborhood.

•

Most parents want their school communities to reflect San Francisco’s
socioeconomic and cultural diversity. But for parents across the city, diversity is
often trumped by a school’s location, academic quality, and their own feeling of
belonging.

•

Even parents who are happy with their children’s schools want more predictability in
the enrollment process and are uncomfortable with a process that feels excessively
complicated or random.

•

Parents want the District to provide clear and accessible information that will help
them choose a school that is a good fit for their child.

•

Parents want to participate fully in the enrollment process, but many encounter
significant language, time, and information barriers.

The content of past community reports can be found on our website: www.sfusd.edu.
(http://portal.sfusd.edu/template/default.cfm?page=policy.placement.assignment.commu
nity)
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SFUSD Student Assignment Redesign

SFUSD’s Current Student Assignment System
The current student assignment plan, in place since 2001, is designed to:
1. Give parents choice;
2. Ensure equitable access; and
3. Promote diversity without using race/ethnicity.
Under the current system, the biggest determinations of where a student goes to school
are parent choice and available seats at any given school.
Students are not automatically assigned a school. Families can request up to seven
schools anywhere in the district.
Younger siblings get priority to attend school with their older sibling.
While there is some local preference, the district is using the same attendance area
boundaries created over 15 years ago, and about 1/3 of schools do not have any
attendance area boundaries.
Some schools have more applications than seats for students. For those schools a
diversity lottery assigns students to one of their choices.
The diversity lottery seeks to achieve economic, linguistic, and academic diversity. It
defines and measures diversity using a complex formula that calculates the probability
that in a given grade randomly chosen students will be different from each other.
The calculation is based on five race-neutral factors:
1. extreme poverty;
2. socioeconomic status;
3. student’s home language;
4. academic performance index of student’s prior school; and
5. student’s prior academic achievement.
For many schools, the applicant pools are not diverse. Since the diversity lottery only
assigns students from the applicant pools, it has limited opportunity to reduce racial
isolation and the concentration of underserved students in the same school.
Students who do not get one of their choices get offered the school closest to where
they live with a seat available.
You have to turn your application in on time to choose among all the schools. If you
don’t turn your application in on time, you can only request schools that still have space.
There is limited connection between where students live and where they go to school,
and as a result school assignments are not predictable.
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SFUSD Student Assignment Redesign

Board of Education’s Priorities
for Student Assignment
In response to the concerns about the current student assignment system, the Board of
Education established three priorities for a new student assignment system, and they
also established measures for evaluating different options.
Board’s Priorities

Reverse the trend of racial
isolation and the
concentration of
underserved students in
the same school.

Provide equitable access
to the range of
opportunities offered to
students.

Provide transparency at
every stage of the
assignment process.

Measures for Evaluating Different Options
•

Minimize the number of schools with more
than x% of students achieving below basic/far
below basic.

•

Minimize the number of schools with more
than x% of a single racial/ethnic group.

•

Minimize the number of schools with more
than x% below basic/far below basic
combined with x% of a single racial/ethnic
group.

•

Minimize the number of schools with more
than x% of students with a low socioeconomic status.

•

Minimize the number of schools with more
than x% of English Language Learners.

•

Make equitable access to high-quality
opportunities independent of “on-time”
participation in the student assignment
system.

•

Increase diversity at racially isolated schools
that also have high concentrations of
underserved students.

•

Decrease the number of under-enrolled
schools.

•

Eliminate incentives for parents to try to
game the student assignment process.

•

Increase the rates of on-time participation in
the enrollment process.

These measures will be used to analyze various options to see if a particular option is
more or less likely to meet the Board of Education’s priorities for a new student
assignment system.
Updated: November 13, 2009
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APPENDIX F
CONSENT DECREE (1983)
SAN FRANCISCO NAACP, ET AL. VS. SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, ET AL.
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APPENDIX G
SFUSD, DIVISION FOR INTEGRATION:
SPECIAL PLAN FOR THE BAYVIEW-HUNTERS POINT SCHOOLS (1993)

317

318

319

320

321

322

323

324

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

332

333

334

335

336

337

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348
APPENDIX H
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE TMAHS POLICE MELEE,
REPORTING FROM OCTOBER 2002 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2004

Melee closes S.F. high school - Melee closes high school in San Francisco
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - October 12,
2002
Author/Byline: Ray Delgado, Jaxon Van Derbeken, Nanette Asimov, Chronicle Staff
WritersEdition: FINALSection: BAY AREAPage: A17
Simmering tensions at Thurgood Marshall High School in San Francisco's Bayview district
erupted into disturbances Friday as scores of baton-wielding police officers were brought in to
break up clashes among students in the hallway.
The unrest forced the midday shutdown of the 1,100-student school, located off Silver Avenue
near Interstate 280 and Highway 101. Then police fanned out in the neighborhood dispersing
students who were milling about, some shouting taunts at officers.
Many teachers and students said the 60 police officers from throughout the city who
responded had overreacted to the confrontation. In the end, two students were arrested, along
with an English teacher, 29-year-old Anthony Peebles, who videotaped some of the unrest and
repeatedly told students not to disperse, police said.
He allegedly pushed an officer who was trying to get him to stop, police said. Peebles was cited
and released on suspicion of inciting a riot, battery on an officer and interfering with an arrest.
An officer seized his video camera.
Several teachers and students said police had used their batons, grabbed the hair of students
involved in the melee and handcuffed innocent youths.
"They were acting as if this was a riot, but it was not at the riot stage," said Kevin Hartzog, a
teacher at Marshall for five years. "The whole thing could have been resolved calmly, without
having officers here in force."
"This was an overreaction," said an English teacher, Pirette McKamey. "The level of this
response was a total disconnect with what was actually happening.
Our students watching this cannot believe it. . . . They were being treated like common
criminals."
Police said they had no choice but to come to the school and react as they did.
They said a series of fights began just before school started Friday morning, when one youth
was attacked by a group of 10 to 15 students just outside the school.
"That precipitated a big fight, and the two officers in the school were overwhelmed," said Capt.
Michael Puccinelli of Southern Station. "There was a riot going on in that school. If we do
nothing, we are derelict in our duty, and someone might get killed in there."

349

The boy who was attacked, 16-year-old sophomore Jason Morgan, said the police response
made things worse.
"I was jumped, then I was put under arrest for being jumped and then the police started
jumping me," Morgan said.
Colleagues said Peebles, who did not return calls seeking comment, was angry at how the
police were handling the situation and told students not to disperse.
Puccinelli said school Principal Juliet Montevirgen reprimanded Peebles at the scene.
"We warned him three times to stop inciting the violence," the captain said.
"He was saying the police were wrong. He certainly didn't act like a responsible faculty
member."
Montevirgen did not return calls seeking comment.
About an hour after police arrived in force late in the morning, a large crowd of angry students
stormed up and down Silver Avenue, yelling at police officers who stood in a line to prevent
them from returning to the school.
The stalemate lasted another hour. Students eventually left the scene at the urging of teachers
and parents.
Many students agreed that police went overboard.
Channing Hale, a 15-year-old sophomore, said she was hit on the side of her head by a police
baton as she tried to get out of the way.
"As I was getting ready to walk away from the crowd, one of the police officers struck me in the
face and they pulled a gun out on my friend," Hale said.
Puccinelli said police had been forced to act. He said officers were facing an angry crowd of 150
to 200 youths inside the school, and that one had snatched a baton.
"We had to move the kids," he said. "The kids were confrontational."
An undercurrent of tension has run through Marshall High since last spring, when district
Superintendent Arlene Ackerman dismissed the school's popular, longtime principal, Samuel
Butscher. The school also had to accommodate about 200 additional students at the beginning
of the school year, some of whom came from the long-troubled and now-closed McAteer High.
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Police added a second officer at the campus in response, and the district posted five security
guards.
Some teachers and students felt the new principal and the district have created a police-state
atmosphere, unnecessarily bringing in officers to deal with minor clashes.
Even before Friday's melee, teachers were describing how the departure of Butscher and the
arrival of Montevirgen, a veteran school district administrator, had led to a breakdown in
discipline.
School board member Dan Kelly said he did not think the change in leadership had caused the
fight. He said those still longing for the old administration "are a few dissidents. But it's a
mistake to pin this incident on that."
District officials said some of the youths involved in the fights Friday did not attend Marshall.
Ackerman's second-in-command, chief academic officer Elois Brooks, said an assistant principal
had brought the Marshall students into the office and the other participants had fled. The
students were suspended, Brooks said.
The incident drew a handful of district administrators and school board members to the school
to develop a response plan, which will include notices to parents and a handout to teachers to
discuss conflict resolution in class.
There will also be a meeting for parents at the school Tuesday night and one or more meetings
between faculty and staff, Brooks said.
"We are certainly sorry and not satisfied when we have students behaving in this manner,"
Brooks said, pledging to investigate not only what happened with students, but whether the
police used unnecessary force in their response.
"I saw some extremely angry children," she said. "But I can assure you that we will also sit down
with the police chief and talk about the lessons learned. "
Caption: PHOTO (2)(1) Jamie Wilcher (center) was hit by a police baton. Her parents, Loretta
Wilcher (left) and Akili Hammond (right), came to take her home., (2) A student is led out of
Thurgood Marshall High School in handcuffs after others were sent home. Photos by Christina
Koci Hernandez/The Chronicle
Memo: E-mail the writers at rdelgado@sfchronicle.com, jvanderbeken@sfchronicle.com and
nasimov@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: Thurgood Marshall High School; BRAWLS & RIOTS; POLICE CONDUCT; SCHOOLS;
SFDateline: San FranciscoRecord: 3262835
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S.F. high school reopens after melee - Marshall parents confront officials
Hide Details
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - October 16,
2002Browse Issues
Author/Byline: Ray Delgado, Chronicle Staff WriterEdition: FINALSection: BAY AREAPage: A23
Students returned to San Francisco's troubled Thurgood Marshall High School on Tuesday
morning for the first time since a confrontation between police and students shut down the
school last week. Many of them were accompanied by parents who angrily demanded answers
from school district officials.
Juniors and seniors filed into the school for impromptu sessions with crisis counselors to learn
about conflict resolution and dealing with anger as part of the school district's plan to quell
tensions at the school after Friday's disturbance. Sophomores and freshmen will return for a
similar program today, and regular classes will resume Thursday.
Many of the students witnessed the late-morning fight between three teenagers that turned
into a tense and lengthy standoff between students and police after officers were called to the
school. Students, and some teachers, say police used unnecessary force to disperse the crowd,
handcuffing innocent bystanders and hitting several students with their clubs.
In the end, the two students involved in the original fight were arrested along with a 29-yearold teacher who was videotaping the confrontation and was accused of assaulting a police
officer.
It was the worst disturbance ever to hit the 1,100-student school, which was founded eight
years ago to be an antidote to the low academic standards that had been associated with the
Bayview-Hunters Point area.
Senior Tramael Burch, 17, said she wasn't really interested in the various conflict-resolution
plans the district pulled together. She said she was too upset about what happened to many of
her friends.
"I had a headache all weekend," Burch said. "I feel like something's inside holding me back. I
was scared about coming back."
Senior Chris Ang, 17, said although he wasn't afraid for his own safety, he thinks that the
fighting last week between black and Asian students will result in racial tension at the school.
"It's kind of a good idea to come back to get everybody together, but in a way, it could start
racial tensions."
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At the same time that students were in class Tuesday, many of their parents met with school
district Superintendent Arlene Ackerman and Principal Juliet Montevirgen. Many unleashed
days of pent-up anger about how the incident was handled by administrators and police.
"I expect the school to handle things internally, not get panicked and call the police like that,"
said Andre Williams, whose 17-year-old daughter Andrea is a senior at the school. "I expect for
that never to happen again."
Parents demanded to know when they would see the school's emergency response plan, how
outside students who were involved in the scuffles got into the school, why the police were
called and responded in riot gear and who pulled an emergency fire alarm that added to the
chaos and funneled many students into the hallway melee.
Ackerman was repeatedly on the defensive during the two-hour meeting and promised to
provide parents with a condensed response plan by the end of the day and to call a special
community meeting with the Board of Education and Police Chief Earl Sanders to answer some
of the other concerns.
"I am trying to get information about what happened," said Ackerman, who was out of town on
Friday when the incident occurred. "There were a number of different perspectives and people
that were here. You have to give me time to answer those questions."
Ackerman said police were called to the school by a police officer stationed at the school and
were told that there was a fight that was out of control and apparently responded in force
because of that characterization.
"I'm not saying the (school resource officer) should have called police, that's just what
happened," Ackerman said.
There are two officers and four security guards stationed at the school. Ackerman said students
would be issued identification cards to help prevent outsiders from getting on campus.
Embattled Montevirgen also addressed the group and apologized to parents for the heavy
police presence Friday.
"After listening to a group of African American parents (Monday) afternoon, I reflected on my
way of looking at the situation," she said. "I was brought up in a community and a culture
where a (police) uniform is the only thing that can save you. I was wrong to bring that
assumption here."
Montevirgen said after the meeting that the fight in the hallway outside her office was so
chaotic that it was hard to know how to control it.
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"This was not just a simple fight," Montevirgen said. "The first floor was so crowded and all of a
sudden there was all this yelling and screaming going on."
Memo: E-mail Ray Delgado at rdelgado@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: Thurgood Marshall High School; BRAWLS & RIOTS; POLICE CONDUCT; SCHOOLS;
SFRecord: 3263434Copyright: Copyright 2002 The Chronicle Publishing Co.
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S.F.'s Marshall High principal quits - Decision follows dramatic standoff between students and
police
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - October 17, 2002
Author/Byline: Ray Delgado, Chronicle Staff WriterEdition: FINALSection: BAY AREAPage: A23
The embattled principal of San Francisco's Thurgood Marshall High School abruptly resigned
Wednesday in front of angry parents meeting with district officials to discuss a melee that shut
down the campus last week.
Principal Juliet Montevirgen announced that she would immediately step aside in the best
interest of students after her tumultuous two-month term leading the campus of 1,100 pupils
culminated with a dramatic standoff Friday morning between students and baton-wielding
police summoned to break up a fight.
Montevirgen endured widespread criticism from parents, students and teachers who
complained of a heavy-handed response from police. Students and teachers said that officers
used excessive force to break up a crowd gathered to watch the fight and that police
handcuffed innocent bystanders.
Although Montevirgen did not call the police, she was criticized for her lack of leadership after
the incident and poor communication with parents about what happened. That only added to
the litany of complaints many had about her tenure at Marshall.
Two students and a teacher were arrested after the melee, and school officials canceled classes
for the remainder of the day after students continued taunting police trying to disperse them.
School district Superintendent Arlene Ackerman said an emotional Montevirgen called her late
Tuesday night and asked to be reassigned to another post "for the sake of the children."
"She felt at this point that she did not want to be an obstacle to the school moving forward,"
Ackerman said. "At this point, I think it's time to move forward. People seem to have accepted
that."
Dr. Frank Tom, assistant superintendent responsible for high schools and a former principal at
Lincoln High, will serve as interim principal.
Marshall's former assistant principal, Lou Garrett, will return and be joined by Jean Bell, who
was assistant principal at Franklin Middle School.
Marshall's other administrators will remain in their positions, district officials said.
Montevirgen, a 30-year district employee and a former principal of Balboa High School, could
not be reached for comment.
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Her resignation capped a dramatic year of changes at an 8-year-old school once considered a
shining example of academic acheivement and higher standards in the city's Bayview-Hunters
Point neighborood.
Many parents and teachers criticized Ackerman's decision last spring to replace veteran
Principal Samuel Butscher, and they blame his absence for the school's recent academic slide
and mounting tension among students.
Ackerman never commented publicly on her decision not to renew Butscher's contract, and
many felt he was replaced because he criticized the district's decision to lower from 280 to 230
the number of credits required to graduate from Marshall. Many students, parents and
teachers took great pride in the higher standards and were dismayed when the district lowered
the bar.
The school also had to accommodate about 200 additional students at the beginning of the
school year, some of whom came from the long-troubled and now- closed McAteer High
School.
Montevirgen's resignation was a welcome surprise to many teachers who had threatened a
sick-out today if Ackerman did not meet a list of their demands.
Environmental science teacher Lance Powell said Thursday night that he and his colleagues
would report for work today with high hopes for the new administration.
"My hope is for the (new) administration to get out in the hallways and get to know these kids,"
he said. "We have to build a new culture from within. We're hopeful that we're moving in the
right direction."
Memo: E-mail Ray Delgado at rdelgado@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: Juliet Montevirgen; Thurgood Marshall High School; BRAWLS & RIOTS; OFFICIALS;
POLICE CONDUCT; RESIGNATION; SCHOOLS; SFDateline: San FranciscoRecord: 3263611
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Dust hasn't settled over Thurgood Marshall fracas
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - November
29, 2002
•
•
•
•
•

Author/Byline: Ray Delgado
Edition: FINAL
Section: SAN FRANCISCO FRIDAY
Page: 2
Column: SCHOOL NOTES
It's been more than a month since the ruckus at Thurgood
Marshall High School in the Bayview District but passions are still
running high for those who were involved in the hallway fight
between students and the ensuing police activity.
Marshall students, parents and community members have been
waiting for a public hearing where they can hear explanations and
speak their mind about the Oct. 11 melee that shut down the
school for the day and brought in a throng of police officers.
It just so happened that the city and school district committee, a
relatively new collaboration between school board members and
city supervisors,
had a meeting planned last week and placed the Marshall matter
on the agenda. Although the committee is not involved in the
school district's official task force investigation, it was the first
chance for many of the committee members to delve into the
Marshall matter.
They got few explanations from school district officials, who often
cited the on-going investigation while still acknowledging a vast
breakdown in communication that led to a heavy-handed police
response.
Although members of the Marshall community weren't specifically
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invited to attend the meeting, many heard about it at the last
minute and scrambled to get there.
Many chastised Board of Supervisors President Tom Ammiano
and Jill Wynns, school board president, for not making sure the
community knew about the meeting.
The district played a controversial videotape taken moments after
police arrived at the high school, a tape that had been confiscated
by police.
Most of the footage was shot by English teacher Anthony
Peebles, 29, who was arrested after refusing police orders during
the incident. The district said the tape is available for anyone who
wishes to see it.
The district attorney declined to press charges against Peebles,
who still faces disciplinary action from the district.
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No charges for teacher in melee - S.F. prosecutor leaving it up to school district
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - November
16, 2002
•
•
•
•

Author/Byline: Wyatt Buchanan, Chronicle Staff Writer
Edition: FINAL
Section: BAY AREA
Page: A17
A San Francisco high school English teacher will face no charges
stemming from an Oct. 11 student melee at Thurgood Marshall
High School in the Bayview neighborhood.
Anthony Peebles, 29, was arrested on suspicion of inciting a riot,
battery on an officer and interfering with an arrest after batonwielding police responded to a fight among numerous students at
the school.
The school principal, Juliet Montevirgen, later resigned over the
incident.
Prosecutors said they thought they lacked sufficient evidence to
convince a jury to convict Peebles, who has taught at the school
since September 2001.
"The best course is to let the school district handle the matter,
which they wanted to do anyway," said Mark MacNamara, a
spokesman for the district attorney's office.
MacNamara said authorities believe Peebles handled himself
inappropriately as a teacher, but such a determination and any
subsequent action must come from school officials.
Peebles has been on paid administrative leave pending the
conclusion of a school district investigation into the incident.
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"This case has been a travesty of justice from the very beginning.
All he did was document what he saw," said Peebles' attorney,
Jeff Adachi, referring to his client's videotaping of the event.
Peebles began filming when he saw police hitting students with
batons, Adachi said. He was teaching when the fight began.
The camera was confiscated by police.
"His only intention was to record what was happening, and he's
been put out there like he's some activist teacher. He's not. He's a
peace-loving man who wants to teach," said Adachi, who is chief
public defender-elect.
Police said Peebles repeatedly told students not to disperse and
pushed an officer who tried to make him stop.
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Four juveniles arrested after the incident face Juvenile Court
hearings next week, MacNamara said.
Memo: E-mail Wyatt Buchanan at wbuchanan@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: Anthony Peebles; Thurgood Marshall High School;
BRAWLS & RIOTS; SF; TEACHERS
Dateline: San Francisco
Record: 3268293
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D.A. drops charges in teen brawl - Other solution sought to fight at S.F. school
San Francisco Chronicle (CA) (Published as THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE) - February
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Criminal charges have been dropped against four students
arrested when a hallway brawl spiraled out of control at San
Francisco's Thurgood Marshall High School last year.
Community pressure and lack of police support helped persuade
the district attorney's office to drop the charges -- most of them
misdemeanors -- against the four teens in Juvenile Court
Wednesday.
The fight broke outside the Bayview district school's
administration office Oct. 11, attracting a crowd of students and
prompting a police officer at the campus to call for backup. More
than 60 police officers, some of clad in riot gear, responded to the
disturbance.
Community activists and some politicians decried the police
response to the incident, and there are still two continuing
investigations into that response.
Assistant District Attorney Walter Aldridge said he was ready to
prosecute the case but asked for a meeting with top police
officials to discuss their concerns prior to Wednesday's hearing.
Aldridge met with Deputy Chief David Robinson and others for
about half an hour prior to the hearing and said he was told that
Police Chief Earl Sanders wanted to see the charges dismissed to
promote community healing.

361

"After discussing the thing with them for about half an hour, I
made a decision that I could live with (dropping the charges),"
Aldridge said. "There was no pressure. The ultimate decision is
on me."
Sanders announced the district attorney's decision at Wednesday
night's meeting of the city Police Commission, saying the youths
would have mentors in the department, including Robinson. He
called it "a unique experiment," adding,
"We're praying this one works."
Commissioner Sidney Chan questioned the deal, saying other
people could seek arrangements in similar situations under the
guise of community healing. "The floodgate can be opened wide,"
he said.
But the commissioners appeared satisfied after the chief's
explanation that the effort should be given a chance to work.
A prominent African American community leader who met with the
Police Department numerous times on behalf of the youths and
their families said Wednesday that department brass and school
district officials wanted to see the charges dismissed against the
youths from the very beginning.
"There were mistakes made that everyone recognized," said Jim
Queen, a member of the African American Police Community
Relations Board, an advisory panel formed more than two years
ago to improve community relations with the Police Department.
"The kids should not be prosecuted because the grown-ups did
not have their act together."
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School District Superintendent Arlene Ackerman said in a
statement that she was pleased with the charges being dropped,
saying, "It was my goal following the Thurgood Marshall incident
that the students . . . should be given a clean slate to move on
with their futures."
School district staff also presented Wednesday a summary of
findings about the incident pulled together by a special community
task force for a joint committee of school board commissioners
and members of the Board of Supervisors.
The Thurgood Marshall Academic High School Community Task
Force found an array of problems in how the school's staff
handled the initial fight and criticized the police response to the
incident.
The task force report condemned school and school district staff
for communication failures and lack of a coordinated response
plan that also led to communication failures with the responding
police officers.
The task force members recommended that the school develop a
school safety plan, which has been done, and advised the district
to create a committee to evaluate the role of police officers
assigned to schools and a protocol for police responses to
incidents at schools. Supervisor Tom Ammiano, chair of the joint
committee, has asked for a hearing about the relationship
between the district and the Police Department.

•

The task force report will be discussed in detail at a special school
board meeting to be held Tuesday night at Thurgood Marshall.
Memo: Staff writer Jaxon Vanderbeken contributed to this report.
/ E-mail Ray Delgado at rdelgado@sfchronicle.com.
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Marshall parents ready to move on after brawl
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The auditorium at Thurgood Marshall Academic High
School was filled to the gills with people who came out for a
special Board of Education meeting last week, but the vast
majority of them weren't there to discuss last year's melee at the
school.
Instead, most of the parents, students and teachers who attended
the meeting pleaded with the board to spare school music
programs and teachers in the face of pending budget cuts.
The district has yet to learn the precise amount of funds it will lose
from the state, but that didn't stop the well-organized coalition of
music education supporters from arguing the need for the popular
school music programs.
The board listened to impassioned pleas for more than an hour
before cutting short public comments so that it could move on to
the item that had them meeting at Thurgood Marshall in the first
place -- the Oct. 11 brawl that brought more than 70 police
officers to the school.
Once the board moved on, however, the auditorium emptied
considerably, to the point where school district staff and board
members outnumbered the handful of people who had come to
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hear the findings of a district-led task force on the incident.
Kim Maufus, the president of the school's Parent Teacher Student
Association, blamed the poor attendance on the school's failure to
send out automated phone messages reminding parents of the
meeting.
Principal Frank Tom apologized for the snafu but told board
members that the school mailed out reminder letters to parents
the week before and sent flyers home with the students.
The PTSA vice president Gloria Edwards disagreed with Maufus'
explanation for the poor attendance, however, telling the board
that parents were ready to move on.
"At some point parents want a healing," Edwards said. "When
(parents) got the letter, their response was 'we don't want to be
here.' "
MAGIC AT LAKESHORE: Lakeshore Elementary School is
hoping a little magic will help fill its coffers tonight.
The school's PTA will hold a special fund-raiser featuring
magician Mike Stroud at the school tonight. The family-friendly
show will feature juggling, acrobatics, comedy and bilingual jokes
in addition to Stroud's regular magic tricks.
Tickets are $10 and the show will begin tonight at 7:30 in the
school's Sharon Guillestegui Community Room. The school is
located at 220 Middlefield Drive at Eucalyptus Street.
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SAN FRANCISCO - Policy violation found in '02 police response
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Correction: A story Friday concerning an Office of Citizen
Complaints' investigation into a melee
at San Francisco's Thurgood Marshall High School did not
accurately describe the nature of the findings. The Office of
Citizen Complaints, the city's police watchdog agency, found
"several policy failures" in the way police responded to the
incident, but it found no violations. The agency's director, Kevin
Allen, said he will recommend new policies for the Police
Department to prevent similar problems from occurring. (06/19/04,
P. A2)
The city's police watchdog agency has found that the Police
Department failed to adhere to its own policies in responding to a
melee at Thurgood Marshall High School in 2002.
The agency, the Office of Citizen Complaints, wrapped up its
investigation in March but did not announce its findings until
Wednesday's Police Commission meeting.
"We did find several policy failures," Office of Citizen Complaints
Director Kevin Allen told commissioners. He would not reveal the
nature of the problems, but more details are expected to emerge
during a Police Commission hearing on the incident scheduled for
July 14.
Police showed up in force to the Bayview District campus on Oct.
11, 2002,
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responding to a backup call from school-based officers who felt a
string of small hallway fights was getting out of hand. About 60
officers from the Police Department and the Sheriff's Department
responded, some in riot gear.
Many students and teachers called the police response heavyhanded. Police officials say the response was appropriate, given
the volatility of the situation.
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Police arrested four students and a teacher, who was accused of
inciting a riot. Charges against all five were later dropped.
Memo: -- -- -- Charlie Goodyear
Index terms: Office of Citizen Complaints; Thurgood
Marshall High School; BRAWLS & RIOTS; POLICE
DEPARTMENTS; SCHOOLS; SF
Record: 3352709
Copyright: Copyright 2004 The Chronicle Publishing Co.
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SAN FRANCISCO - Police crowd-control tactics questioned - Watchdogs issue
report on 2002 melee at Marshall
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San Francisco's civilian police review board questioned
Wednesday night whether the Police Department has adequate
crowd-control policies to deal with melees like the one that
erupted at Thurgood Marshall High School in 2002.
About 60 officers and deputies -- many clad in riot gear from a
training exercise -- showed up in force on the Bayview district
campus on Oct. 11, 2002, responding to a backup call from
school-based officers who thought a string of small hallway fights
was getting out of hand.
Students and teachers say the police presence escalated the
tension and call their response heavy-handed. Police officials say
the response was appropriate, given the volatility of the situation.
Police arrested four students and a teacher, who was accused of
inciting a riot. Charges against all five were later dropped.
In a report issued Wednesday by the Office of Citizen Complaints,
police officers were generally lauded for their "knowledge and
skill" in the use of tactics to control the crowd.
"However, the incident raises questions about the propriety of
using current crowd-control policies and tactics in a high school
setting, particularly in response to a call of a fight with no
weapons," said office investigator Donna Medley.
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Deputy Police Chief Greg Suhr defended the department, saying
while it was unfortunate that some students felt they had had an
unpleasant experience with the police, "I still think these officers
did a good job."
One officer that day nearly two years ago brandished a gun at a
student after the youth removed the officer's baton, Suhr said. "As
bad as it sounds to the people on scene, that is within policy,"
Suhr said.
Suhr said he would research whether the department has
specifically crafted policies dealing with crowds of students on
campuses.
Medley said investigators with her agency had looked into
allegations that officers beat predominantly African American
students. "In investigating these incidents that gave rise to the
perception of racial bias, the OCC was presented with other facts,
perceptions and rationale that disputed the allegation," Medley
said.
In one instance, students saw police take away a youth and
thought they were arresting him when, in fact, they were trying to
get him to paramedics to treat a bleeding forehead.
There was "insufficient evidence to prove or disprove" a number
of other allegations made by students, including claims that
officers used profanity, failed to provide their names and badge
numbers, failed to provide medical assistance and detained
students without justification.
The report noted, however, that "the general level of supervision
of the officers and command staff communications were in
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conformance with department policy and training."
Malaika Parker, director of Bay Area PoliceWatch, said she was
not surprised that the department was absolving itself of blame.
"It's not appropriate for police in riot gear to storm onto campus,"
Parker said. "The 'act now, who cares what people think as long
as we can make it look pretty' is not acceptable."
Another PoliceWatch member, Vanessa Moses, agreed, saying of
the Office of Citizen Complaints' report, "It sounded like a list of
justifications to me. "
Police Commissioner Theresa Sparks questioned why it took 21
months to produce the report. Office director Kevin Allen said that
there were many people to interview and that some students
refused to speak with his investigators or referred them to
statements they had previously made.

•
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Last year, the Thurgood Marshall Academic High
School Community Task Force found an array of problems in
how the school's staff handled the initial fight and criticized the
police response to the incident.
Memo: E-mail Henry K. Lee at hlee@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: Thurgood Marshall Academic High
School Community Task F
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Nearly two years have passed since police responded to a series
of small hallway fights at Thurgood Marshall Academic High
School in the Bayview. And to this day a debate rages over
whether officers acted appropriately.
Some students and teachers say the police were heavy-handed;
officers say they did what was needed to quell what turned into a
near riot.
There may never be agreement on how the Oct. 11, 2002,
situation was handled. But now focus is turning to the future and
whether the Police Department should rethink its crowd-control
tactics in school settings.
The Police Commission will hold a hearing on the Thurgood
Marshall incident at 5:30 p.m. Sept. 22 at City Hall.
--- --- --He's back: Mayor Gavin Newsom's appointment of Dick Sklar to
the Public Utilities Commission's oversight panel brings back one
of the most flamboyant, smart and feisty figures in city
government.
Sklar, once tapped by Bill Clinton to serve as envoy to the
Balkans to oversee the rebuilding of Bosnia, and by Gray Davis to
help the state through the energy crisis, first made his mark in
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San Francisco as head of the city's Public Utilities Commission -and boss of the Municipal Railway -- when Dianne Feinstein was
mayor.
His relationship with Feinstein deteriorated, however. She called
him arrogant, and he suggested the mayor, who went on to
become a U.S. senator, was a political lightweight.
--- --- --Title wave: Sean Elsbernd learned quickly that having the title
"Supervisor" before his name makes his life different. "Now when
I make calls there's a lot quicker action," said the new supe, who
has found the bureaucrats pay more attention when he's on the
other end of the line.
It was less than a month ago that Elsbernd served as a behindthe-scenes legislative liaison for the mayor, and before that toiled
as an aide to former Supervisor Tony Hall. When Hall resigned,
Newsom made Elsbernd the District 7 supervisor.
Another perk of being supervisor: Elsbernd now has his own
parking space in front of City Hall. And, he said, he can call his
new colleagues by their first names. "I no longer have to call them
'supervisor.' "
Plenty of people are gunning to strip Elsbernd of his new title.
He's facing 12 challengers in the District 7 race.
--- --- --Back to school: Last weekend, 1,000 kids from Bayview-Hunters
Point got free backpacks and school supplies as part of an
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outreach program by the public defender's office. More than three
dozen other city agencies and community-based organizations
participated.
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"There was a real need for a collaborative effort that was
neighborhood based, and we wanted to do something positive for
the youth," said Public Defender Jeff Adachi.
Memo: E-mail Rachel Gordon at rgordon@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: POLITICS; SF
Record: 3363768
Copyright: Copyright 2004 The Chronicle Publishing Co.
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SAN FRANCISCO - Students, activists seek apology for '02 near-riot at Marshall
high
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Students, teachers, parents and community activists are
demanding that authorities apologize for an incident at Thurgood
Marshall Academic High School two years ago in which a small
hallway fight erupted into a near-riot after scores of officers
arrived.
A crowd packed the San Francisco Police Commission meeting
Wednesday night to ask for an apology from police. Critics
accused police of engaging in heavy-handed tactics, alleging
officers used unnecessary force, threatened students with guns
and were verbally abusive.
At least 60 and perhaps 100 or more San Francisco police
officers and sheriff's deputies responded to the Bayview school
during the incident on Oct. 11, 2002.
Police officials have insisted that officers acted appropriately.
"I thought that the officers came into a difficult situation ... and the
situation was abated," Deputy Chief Greg Suhr said in an
interview Wednesday. "I believe the officers acted properly."
One person was injured, and that happened before officers
arrived, Suhr said.
Marcela Garcia, who was a senior at the school at the time, tells a
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different story.
"Images like those that happened on Oct. 11 are hard to erase,"
Garcia told the commission. "In my mind, I thought the police
were there to help and not harm. That day, they should have
helped and not harmed."
On that day, police arrested four students and a teacher. Charges
against all five were later dropped.
The Office of Citizen Complaints, the city's independent police
watchdog agency, found in investigating the matter that the Police
Department failed to follow several policies but did not violate
department rules. The agency has made a series of
recommendations, which the commission will consider at a later
date, intended to improve police interaction at the city's schools.
Meanwhile, the Police Department is crafting new protocols that
will detail how officers should respond to specific incidents on
campuses. The department also is working with school officials
and community groups on school safety issues, including violence
prevention programs.
Commissioners urged police to move swiftly in putting new
procedures and policies in place.
"It seems like everything that possibly could go wrong that day
went wrong," Commissioner Gayle Orr-Smith said.
Anthony Peebles, the teacher that police arrested, told the
commission that to this day, he's still affected by what happened.
"That day for me personally just blew (my) idealism out of the
water," he said.
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Peebles, an English teacher angered over the large presence of
law enforcement, videotaped the melee and was arrested by
police for refusing to follow their orders. His tape was shown at
the commission meeting, and his anger at the large police
presence was evident. San Francisco Public Defender Jeff
Adachi, who was in private practice at the time, represented
Peebles. Adachi said the more he looked into what happened at
Marshall, the more he became "convinced that not only was this
incident excessive in terms of police response, but outrageous,
and that racism was involved."
Peebles, like many of the students who complained about the
police activities that day, is African American.
"Great harm was done to the school that day, and to the
community and the kids," said Commissioner Peter Keane,
adding that he's hopeful the department is moving in the right
direction by taking a hard look at how things can be done better.
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Keane made a motion for the Police Commission to offer a formal
apology in the case. His proposal will be taken up at another
meeting.
Memo: E-mail Rachel Gordon at rgordon@sfchronicle.com.
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SAN FRANCISCO - Police officers call for apology by commissioner - Remarks
hinting racism in school response resented
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A San Francisco police commissioner stood before scores of
angry officers Wednesday night, listening to their demands that
he apologize and resign for remarks he made the week before
about police response to a small hallway fight at a public high
school two years ago that erupted into a near- riot.
Commissioner Peter Keane had suggested that racism was a
factor in the large police presence at the Thurgood
Marshall Academic High School incident in the Bayview district
on Oct. 11, 2002, and that the students there were left with
psychological scars similar to those felt by the survivors of the
terrorist massacre at a Russian school last month.
The Police Officers Association jumped on the remarks
immediately and called for Keane to quit, saying he had maligned
the city's police officers. They showed up in force, some in
uniform, some in their street clothes, to the commission's weekly
meeting, held this week in an elementary school in the Mission
District.
"All San Francisco police officers have come here tonight
expecting an apology," said police union president Gary
Delagnes. "Indeed, we demand it."
Even the city's police chief joined in. In a prepared statement,
Chief Heather Fong took Keane to task without identifying him by
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name.
"We welcome constructive criticism from all quarters," Fong said.
"We do not invite or endorse, however, comments that paint the
actions of our officers with a broad brush. Those kinds of
generalities are neither accurate nor are they productive."
In reference to the Russian school incident, Fong said, "Such an
analogy, whatever the motivation, is offensive and without
foundation."
Keane addressed the crowd at the start of the meeting, having
been forewarned that he was at the center of a brewing storm. He
said people had twisted his words from the week before and
taken them out of context.
He said he had never compared the Russian school siege to
the Thurgood Marshall fracas, other than to state how some
students felt in its aftermath. "These kids feeling secure in their
school, in their educational environment, that was taken from
them, so great harm was done to the community and to the
school and to the kids," he said last week in describing the fallout.
More than 60 San Francisco police officers and deputy sheriffs,
some in riot gear, converged on the school at the request of an
officer assigned to the campus after a small hallway fight erupted.
Keane also questioned whether the same thing would have
happened at a school on the west side of the city that didn't have
such a large African American student population. Keane said he
wasn't calling the officers racists.
Instead, he explained Wednesday, that there could have been
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"subtle," even "unconscious" racism that came into play.
"We have to confront it honestly as a factor," he said.
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At the start of the meeting, Keane refused to apologize, but he
had a change of heart after listening to all the testimony and said
he regretted bringing up the Russian school massacre.
Caption: PHOTOPeter Keane criticized police response to a high
school incident in the Bayview two years ago.
Memo: E-mail Rachel Gordon at rgordon@sfchronicle.com.
Index terms: Peter Keane; Thurgood Marshall Academic High
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APPENDIX I
COLEMAN’S REPORT ON POLICE MISCONDUCT AT THURGOOD MARSHALL
ACADEMIC HIGH SCHOOL ON OCTOBER 11, 2002

COLEMAN ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH
A Voice for San Francisco’s Children

Report on Police Misconduct at
Thurgood Marshall Academic High
School on October 11th, 2002

September 22, 2004
NTanya Lee, Director of Youth Policy
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“The police immediately came toward the African Americans and started hitting us
with billy clubs (batons) and handcuffing innocent people who were not even involved
in anything, simply trying to go to their classes. They slammed students up against
lockers, put guns to students heads, and handcuffed innocent people. There were many
people who got hit with batons. I personally got hit with a baton.”
J.R., Student
“It was innocent people that the police hit. I just want to get an education.” – Tiarra,
Student

I. OVERVIEW
This report summarizes eyewitness accounts of the interaction between Thurgood Marshall
students, parents and teachers and the San Francisco Police Department on October 11th,
2002.
The report makes a number of “Findings” and a series of Recommendations, which have been
reviewed by many members of the TMAHS community.
It is our hope that this report contributes to efforts to reveal the truth of the events of that
day, and moves us closer to ensuring “ 10/11 Never Again.”
For information about these findings or recommendations, please contact Ntanya Lee,
Director of Youth Policy, Coleman Advocates, at (415) 239-0161 x21.

II. FINDINGS
FINDING I: OCTOBER 11th BEGAN WITH AN ORDINARY STUDENT
CONFLICT.
A fight between several students took place on campus on the morning of October 11th, 2002.
The primary cause of the fight was a financial dispute between two of the students, one of
whom was African American and the other Asian American.
School staff and two School Resource Officers broke up the fight, and the students were taken
to the main office.
Shortly thereafter, a second fight took place began between a relative (an older cousin) of the
African American student and friends of the Asian American student, in the hallway on the
first floor. While this was a second fight, it was about the original conflict between the two
students.
FINDING II. AGGRESSIVE POLICE ACTION CREATED A SECOND CONFLICT
– BETWEEN AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENTS AND THE POLICE
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At some point during or soon after the first fight, the SRO reportedly called for significant
police backup. As the second fight was being broken up by school site staff and SROs, at least
6 SFPD charged in, handcuffed the cousin and used force against the original African
American student who had left the main office to see what was happening in the hallway. He
was aggressively ‘taken down’ by police – pushed down to the floor with the officer’s knees
on his back, and handcuffed.
A crowd of students (primarily African American) became angry that the police were using
such aggressive tactics against the student. They yelled at the police that “you have the wrong
student!” The police yelled at the students to disperse, but the students refused. The students
reported that while the fight had been between Asian and Black youth (and it was the cousin
who was injured), it was only African Americans who were being manhandled and arrested
and they were attempting to stop a grave injustice. Trained staff or police could have
perceived this and de-escalated the situation. Instead, the police arrested several youth,
handcuffing them in the hallway in front of many other students. Students then became more
distressed seeing their friends who hadn’t been in the fight taken away by the police.
The aggressive police tactics against the African American students greatly escalated an already
tense situation, created a new conflict between police and Black students at the school,
broadening the issue, creating fear, anger and distress among Black students who had nothing
to do with the original fight.
School administrators and police perceived student antagonism and anger as a sign that a ‘riot’
was going to take place, and more police were called to the scene.
FINDING III. THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THURGOOD MARSHALL HIGH
SCHOOL WAS EXCESSIVE – PERHAPS THE LARGEST POLICE RESPONSE TO A
SCHOOL CONFLICT IN US HISTORY.
While we do not have documentation from SFPD as to who made the calls, and what was said
in those calls, it is clear that the response was extremely disproportionate to the situation.
From published reports and statements at public meetings by the San Francisco Police
Department and the Sheriff Department, at least 60 SFPD and 30 Sheriff Deputies arrived at
this small high school on the edges of Bayview Hunters Point, totaling at least 90 law
enforcement officers. 10 were officers in SWAT or “riot” gear, and there were 5 prisoner
transport wagons brought to the scene.
There were dozens of police inside the school, immediately outside the school, and in a
military-style ‘police line’ near Silver Ave, marching in formation towards students. The Riot
squad had full riot gear, including helmets, shields and clubs.
FINDING IV. THE INCIDENT WAS NOT A ‘STUDENT RIOT’.
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From the SFUSD Thurgood Marshall High School Taskforce Final Report:
“It was generally felt that the police presence escalated the situation between a few
students into what the media termed a ‘melee’. Individuals felt that too many police
were on the scene. There were reports that an officer brandished a weapon at a
student, and several students stated that police used physical force (including batons,
hitting, and pushing), profanity or inappropriate language toward students, and
disparate treatment of Black and Asian students.”
In many accounts since October 11th, 2002, this incident has been referred to as a student
‘riot’, implying that students were the primary perpetrators of violence and that they caused
or instigated other students to commit criminal acts – that the police were then called in to
control.
The evidence suggests that the event was more akin to a ‘police riot’ than a student riot. Over
90 police officers arrived in force, used abusive, aggressive and violent tactics against unarmed
youth who were in their own school and who were not committing any crimes. There was no
‘unlawful assembly’ of students, (usually a criteria for a riot). In fact, students were in their
own school, where they are required by law to be. They were not holding a large student
protest or walkout. There was no brawl between dozens of students. There were no guns
found on any student.
The police aggression created fear, panic, distress, and anger. While some students resisted
being hit and abused by the police, the primary instigators of violence that day were members
of the San Francisco Police Department.
“To me this was just a simple problem which could have been resolved before it
escalated like this. Personally, I feel that the police exacerbated the problem by coming
in doing what they did because they caused students to get angry and even more
distraught and they didn’t know how to react to the situation at hand. How would
you feel if you were walking on your way to class and the police came and hit you in
your face with a billie club?” – J.R., student
The SFUSD Taskforce recommended that charges against the arrested students be dropped, in
recognition that students were not the primary actors that day: “Based on our investigation,
the situation escalated due to a failure of procedures that were controlled by the adults at the
school site. The Community Task Force does not want students punished for the failures of
the adults.”
FINDING V. POLICE USED EXCESSIVE FORCE AGAINST UNARMED
STUDENTS & ADULT BYSTANDERS
In first hand accounts to media, SFUSD Taskforce members and other investigators, at least
30 students reported the following:
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•

At least two students report that police threatened them with guns to their heads.

•

Students were hit across the face, chest, back, and other parts of the body by police
batons
Student, JR: “The police immediately came toward the African Americans and started
hitting us with billy clubs (batons) and handcuffing innocent people who were not even
involved in anything, simply trying to go to their classes. They slammed students up
against lockers, put guns to students’ heads, and handcuffed innocent people. There were
many people who got hit with batons. I personally got hit with a baton.”
Student: CH, a 15 yr old, said she was hit on the side of her head by a police baton as she
tried to get out of the way. “As I was getting ready to walk away from the crowd, one of
the police officers struck me in the face.”
Student: “The police were pushing my friend and I blocked her and they started hitting
me.”
Parent: “My son was hit in the chest.” She took her son to the hospital three days after the
incident.
Parent, LW: “My husband found my daughter crying hysterically. She had been hit in the
arm with a police officer’s billy club while trying to go to her next class during passing
period. She was in pain from being hit and also emotionally distraught from seeing her
friends assaulted.”
Parent: “Ronnie Cooper told us his daughter went directly to the hospital from the
school. He said an officer had smacked her wrist with a baton and forced her to the
ground.” (SFBG, 10/23)
Student, Alina: “Seeing a lot of people getting abused by the police really scared all the
students…When the cops were all up on the side walk they attacked a girl...I ran over to
her to see if she was ok. A lot of other girls were trying to help her. Then the cops came
and started hitting everyone. One cop was hitting me twice on my arm.”
Student: A friend was hit in the mouth with a billy club, and their mouth bled.

•

Students were thrown to the ground by police officers.
Teacher: “I saw a female student thrown out of the door by the police face first.”
One boy was pushed to the floor and kicked while on the floor.
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•

Students were verbally abused, and called derogatory slurs, including “bitch” and
“nigger.”
Staff: An officer pushed a female student into Mr. Peebles and shouted “Move, bitch!”
Staff: Police officers were standing around [a student] and yelling/cursing at other
students. At one point an officer shouted to students, “You want to come here? Just try
it!”
Staff: Three police officers called me a nigger as well as other students in the hallway.

•

Several parents/relatives were harassed and hit by police officers when they came to
find and pick up their children.
Staff: A female student was on the ground…later heard she had suffered an asthma
attack…Just then, a man came running toward the student. Before he could reach her,
several police officers knocked him into the bushes. The man was the student’s uncle.”
Parent: Looking for her child…“I was then approached by a line of riot-geared police
officers marching down the hill. I wondered why they were going toward those children
in that manner. None of the children I had just passed represented a threat of any kind to
anyone…I was then stopped in my tracks by a stick being shoved into my abdomen and an
officer rudely telling me to go back the way I came. I calmly explained that that I am a
parent who lived in the area and was there to see my child home safely. He told me I
would not be allowed to do so and had better go back and began shoving harder. At that
moment, a female officer [intercepted]…Had it not been for her, I probably would have
been beaten as well. I definitely felt that I was in danger.”

FINDING VI. AT LEAST 90% OF YOUTH WHO EXPERIENCED VERBAL OR
PHYSICAL ABUSE BY THE POLICE WERE AFRICAN AMERICAN.
Background: Several years ago, the African American community appealed to the San
Francisco Unified School District to create a college-preparatory school that would
specifically respond to the needs of African American Students and specifically students from
Bayview Hunters Point. That school is Thurgood Marshall Academic High School. The
school has represented the hopes and dreams of many in the African American community
for greater academic success and achievement for their children. While Thurgood Marshall
High School is not primarily African American, it has the highest concentration of African
American high school students in the school district, and is located on the edge of the
Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood. It is this context that makes the police targeting of
African American youth on October 11th particularly alarming.
Although the student body of Thurgood Marshall Academic High school is only 30% African
American, witness on the scene on October 11th almost unanimously report that at least 90%
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of students who experienced police abuse were African American. A few Latino and Samoan
students were also hit.
Disproportionate detention and arrest of African American students: Reports indicate that
between 10 and 30 students were detained during the incidents of that day, handcuffed in
front of their peers, taken away in police ‘paddy wagons’ and held at the nearby Bayview
police station. Their parents were not called, and many had to frantically search for their
children for several hours. Ultimately most were sent home. However, 4 students were
arrested and held at juvenile hall. Students report that some were arrested for touching police
officers. Only after months of community outcry, and a recommendation from the SFUSD
Community Task Force, were the charges dropped.
Less than a month previous to this incident, a major student fight took place outside of
Lincoln High School on the West side of town. The fight was between Asian American and
white students, involving almost 50 students with weapons including bats and knives and
student injuries. In this case, less than 6 police officers responded to the scene.
Why were so many police sent to Thurgood Marshall? Why were police tactics so aggressive? Why
were so many African American students criminalized – handcuffed, detained and incarcerated?
Did the SRO on campus perceive that a ‘riot’ was about to take place because of racial
stereotypes? Did the police who responded to the scene assume that the African American
students in the hallways were all gang-affiliated youth with plans to commit great acts of
violence? The facts suggest that there was racial profiling and targeting of African American
students, a clear violation of their civil and human rights.

FINDING VII. AN AFRICAN AMERICAN TEACHER, ANTHONY PEEBLES, WAS
WRONGLY HARRASSED AND ARRESTED.
Anthony Peebles was a teacher at TMAHS on October 11th. After witnessing abusive police
behavior, Mr. Peebles began videotaping the events. He reports that he was specifically
targeted by police, while no white teachers were harassed, prevented from moving around the
building, detained or arrested. He was arrested, and faced disciplinary actions from SFUSD.
Due to community concern and lack of evidence, the charges against him were finally
dropped and he was allowed to return to TMAHS. He now teaches in Oakland.
Statement from Anthony Peebles:
During a passing period at TMAHS, nearly 80 police officers descended on a public
high school in San Francisco's Bay View Hunters Point district. During this attack,

387

numerous students, teachers and parents were injured by the excessive and aggressive
tactics perpetrated by the police. I personally witnessed a gun pulled out at a student,
another female student was thrown out of the office by her hair and her pants by
police chief Puccinelli. Three police officers called me a nigger as well as other students
in the hallway. I was hit by two other officers in the arm and the abdomen. I witnessed
another student being kicked in the stomach in an attempt to restrain him in the main
office, in front of shocked staff members.
In an attempt to calm students down and make them feel more human, I began
rubbing the legs of two of the students who were in hand cuffs on the ground in the
hallway. Immediately an officer grabbed me by the collar of my sweater off of the
ground. At this point I began running up the stairs to the media lab. I grabbed a
camera and ran back down stairs into the police melee.
When I arrived back down stairs, the police had pushed all the students out of the
center of the hallway and into the outside areas at the end of the hall. When I heard
students screaming in the back I began walking toward them, filming police badge
numbers and students testimony of what had taken place. I attempted to walk to the
outside area where students were being held and was forcefully with held from moving
forward by another officer. Meanwhile white teachers were allowed to walk back and
forth through the hallway and the outside area. I attempted to move forward and was
then pushed into the lockers and then grabbed violently out of the way.
I retreated up the stairs and was then arrested by six officers being led by the principal
of the school. I was taken into a paddy wagon full of students and led to the Bayview
district. No one was read any rights and held for three hours. Inside the holding cells,
police officers walked back and forth taunting students with gang terms and jeers of
"big block" and other gang terms. When released I was told not to speak to any police
officers or Press.
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Police Commission should publicly apologize to the students and parents of
Thurgood Marshall High School for the needless harm and trauma caused by the SFPD
on October 11th, 2002 and indicate its commitment to take steps to ensure that this
never happens again.
2. The Police Commission should create a new policy for Police Conduct in Schools. This
policy should shape, and govern, the SFPD’s Memorandum of Understanding with the
SFUSD. The Police Commission should pass a new policy that includes the following
components:
SFUSD’s June 1999 “Safe Schools Resolution” governing police conduct on school
grounds shall also be the policy of the SFPD.
There shall only be very limited circumstances in which police backup is
appropriate on school grounds and when police officers have the sole the authority
to call for such backup. For example, there must be evidence of a clear, immediate,
lethal threat to public safety.
New, limited “use of force” standards and crowd control tactics should be
developed, appropriate for law enforcement interaction with children, in closed
school settings.
Additional, regular training shall be required for all San Francisco Police
Department officers on methods of de-escalating student conflicts and working
with children and youth of color (especially African American, Latino and Pacific
Islander youth).
3. The Office of Citizen Complaints should assign a special, permanent investigator as a
Youth/Schools Investigator. This Investigator should be the primary contact when there are
complaints about police misconduct involving children, and/or police misconduct on school
grounds. This Investigator should be charged with ensuring that every school site has
complaint forms available and that the OCC Complaint process is well known to all members
of the school community.
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APPENDIX J
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF CITIZENS
COMPLAINTS’ BEST PRACTICES REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
POLICE RESPONSE TO A NON-WEAPON FIGHT
INCLUDING CROWD CONTROL TECHNIQUES IN A HIGH SCHOOL
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APPENDIX K
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF CITIZENS
COMPLAINTS’ PROPOSAL FOR A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE POLICY AND
CRITIQUE OF SFPD’S 7.01 GENERAL ORDER JUVENILE POLICY DGO
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APPENDIX L
RESEARCH SUBJECTS’ BILL OF RIGHTS

Research Subjects Bill of Rights
The rights listed below are the right of every individual asked to participate in a research study.
Research subjects can expect:
•

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

To be told the extent to which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained and
of the possibility that specified individuals, internal and external regulatory agencies, or study sponsors
may inspect information in the medical record specifically related to participation in the clinical trial.
To be told of any benefits that may reasonably be expected from the research.
To be told of any reasonably foreseeable discomforts or risks.
To be told of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of treatment that might be of benefit to the
subject.
To be told of the procedures to be followed during the course of participation, especially those that are
experimental in nature.
To be told that they may refuse to participate (participation is voluntary), and that declining to
participate will not compromise access to services and will not result in penalty or loss of benefits to
which the subject is otherwise entitled.
To be told about compensation and medical treatment if research related injury occurs and where
further information may be obtained when participating in research involving more than minimal risk.
To be told whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions about the research, about the research
subjects' rights and whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury to the subject.
To be told of anticipated circumstances under which the investigator without regard to the subject's
consent may terminate the subject's participation.
To be told of any additional costs to the subject that may result from participation in the research.
To be told of the consequences of a subjects' decision to withdraw from the research and procedures for
orderly termination of participation by the subject.
To be told that significant new findings developed during the course of the research that may relate to
the subject's willingness to continue participation will be provided to the subject.
To be told the approximate number of subjects involved in the study.
To be told what the study is trying to find out.
To be told what will happen to me and whether any of the procedures, drugs, or devices are different
from what would be used in standard practice.
To be told about the frequent and/or important risks, side effects, or discomforts of the things that will
happen to me for research purposes.
To be told if I can expect any benefit from participating, and, if so, what the benefit might be.
To be told of the other choices I have and how they may be better or worse than being in the study.
To be allowed to ask any questions concerning the study both before agreeing into be involved and
during the course of the study.
To be told what sort of medical or psychological treatment is available if any complications arise.
To refuse to participate at all or to change my mind about participation after the study is started; if I
were to make such a decision, it will not affect my right to receive the care or privileges I would receive
if I were not in the study.
To receive a copy of the signed and dated consent form.
To be free of pressure when considering whether I wish to agree to be in the study.

If I have other questions, I should ask the researcher or the research assistant. In addition, I may
contact the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS), which is
concerned with protection of volunteers in research projects. I may reach the IRBPHS by electronic
mail at IRBPHS@usfca.edu
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APPENDIX M
INFORMED CONSENT FORM, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Hi In efforts to make sure that I meet all of the IRB guidelines, I wanted to provide you with the
informed consent document. It outlines what my research is about and if you agree to
participate in the case study, I will then contact you to obtain some demographic information
before we begin our discussion.
Please see below all of the information.
______________________________________________________________________________

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Below is a description of the research procedures and an explanation of your rights as a
research participant. You should read this information carefully. If you agree to participate, you
will reply “with an affirmation or yes” to this email to indicate that you have read and understand
the information on this consent form. You are entitled to and will receive a copy of this form.
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Kim-Shree Maufas,
a graduate student in the Department of International and Multicultural Education within the
School of Education at the University of San Francisco. The faculty supervisor for this study is
Dr. Betty Taylor, a professor in the Department of International and Multicultural Education
within the School of Education at the University of San Francisco.
WHAT THE STUDY IS ABOUT:
The purpose of this research study is to explore the experiences of Thurgood Marshall
Academic High School (TMAHS) Community Members, such as students (sophomores in
2002), educators, administrators, other on-site staff, and community members who attended,
worked at, or were a part of the Thurgood Community from just before 2001 and possibly
through 2007. Participants will be asked to think about on the school community, the culture,
the clubs, environment, how people got along together, and overall what it felt like to be at
Thurgood. Additionally, what were some thoughts about have security guards and further a
SFPD Resource Officer Program on campus. More specifically, this study would like the
TMAHS Community participants to share their reflections about the October 11, 2002 Incident.
WHAT WE WILL ASK YOU TO DO:
During this study, the following will happen: You will receive a survey first then the
researcher will set-up a time for you to answer a series of questions that relate to your experience
as a Thurgood Marshall Academic High School (TMAHS) Community Member and your time at
the school. Then specifically, you will be asked some questions relating to the San Francisco
Police Department’s School Resource Officer (SRO) on-campus program at Thurgood. The
time-period that this study focuses on is from Fall 2001 through to Spring 2007 (or until your
graduation from Thurgood if you were a student). In order for the researcher to collect the rich
data from participants, recording devices will be used during the interview. This will aid in the
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transcription process. One year after the conclusion of the study audio recordings will be
destroyed.
DURATION AND LOCATION OF THE STUDY:
Your participation in this study will involve one session that lasts one hour and a possible
follow-up call to clarify responses if needed. The study will take place at the convenience of the
researcher and participant.
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS:
We do not anticipate any risks or discomforts to you from participating in this research. If
you wish, you may choose to withdraw your consent and discontinue your participation at any
time during the study without penalty.
BENEFITS:
Sharing your story with others can be cathartic in that it has the possibility of providing
internal healing for all that were a part of the TMAHS Community. You will receive no other
direct benefit from your participation in this study; however, the possible benefits to others
include solidarity and learning from the techniques employed to advance and maintain in
challenging environments. Your voice will be included in the analysis of how to support other
students and/or school site staff who have similar experiences with law enforcement on their
school campuses as part of the recommendations to K-12 policy decision makers going forward.
PRIVACY/CONFIDENTIALITY:
Any data you provide in this study will be kept confidential unless disclosure is required
by law. In any report we publish, we will not include information that will make it possible to
identify you or any individual participant. Specifically, we will use pseudonyms to differentiate
participant data. No one will have access to participant data outside of the researcher.
COMPENSATION/PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION:
There is no payment or other form of compensation for your participation in this study.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF THE STUDY:
Your participation is voluntary and you may refuse to participate. Furthermore, you may
skip any questions or tasks that make you uncomfortable and may discontinue your participation
at any time. In addition, the researcher has the right to withdraw you from participation in the
study at any time.
OFFER TO ANSWER QUESTIONS:
Please ask any questions you have now or later, you may contact Kim-Shree Maufas. If
you have further questions later, you may also contact the principal investigator, Dr. Betty
Taylor at 415-422-6041 or taylorb@usfca.edu. If you have questions or concerns about your
rights as a participant in this study, you may contact the University of San Francisco Institutional
Review Board at IRBPHS@usfca.edu.
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IRBPHS APPLICATION (AUGUST 2017)
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(4) Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after participation.
If you are requesting a waiver or modification of informed consent (e.g., incomplete disclosure, deception), explain how
your project meets the requirements for waiver or modification of informed consent, as outlined above.
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KimShree Maufas <kmaufas2@dons.usfca.edu>

Expedited Review Approved by Chair  IRB ID: 853
Terence Patterson <noreply@axiommentor.com>
ReplyTo: Terence Patterson <irbphs@usfca.edu>
To: kmaufas2@usfca.edu

Sat, Sep 2, 2017 at 9:51 AM

IRBPHS  Approval Notification

To: KimShree Maufas
From: Terence Patterson, IRB Chair
Subject: Protocol #853
Date: 09/02/2017

The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the
University of San Francisco (USF) has reviewed your request for human subjects approval
regarding your study.

Your research (IRB Protocol #853) with the project title A Case Study of Police Presence
in Schools: The Thurgood Marshall Academic High School 10.11.02 Incident has
been approved by the IRB Chair under the rules for expedited review on 09/02/2017.

Any modifications, adverse reactions or complications must be reported using a
modification application to the IRBPHS within ten (10) working days.

If you have any questions, please contact the IRBPHS via email at IRBPHS@usfca.edu.
Please include the Protocol number assigned to your application in your correspondence.

On behalf of the IRBPHS committee, I wish you much success in your research.
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/?ui=2&ik=0db931889b&jsver=vPUi2w7Prus.en.&view=pt&msg=15e4381442020263&q=irb&qs=true&search=query&siml=15e43…
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Terence Patterson, EdD, ABPP
Professor & Chair, Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects
University of San Francisco
irbphs@usfca.edu
USF IRBPHS Website
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